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Introduction
People with disabilities, especially the impoverished among them,
have long been the object of legal advocacy. Historically, lawyers acting
on behalf of the disabled poor have fashioned litigation strategies to se* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. A.B. 1981, Brown
University; J.D. 1984, Columbia University School of Law. I am grateful to Naomi Cahn,
Mary Coombs, Ellen Barker Grant, Michael Perlin, Rob Rosen, Stephen Schnably, Susan Stefan, and Steven Winter for their comments and support. I also wish to thank David Bodian,
Porsche Shantz, Kathleen Young, and the University of Miami School of Law library staff for
their research assistance, as well as Simeon Herskovits, Anne Spangler, and the editors of the
Hastings Law Journaland the Hastings Women's Law Journalfor sponsoring a conference on

the theoretics of practice. This Article is dedicated to dis/abled widows.
[769]
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cure basic individual rights and to obtain much needed institutional reforms. Spanning both civil and criminal law contexts, these strategies
reveal the ideological and discursive conjunctions linking disability and
poverty.1 Nowhere are such conjunctions more striking than in the prac2
tice of Social Security law.
The Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program 3 and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program 4 of the Social Security Act frame the litigation strategies pursued by lawyers for
the disabled poor. Like the notion of the poor, the concept of the disabled is an artifact of American law and society. 5 An artifact is a social
construct-a thing-consisting of historically specific ideals and discourses. 6 Ideals signify normative images. 7 Discourses inscribe those
1. See Marvin B. Sussman, Dependent DisabledandDependent Poor: Similarity of ConceptualIssues and Research Needs, in SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF DISABILITY
247, 247 (Joseph Stubbins ed., 1977) ("Disability and poverty as phenomena are socially defined and structured.").
2. See ROBERT H. HAVEMAN ET AL., PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD DISABLED WORKERS
53 (1984) ("Social Security is a compromise between an insurance program and an income
redistribution program."); THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD
WELFARE STATE 26-27 (1990) ("The basic purpose is to provide economic security, to prevent
people from falling into destitution rather than rescuing them after they have already fallen.");
id. at 102 ("[S]ocial insurance payments to the disabled and to the survivors of deceased workers eliminate nearly four times as much poverty among the nonaged poor as do means-tested
cash benefits."); Robert M. Ball, The Original Understandingon SocialSecurity: Implications
for Later Developments, in SOCIAL SECURITY: BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS 17, 37
(Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw eds., 1988) ("Poverty among the elderly is concentrated largely on single retired workers and single survivors."). For a comparative analysis of
disability programs, see MARGARET S. GORDON, SOCIAL SECURITY POLICIES IN INDUSTRIAL
COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 111-33 (1988).
3. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
5.

See CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITZ, DISABILITY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT: LEGISLATIVE

ROoTS 1 (1988) (conceptualizing disability as a social construct); see also JOHN GLEIDMAN &
WILLIAM ROTH, THE UNEXPECTED MINORITY:

HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN AMERICA

(1980) (citing handicap as a social construct); SEYMOUR B. SARASON & JOHN DORRIS, EDUCATIONAL HANDICAP, PUBLIC POLICY, AND SOCIAL HISTORY 12-13 (1979) ("When we use
the term mental retardation, we tend to be unaware of the perceptions and attitudes toward the
people we have put in this category as reflections of our culture rather than inherent or objective characteristics of these people."); Malcolm Johnson, Dependency and Interdependency,in
AGEING IN SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL GERONTOLOGY 212 (John Bond & Peter Coleman eds., 1990) [hereinafter AGEING IN SOCIETY] ("Inclusion in the groupings of
dependent people involves a process of social definition.") (emphasis in original); Robert M.
Nelson, The Poverty of Justice: Ethics and the Physically Disabled, in PSYCHOSOCIAL INTERVENTIONS WITH PHYSICALLY DISABLED PERSONS 222, 223-24 (Bruce W. Heller et al. eds.,
1989) ("Handicap is a more obviously social construct, which may include external barriers or
disadvantages imposed by society upon the disabled.") (citations omitted). See generally PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1967)
(exploring the sociology of knowledge).
6. On the genesis of artifacts, see ROBERTO UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECES-
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images in sociolegal roles and relations. 8 Because of its ideological and
discursive character, disability is a thing both imagined in lawyer consciousness and inscribed in lawyer talk. 9
Artifactual construction marks the momentary fusion of legal ideology and discourse, the temporary merger of lawyer consciousness and
talk in daily advocacy. Despite the pretense of agreement, this union is
SITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 2 (1987) [hereinafter

UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY]. Compare Charles Davis, Religion and the Making of Society, 81

Nw. U. L. REv. 718, 719 (1987) (complaining that Unger's artifactual thesis "overlooks the
ambiguity of modernity") with Susan S. Silbey & Austin Sarat, CriticalTraditionsin Law and
Society Research, 21 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 165, 167 (1987) (asserting that "[tihe concepts, texts,
and situations we both live with and observe do not exist outside the very systems of thought
we construct"). See also Robert Bogdan & Douglas Bilden, Handicapism, in ALLEN D. SPIEGEL & SIMON PODAIR, REHABILITATING PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES INTO THE MAINSTREAM OF SOCIETY 15, 15 (1981) (describing "handicapped people [as] ... societally created

rather than [as] ... a natural or objective condition."); S.N. Eisenstadt, Explorationsin the
Sociology of Knowledge: The SoteriologicalAxis in the Constructionof Domains of Knowledge,
in CULTURAL TRADITIONS AND WORLDS OF KNOWLEDGE: EXPLORATIONS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 1-71 (S.N. Eisenstadt & Ilana Friedrich Silber eds., 1988) (exploring the
development of the sociology of knowledge); Joseph A. Kuypers & Ven L. Bengston, Perspectives on the Older Family, in INDEPENDENT AGING 2, 8 (William H. Quinn & George A.
Hughston eds., 1984) ("Behavior is selectively perceived and fitted into already constructed
meanings."); Sussman, supra note 1, at 249 ("Disability, then, is not only a physical fact but
also a social fact.").
7. The public and private representation of normative images of the disabled creates and
gives meaning to the sociolegal order of disability. This order is comprised of institutions
(legislatures, courts, public agencies, and private organizations) and texts (statutes, regulations, rules, and practices). See, e.g., PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE 208-09 (1987)
("Ideology represents-although frequently in an unconscious form-a set of unrealised ideals
as to the nature of collective existence, a prospective agenda predicating and limiting general
attitudes, prescribing and enforcing ways of life or modes of being."); ROBERT WUTHNOW,
COMMUNITIES OF DISCOURSE: IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN THE REFORMATION,
THE ENLIGHTENMENT, AND EUROPEAN SOCIALISM 557 (1989) (describing the mediation of

moral constructs and social experience by symbolic frameworks).
A similar process of representation affects the elderly:
The general tangibility and mimetic quality of such representations [of aging] and the
associated mental pictures we carry around with us clearly have an immediacy and
facticity which make us think that they are real and self-evident, and ignore the fact
that such representations are only able to function within a symbolic order.
Mike Featherstone & Mike Hepworth, Images of Aging, in AGEING IN SOCIETY, supra note 5,
at 250, 252.
8. On the discursive reification of norms, see Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Richard Delgado,
Norms andNormal Science: Toward a Critiqueof Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 933 (1991); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid
SeriousMoralError?,69 TEx. L. REV. 1929 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics
of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991).
9. See RANDALL COLLINS, CONFLICT SOCIOLOGY: TOWARD AN EXPLANATORY SCIENCE 343 (1975) (observing that professional practitioners engage in a form of "ritual realitycreating").
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fractured by conflict endemic to the very process of social construction.
Indeed, the process itself enmeshes competing ideals and discourses in
material practices. The conventions of legal advocacy constitute a discrete form of material practice. Their deployment activates an internal
ideological and discursive contest. The ideal and discourse that survive
this internal contest define the dominant legal vision of disability and the
disabled. 10
The strength of that dominant vision lies in its given quality. Envisioning an artifact as given suggests both natural and necessitarian logics.
Natural logic adverts to the inherent traits of an artifact, finding objective correlates in the material world. Necessitarian logic proffers the
same traits as pliable attributes molded in conformity with changing institutional or systemic visions.
The sociolegal struggle to establish a unitary ideal and discourse of
disability, and to thereby privilege an undisputed vision of the disabled,
embroils administrators, adjudicators, lawyers, and clients in juridical
role conflict. That conflict is not confined to conventional rights controversies under the auspices of the Social Security Act. More broadly cast,
juridical role conflict is associated with the institutional organization of
the state apparatus in administering and adjudicating disability, particularly conflict arising out of the often incompatible role functions of administrators, adjudicators, lawyers, and clients. Those roles implicate
both client-state and client-lawyer relationships. Each relationship
serves as a forum for ideological and discursive conflict."1
The client-state relation is the primary situs of conflict throughout
the administrative and adjudicative stages of the disability determination
process. 12 Although the presence of conflict is constant, the experience of
10. See EDWIN M. SCHUR, LABELING DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 149 (1971) ("Opposing
'forces'-be they pressure groups or subcultures at the collective decision-maling level, actors
and others on the interpersonal level, or 'clients' and control agencies at the organizationalprocessing level-struggle to define situations, types of behavior, specific acts, and the essential
'character' of particular individuals.").
11. See Frances Fox Piven, Women and the State: Ideology, Power, and the Welfare
State, in GENDER AND THE LIFE COURSE 265, 266 (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1985) ("All social
relationships involve elements of social control, and yet there is no possibility for power except
in social relationships.").
12. While the client-state relation may appear fixed, it is in fact the outgrowth of continuing sociolegal struggle. See Joel Rodgers, Traveling Light: State Theory and Sociolegal Research, in STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 287, 290 (1991) ("State institutions are
both the product of previous struggles, and, at any given moment, effectively 'fixed' for actors
as part of their institutional environment."). For theoretical perspectives on the welfare state
under capitalism, see AGE, CLASS, POLITICS, AND THE WELFARE STATE 22-49 (Fred C.
Pampel & John B. Williamson eds., 1989); Linda Gordon, The New Feminist Scholarship on
the Welfare State, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 9-35 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990);
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conflict varies at each stage of the determination process. This variation
may be more or less significant depending upon the precise nature of the
determination. The experience of conflict at the application stage, for
example, may be more pronounced than at the reconsideration stage, but
less so when compared to the hearing stage.
The client-lawyer relation poses a secondary locus of conflict, situated at points of advocacy in the determination process. These points of
advocacy may correspond to the different stages of determination and to
the assorted conventions of practice. Client-lawyer conflict may erupt,
for instance, at the hearing stage regarding the form of direct and crossexamination.
Juridical roles and relationships mediate the interpretation of disability.1 3 Mediation occurs in the contexts of administration, adjudication, and advocacy.14 Here, the roles of administrator, adjudicator, and
advocate filter competing images of disability. Moreover, the relations
dictated by these roles provide an added screen, obscuring the lived reality falsely designated "disability." The mediation process aligns competing interpretations in hierarchical order,1 5 assembling dominantsubordinate groupings of ideals and discourses.1 6 Alignments that elevate ideals and discourses on necessitarian grounds are of limited virtue.
IAN GOUGH, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WELFARE STATE (1979); HAROLD RALPH
MILIBAND, THE STATE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY(1969); JAMES O'CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE (1973); Nicos POULANTZAS, STATE, POWER, SOCIALIsM (1980); DAVID
STOEsz & HOWARD JACOB KARGER, RECONSTRUCTING THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE
3-21, 23-39 (1992); ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, CLASS, CRISIS AND THE STATE (1979).

13.

Cf Paul R. Amato & Philip Pearce, A Cognitively-Based Taxonomy of Helping, in
22, 24 (1983) ("[S]hared
perspectives and similar definitions of social episodes are likely to characterize the cognitive
appraisals of similar groups of people. Such shared perspectives or intersubjectivities can be
seen as the building blocks for the commonality and normative behaviour which takes place in
social episodes.").
14. See SCHUR, supra note 10, at 51 ("[O]rganizational practices, particularly the selection and processing of individuals by formal agencies of control, often reflect common public
stereotypes or more specific organizational ideologies grounded in stereotyped thinking.").
15. See NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS & MORAL EDUCATION 116-17 (1984) (asserting that individuals and institutions may contribute to the diminution of another's ethical ideal).
16. The polarity of hierarchical order cannot be fixed. Discursive and material contest
shifts dominant-subordinate oppositional poles, relocating hierarchy in different forms and
contexts. Compare Jeremy Paul, The Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1779, 1807
(1991) (claiming that the "careful systematization of legal argument often reveals the replication of patterns of opposed arguments occurring across a wide variety of contexts") with
Featherstone & Hepworth, supra note 7, at 252 (arguing that "symbolic polarities are never
final and fixed, but change historically as groups struggle to define and reconstruct images to
suit their own particular purposes and advantages").
MICHAEL SMITHSON ET AL., DIMENSIONS OF HELPING BEHAVIOUR
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Though adept at prosaic description 17 and instrumental explanation,18
necessitarian analysis accommodates only the dominant juridical vision
of a sociolegal artifact. This accommodation excludes opposing visions,
negating alternative sets of ideals and discourses. The upshot of this exclusion is silence, in the instant case the silencing of impoverished people

with disabilities.
In this Article, I analyze the ideals and discourses of both dominant
and subordinate juridical visions of disability. To frame this analysis, I
deploy a theoretical structure extracted from the work of Roberto Unger.19 In a prior writing, I turned to Unger to explicate the ideology of
poverty lawyers. 20 Unger's relevance to the subject of poverty law stems

from his revision of social theory to meet the exigencies of societal cri17. Prosaic description refers to the "concreteness" of historical events, treating the
events as "objective phenomena" rather than as partial images of the world. Anthony V.
Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: LearningLessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE
L.J. 2107, 2138 (1991) [hereinafter Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice].
18. Instrumental explanation manipulates ideals and discourses as a means of obtaining
and ratifying purposeful outcomes. See Guyora Binder, What's Left?, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1985,
2019 (1991).
19. In this instance, I forego Unger's early work to concentrate on his recent three volume treatise. See ROBERTO UNGER, POLrrIcs: A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY
(1987) [hereinafter UNGER, POLITICS] (including SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SrrUATION AND ITS
TASK (1987) [hereinafter UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY], FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 6, and
PLASTICITY INTO POWER: COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL STUDIES ON THE INSTITUTIONAL

CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SuccESs (1987) [hereinafter UNGER, PLASTICITY
INTO POWER]).

For three decades, Unger's work has stirred wide and varied criticism. See, eg., William
P. Alford, The InscrutableOccidental? ImplicationsofRoberto Unger's Uses and Abuses of the
Chinese Past, 64 TEX. L. REV. 915, 916-19 (1986) (assailing Unger's Chinese historiography);
William Ewald, Unger'sPhilosophy: A CriticalLegal Study, 97 YALE L.J. 665, 735-56 (1988)
(dismissing Unger as frivolous); Stanley Fish, Unger and Milton, 1988 DUKE L.J. 975, 9981008 (challenging Unger's claim of contextual contingency and revisability); Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, The "Rights" Stuff. Roberto Unger and Beyond, 62 TEx. L.
REv. 1477, 1478-79, 1513-39 (1984) (revising Unger's conception of the human personality).
In the wake of the multivolume Politics,Unger has been charged with left Kantian extravagance, Bernard Yack, Toward a Free Marketplace of Social Institutions: Roberto Unger's
"Super-Liberal" Theory of Emancipation, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1961, 1971-77 (1988) (book
review); Third World romanticism, Richard Rorty, Unger, Castoriadis,and the Romance of a
National Future, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 335, 339-41 (1988); and eurocentrism and patriarchy,
Cornel West, Between Dewey and Gramsck Unger'sEmancipatoryExperimentalism, 81 Nw.
U. L. REv.941, 941, 950 (1987).
20. See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic
Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659, 663 (1987-88) [hereinafter Alfieri,
The Antinomies of Poverty Law] ("Ideological inquiry seeks to reveal the particular assumptions, expectations, and values concealed in dominant habits of petception and interpretation."). But cf Paul R. Tremblay, A Tragic View of Poverty Law Practice, 1 D.C. L. REv.
(forthcoming 1992, manuscript at 1) (manuscript dated Dec. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Tremblay,
A Tragic View] (questioning transformative theories of poverty law practice).
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sis. 21 Poverty law is a field in crisis, its practice failing to alleviate either
economic impoverishment or sociolegal powerlessness. The adjacent
field of disability law is also in crisis, its overlapping practitioners expounding a vision of the disabled devoid of disabled people's own empowering ideals and discourses. For Unger, such silencing visions urge
an investigation of ideological habits of interpretation.
Having ventured to expose the violent interpretive habits of poverty
lawyers, 22 I return to Unger to undertake a broader inquiry of law and
ideology. 23 Although sparked by my previous investigation of poverty
law, both the form and substance of this inquiry are more expansive,
contemplating the intersection of ideology and discourse in the area of
disability law. 24 This area is daunting in two respects. It encroaches on
21. See ROBERTO UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOcIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY (1976).
22. See Alfieri, ReconstructivePoverty Law Practice,supra note 17, at 2118-30 (describing
the discursive violence of traditional interpretive practices).
23. Cf Carol J. Greenhouse, CourtingDifference: Issues of Interpretation and Comparison in the Study of LegalIdeologies, 22 LAW & Soc'y REv. 687, 687 (1988) (exploring the selffulfilling nature of ideology); Mark Kessler, The InterorganizationalPolitics of Legal Activity,
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 20-27 (exploring the interorganizational environment and
activity of federally funded legal services programs); Elizabeth Mertz, The Uses of History:
Language, Ideology, and Law in the United States and South Africa, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REv.
661, 661 (1988) (comparing legal language and ideology applied in the determination of South
African and United States indigenous peoples' land rights); Neal Milner, The Dilemmas of
Legal Mobilization: Ideologies and Strategies of Mental PatientLiberation Groups, 8 LAW &
POL'Y Q. 105, 105 (1986) (considering the conflicts and tensions between multiple ideologies in
legal and political mobilization).
24. The early literature of disability law suffers from a preoccupation with mental impairments. This historical preoccupation is divulged by reviewing the primary subject matter of
the Mental and Physical Disability Law Reporter. Published in 1976 by the American Bar
Association Commission on the Mentally Disabled, the Reporter concentrated almost exclusively on mental disability until 1984.
For useful discussions of mental disability advocacy in both institutional and communitybased settings, see Samuel Jan Brakel, Legal Aid in Mental Hospitals, 1981 AM. B. FOUND.
REs. J. 21, 78-93 (arguing for increased lawyer fact-finding, mediation, and counseling); Samuel Jan Brakel, Legal Problems of People in Mental and PenalInstitutions: An Exploratory
Study, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 565, 576 (surveying the legal problems and needs of
institutionalized mental patients and prisoners); Samuel Jan Brakel, The Role of the Lawyer in
the Mental Health Field, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 467, 474-75 (proposing a lawyerombudsman model of legal services); Stanley S. Herr, The FutureofAdvocacy for Persons with
MentalDisabilities,39 RUTGERs L. REV. 443, 464-65 (1987) (recommending the collaboration
and coordination of advocacy models); Steven J. Schwartz, DamageActions as a Strategyfor
Enhancing the Quality of Care of Persons with Mental Disabilities,17 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 651 (1989-90) (advocating damage remedies as a means of compensation and systemic reform); Robert Henley Woody, Public Policy and Legal Aid in Mental Hospitals: The
Dimensionsof the Problem and TheirImplicationsfor Legal Educationand Practice,1982 AM.
B. FOUND. REs. J. 237, 242 (endorsing mental health and human behavior training for law
students and lawyers); Robert Henley Woody, The Lawyer in the MentalHealth Field: Beyond
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the territories of both civil and criminal law. And it encompasses the
public and private bar. These tendencies are considered only tangentially
here, laying the groundwork for later inquiry. My main purpose is to

show not only how disability ideals and discourses interlock to create a
dominant vision, but also how they may be transformed and the vision
upreared from below. 25 To begin this transformative project, I address
26
the subject of disabled widows.
The Article consists of four parts. Part I introduces Unger's critical
framework, pointing out the basic elements of his analysis. Applying
that analysis, I identify a dominant and subordinate set of disability ideals. 27 Dominant ideals of disabled widows are infused by normative
images of benevolence and discipline. Subordinate ideals are imbued
with normative images of autonomy and community.
Part II assesses the dominant ideals of benevolence and discipline in
the institutional context of disability administration and adjudication.2 3
This assessment reveals the systemic interconnection of ideals and disBrakel, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 211, 214, 216 (encouraging the interchange of legal and
mental health disciplines).
The preoccupation with mental impairments has diminished with the enactment of federal
remedial statutes. Examples of such statutory development include the Rehabilitation Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988)),
the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103, 84 Stat.
486 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1984)), the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1988)), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990)). See
generally Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Analysis and Implications of a Second-GenerationCivil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413,415 (1991)
(analyzing the approach and content of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act).
25. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Gettingfrom Here to There, 1991 DUKE L.J. 689, 708
(advocating "[a]n anti-imperialistic conception of knowledge-a conception in which 'truth' is
continually being created from the bottom up rather than imposed once and for all from the
top down"); Mar J. Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in
Plowed Up-Ground, 11 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 2 (1988) (asserting the "separate knowledges"
of outsider groups).
26. My decision to limit the scope of the Article to a study of disabled widows is motivated by two factors. First, the enormous breadth and complexity of the disability law system
recommends a narrowly fashioned, incremental approach to the overall subject matter. Second, the treatment of disabled widows illustrates the main themes of an analysis I wish to
enlarge and refine in subsequent works on disability law.
27. In identifying these two competing sets of ideals, I do not posit a strict dichotomy of
meaning. The ideals are too closely intertwined to be reduced to simple polarities. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 209 (associating the characteristics of dependence and independence).
28. Although disability administration and adjudication are distinct tasks, both occur
within the bureaucratic context of the juridical state. Administration occurs at the bureaucratic level of rule promulgation and implementation. Adjudication takes place at the street
level of claim determination.
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courses. Forging this interconnection is the power of normative inscription: the power to imprint normative images on the text of discourse.
Once inscribed, the images are reproduced by discourse. In this sense,
discourse is normatively self-inscribing. The daily reinscription of discourse in the disability determination process regulates the roles and relations of administrators and adjudicators. Here, regulation emulates the
movements of ideology, constraining the ability both to imagine and to
describe disabled people beyond conventionally inscribed stereotypes.
Adding to these constraints is the presupposition of neutrality, also
an earmark of ideology. The cycle of discursive self-inscription obscures
the exercise of power visible at the original moment of normative inscription. As the cycle of discourse repeats, the act of power and the moment
of inscription become increasingly shrouded. The erasure of power from
the surface of discourse sanitizes client-state relations. Hence, the institutional roles of disability administrators and adjudicators, and their relations with disabled clients, appear uncontaminated by power. Citing a
recent widow's disability case history,2 9 I trace the operation of the dominant ideals in regulating the discursive practices of disability administrators and adjudicators at the center and at the margins of widows'
30
disability law.
Part III appraises the dominant ideals of benevolence and discipline
in the context of disability advocacy. The appraisal explores the inscription of ideals into the body of discourse and the reproduction of ideals
through discourse. The dynamics of normative inscription and reproduction charge disability advocacy, actuating its conventions and mobilizing clients to enact roles based on ideal images of the disabled. Client
role enactment and reenactment evolves in response to the advocacy
commands of lawyer conventions. 31 This distorting reciprocity gives rise
29. The case history is based on the litigation in Hill v. Sullivan, 125 F.R.D. 86
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). I served as a member of the Hill litigation team from 1986 until 1990, individually representing the named plaintiff, Marjorie Hill, throughout the administrative review
process and collaborating with co-counsel in representing Mrs. Hill in the district court proceedings. All citations to the record of administrative and judicial proceedings are made with
the permission of Mrs. Hill.
30. This method of investigation is feminist derived. As Cynthia Farina explains:
[Tihe meaning and value of rules and institutions can be discovered only by understanding how they affect the people within them. Feminism typically understands
knowledge as nonfinal-that is, as expanded by increasing perspective and seeking
out voices on the margins. Therefore, ends and means must constantly be reassessed
as new information is acquired.
Farina, supra note 25, at 707 (footnotes omitted).
31.

Cf. ROBERT A. ScoTT, THE MAKING OF BLIND MEN: A STUDY OF ADULT SOCIAL-

IZATION 70-104 (1969) (discussing the agency socialization of blind clients).
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to a victimization strategy of disability advocacy that is invented by lawyers and applied equally in administrative and judicial forums.
Part IV examines the subordinate ideals of autonomy and community. The examination focuses on the discursive practices of client-lawyer relationships, noting the expression of subordinate ideals in the
oppositional narratives of disabled widows. Oppositional narratives are
suppressed forms of discourse enunciated by subordinated people. Because neither state-levied nor lawyer-induced suppression is total, the
narratives are spoken at the margins of dominant disability discourse, yet
they recite ideals and impart images central to an alternative vision of the
disabled. In essence, they are a counter discourse located alongside, beneath, and sometimes within dominant discourse. To transform disability advocacy, I propose the integration of oppositional narratives into
traditional client-lawyer and client-state discourses. My hope is that
such integration will yield an enabling strategy of disability advocacy.
The explicit goal of this strategy is to enable disabled widows to avert the
experience of victimization in advocacy and to construct an alternative
experience inspired by their own ideals, images, and narratives.
1.

Ideals and Discourses

My attempt to illuminate the constitutive ideals and discourses of
widows' disability law is prompted by Unger's theoretical break from
necessitarian styles of sociolegal analysis. Necessitarian styles of analysis
infect both civil and criminal law advocacy, constructing interpretive as
well as remedial strategies. 32 Interpretive strategies redescribe the client's world, investing meaning in acts and omissions, assigning motives
and needs. Remedial strategies designate roles and formulate stories to
satisfy client-imputed goals. Necessitarian analysis 33 constructs the phenomenon of widows' disability in artifactual terms of dependence, 34 in32.

For discerning critiques of necessitarian styles of advocacy, see Clark D. Cunning-

ham, Lawyer as Translator,Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Dis-

course, 77 CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming 1992) (criminal defense); Lucie E. White,
Subordination,RhetoricalSurvival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearingof Mrs G.,

38 BuFF. L. RFv. 1 (1990) (public assistance).
33. See UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 19, at 174-77 (explaining necessitarian
analysis).
34. See ROBERT C. ATCHLEY, SOCIAL FORCES AND AGING 123 (4th ed. 1985) (discussing the perception and treatment of the disabled as dependent); GEORGE HENDERSON & WILLIE V. BRYAN, PSYCHOSOCIAL ASPECTS OF DISABILITY 133-34 (1984) (discussing dependency
as a coping mechanism); HAZEL QURESHI & ALAN WALKER, THE CARING RELATIONSHIP:

ELDERLY PEOPLE AND THEIR FAMILIES 69 (1989) (citing the frequent equation of disability
with physical and psychological dependency); Margaret Clark, Cultural Values and Dependency in Later Life, in AGING AND MODERNIZATION 263, 264-65 (Donald 0. Cowgill & Low-
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competence,3 5 and deviance. 36 Under this analysis, the qualities of
37
dependence, incompetence, and deviance are envisioned as inevitable
aspects of a disabled widow's social life attributable to a single factor or
sequence of factors.38 For disability administrators, adjudicators, and
ell D. Holmes eds., 1972) (describing socioeconomic dependency of the aged in terms of
control over sources of wealth and power).
35. See Constantina Safilios-Rothschild, DisabledPersons'Self-Definitions and TheirImplicationsfor Rehabilitation,in THE SOCIOLOGY OF PHYSICAL DISABILITY AND REHABILITATION 39, 39 (Gary L. Albrecht ed., 1976) ("[T]he disabled person is often considered to be less
intelligent, less able to make the 'right' decisions, less 'realistic,' less logical, and less able to
determine his own life than a nondisabled person."); Sussman, supra note 1, at 234 ("Related
to the organizational power and status of the [rehabilitation] professional is his ability to label
and stereotype his clients with different disabilities on the bases of the clients' incompetence
and to use the label effectively in controlled treatment.").
36. On the interwoven characterization of dependence and deviance, see Johnson, supra
note 5, at 216 ("To carry the label 'dependent' is to carry the burden of being deviant--someone who no longer enjoys a place in the mainstream of society and whose behaviour is 'abnormal.' "). See also ATCHLEY, supra note 34, at 291 ("The handicapped or disabled deviate from
the expectation that 'normal' adults should be of 'sound' body."); TALCOTT PARSONS, PATIENTS, PHYSICIANS, AND ILLNESS 165-87 (1958) (describing illness as a deviation); QURESHI
& WALKER, supra note 34, at 70 (claiming that the link between disability and dependency is
neither "clear-cut" nor "uniform"); SCHUR, supra note 10, at 24 ("Human behavior is deviant
to the extent that it comes to be viewed as involving apersonallydiscreditabledeparture from a
group's normative expectations, and it elicits interpersonal or collective reactions that serve to
'isolate,' 'treat,' 'correct,' or 'punish' individualsengaged in such behavior.") (emphasis in original); Sussman, supra note 1, at 249 ("Disability is thus created and is viewed as a form of
deviance in the sense that the individual is disadvantaged in social terms because of an 'imputation of an undesirable difference.' ").
37. Edward V. Roberts, A History of the Independent Living Movement: A Founder's
Perspective, in PSYCHOSOCIAL INTERVENTIONS wrrH PHYSICALLY DISABLED PERSONS,
supra note 5, at 231, 231 ("Historically, people with disabilities have been seen as physically or
mentally ill, as permanent clients of the 'medical model' of lifetime care.").
38. See MICHAEL SMrrHsON ET AL., supra note 13, at 2, 12 ("Attribution theory is concerned with the attributions people make about the causes of their own and other people's
behaviour."); BEATRICE A. WRIGHT, PHYSICAL DISABILITY-A PSYCHOSOCIAL APPROACH

39 (2d ed. 1983) ("Attribution theory deals with the conditions under which we assign attributes (causes, characteristics, properties) to various entities in our world, such as people, things,
events, and situations."); Nancy Eisenberg et al., The Development of Self-Perceptions, in ALTRUISTIC EMOTION, COGNITION, AND BEHAVIOR 77, 78 (1986) (endorsing findings that "people are inclined to view their own behaviors as being situationally determined, whereas they
attribute others' behaviors to dispositional qualities") (citations omitted); John P. Meyer &
Anne Mulherin, From Attribution to Helping: An Analysis of the Mediating Effects of Affect
and Expectancy, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 201 (1980) (applying Bernard Weiner's attributional model of motivation to the study of helping behavior); Bernard Weiner, A
Cognitive (Attribution)-Emotion-Action Model of Motivated Behavior: An Analysis of Judgments ofHelp-Giving, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 186 (1980) (proposing attributional model based on experiments studying attributional and affective determinants of helping
judgments).
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lawyers, these factors include age, 39 gender, spousal and state depen41
4
dence, nonwage-earner history, and physical or mental impairment.
The authority of necessitarian analysis is bound to the institutional
42
contexts of disability administration, adjudication, and advocacy.

Without this institutional tie, necessitarian analysis carries no force or
legitimacy. Decontextualized, it offers merely another version of instrumentalism. Only when fastened to a juridical institution or agent does
necessitarian analysis acquire the authority to enforce an artifactual vision of the client world. Administrators, adjudicators, and lawyers
adopting that analysis exercise descriptive and explanatory power.43
Their power is role-specific and emerges in the discursive practices regulating the client-state and client-lawyer relationships." Such practices
45
display the stereotyping tendencies of self-reference and self-regulation.
Implicit in these tendencies is the inversion of subject-object relations
and the ensuing loss of the client subject. In necessitarian discourse, the
client-as-subject is displaced by the institutions, agents, and conventions
39. Artifactual ideals shape societal expectations of the elderly.
Minimal expectations of performance and behavior by the family, by society, and
sometimes by elderly people themselves, inhibit their functioning at full capacity.
Inasmuch as people, to a large extent, live up to their own and others' expectations,
low expectations lead to low performance or functioning levels. Further, a disregard
for the importance and of compensation and of adjustment to decreasing functional
capacities stabilizes the problem.
INDEPENDENT AGING, supra note 6, at xii-xiii.
40. See ATCHLEY, supra note 34, at 291 ("[T]he stigma for the disabled more often comes
from their physical appearance.") (emphasis in original); CONSTANTINA SAFILIoS-ROTHSCHILD, THE SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF DISABILITY AND REHABILITATION
123 (1970) ("[The nondisabled] behave as if there were a natural incompatibility between the
presence of a physical disability and 'positive' traits and qualities.") (footnote omitted).
41. Cf Michael S. Sorgen, Labeling and Classification,in THE MENTALLY RETARDED
CITIZEN AND THE LAW 214-44 (Michael Kindred et al. eds., 1976) (citing the stigmatization
accompanying the classification and labeling of persons as mentally retarded).
42. Cf JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 61-141
(1986) (comparing the institutional authority of courts, legislatures, and bureaucracies).
43. This exercise of power may be unconscious. Joseph Kuypers and Vern Bengston
contend that:
[P]ersons do not usually notice that they are selecting or constructing a certain view
of a situation rather than another view. The meaning seems to be in the situation, not
in their hands. They simply 'make sense' of the matter and continue, unaware that
they have done it, that the meaning resides in the person and not inherently in the
external world.
Kuypers & Bengston, supra note 6, at 7 (emphasis in original).
44. See Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Stories We Tell About
Reasonable Women, 77 CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming 1992).
45. Cf SCHUR, supra note 10, at 41 ("[Stereotyping] reflects the needs of participants in
complex interactions to order their expectations so that they can predict the actions of others,
at least to an extent sufficient for coherent organization of their own behavior.").
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of the juridical state. Discursive practices reflect this shift, repeatedly
referring to the imperatives of administration, adjudication, and advocacy. These imperatives instate administrators, adjudicators, and lawyers as subjects, relegating disabled clients to the status of objects.
Continuous reference to the client-as-object exerts a regulating influence
on discourse.4 6 State bureaucratic officials, for example, refer to the constraints of their role in administering and adjudicating disability claims. 47
Lawyers also point to such constraints in fashioning advocacy strategies. 48 This self-regulating discourse reinforces an institutionally based
necessitarian logic.

49

In place of necessitarian logic, Unger employs a contingent style of
analysis. This style of analysis views ideals and discourses as contestable
visions fluctuating within unstable contexts. Under this view, all visions
waver, all contexts change. The cardinal point of contingent analysis is
to locate and dislodge momentarily fixed visions and thereby revise the
contexts that they inform. Contingent and necessitarian styles of analysis are distinguished by their treatment of facts, causation, and sequence.
Contingent analysis50 describes disabled widows tentatively, without necessary inferences of dependence, incompetence, or deviance. Lawyers espousing this analysis treat signs of disabled widows' dependence and
incompetence not as indicia of deviance, 5 1 but as artifactual patterns created by a particular mix of ideals and discourses in a distinct sociolegal
46. See Michael J. Sallnow, Cooperationand Contradiction: The Dialectics of Everday
[sic]Practice, 14 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 241, 254 (1989) ("Since the process of ideological reification amounts to the gradual suppression of the voice of alternative meaning, the
culmination of that process is the silencing of the voice altogether, the metamorphosis of conscious subject into pure object.").
47. See, eg., Note, Own Motion Review of DisabilityBenefit Awards by the Social Security
AdministrationAppeals Council: The Improper Use of an ImportantProcedure, 2 ADMIN. L.J.
141, 151-52 (1988) ("Cases cannot be fairly adjudicated due to the substantial backlog created
by an excessive caseload and the limited amount of resources available.") (footnotes omitted).
See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 27-156 (1980) (analyzing bureaucratic resource and practice constraints).
48. See Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethicfor Legal Services Practice,
37 UCLA L. REv. 1101, 1104-16 (1990) [hereinafter Tremblay, A Community-Based Ethic].
49. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 19, at 193-95 (discussing the qualities and
weaknesses of structural constraints).
50. Unger defines contingency in terms of illusion: "all things or some things might be
otherwise than they are." UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 19, at 173. His discussion is
aided by the idea of historicity in natural science and social theory. Ia at 188-92; cf Adelaide
H. Villmoare, Women, Differences, andRights as Practices: An InterpretiveEssayand a Proposal, 25 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 385, 387-88 (1991) (viewing law as "contingent, plural, multilayered, not exclusively of state institutions or any single or unitary meaning") (citation
omitted).
51. SCHUR, supra note 10, at 8 (viewing deviance as a "continuously shaped and reshaped
outcome of dynamic processes of social interaction") (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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context. 52 These socially constructed patterns are loosely connected to a
number of determinative factors. 53 But no one factor determines the design. Once accumulated, the factors are distributed in varied sequences. 54 There is no single causal sequence, no direct linkages to be
discovered. While the factors at work include considerations of age, 55
gender, spousal and state dependence, nonwage-earner history, and medical impairments, contingent analysis also takes account of the ideals and
discourses articulated within institutional roles and relationships.
By enlarging the range of determinative factors available to understand false patterns of widow dependence, incompetence, and deviance,
contingent styles of analysis challenge the dominant vision of disabled
widows. The key to this alternative method of analysis is the location of
ideological and discursive anomalies or discontinuities in the institutional
contexts of disability administration, adjudication, and advocacy.5 6 Contextual anomalies are moments of contradiction or inconsistency experienced in client-state and client-lawyer roles and relationships. These
discontinuities occur randomly, the causal effects of imperfectly integrated formative structures and formed routines.5 7 A case in point is the
victimization strategy widely utilized by lawyers on behalf of disabled
52. Id at 160 (asserting the created and thus political nature of deviance); Sussman,
supra note 1, at 249 ("Disability is a deviation defined by the nondisabled: it is a social condition imposed upon the individual for real or alleged impairments."). Cf Austin J. Shelton,
Igbo Child-Rearing,Eldership, and Dependence" A Comparison of Two Cultures, in THE DEPENDENCIES OF OLD PEOPLE 97-106 (Richard A. Kalish ed., 1969) (cross-cultural comparison of social dependence); Sarah M. Nelson, Widowhood and Autonomy in the NativeAmerican Southwest, in ON THEIR OWN: WIDOWS AND WIDOWHOOD IN THE AMERICAN
SOUTHwEsT 1848-1939, at 22-41 (Arlene Scadron ed., 1988) (associating the autonomy enjoyed by southwestern Native American women with the decreased level of economic and
social penalties suffered by widows).
53. QURESHI & WALKER, supra note 34, at 70 ("Disability... is a function of social and
environmental factors.") (citation omitted).
54. Hazel Qureshi and Alan Walker observe:
There is, of course, a correlation between disability and dependency but, for any
given degree of disability measured in functional terms, physical dependence on another person for care and tending will vary between individuals according to the
interaction of disability and environment. In fact the degree and impact of both, over
much of their range, is determined to a significant extent by social and environmental
factors.
Id.
55. INDEPENDENT AGING, supra note 6, at xii ("Economic, political, and social structures exist that, by their nature, keep older persons unjustifiably dependent.").
56. I use the terms "anomaly" and "discontinuity" interchangeably throughout the text.
57. The random occurrence of discontinuities may conceal deliberate strategies of resistance. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn: The Story of Josephine V., 4 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 619 (1991) [hereinafter Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn] (street-level resistance);
White, supra note 32 (fair hearing resistance).
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widows who, in a turnabout, articulate powerful oppositional narratives
of independence and competence.
Like any artifactual order, widows' disability law is composed of
formative structures and formed routines. 58 The ideals of benevolence,
discipline, autonomy, and community comprise the formative structures
of widows' disability. These ideals are entrenched in the sociolegal context of the Social Security Act. The original Act spoke in benevolent
terms of alleviating distress, destitution, and dependency.5 9 That purpose was compromised by the congressionally recognized need to instill
the discipline of thrift6° and cost conservation. 6 1 Both ideals, in turn,
were counterposed against the ideals of autonomy and community. The
Act articulated the ideal of autonomy in terms of the economic independence 62 and self-support 63 guaranteed by the right" to cash benefits. 65
58. On formative structures and formed routines, see UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra
note 19, at 4, 195. For criticism, see David E. Van Zandt, Commonsense Reasoning Social
Change and the Law, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 894, 894-97 (1987); Ernest J. Weinrib, Enduring
Passion, 94 YALE L.J. 1825 (1985) (book review); David M. Smolin, Note, Roberto Unger's
Theory of Personality,Law, and Society: Critique and Proposalfor a Revised Methodology, 55
U. CIN. L. REV. 423, 433-34 (1986).
59. See H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935) ("We must relieve the existing
distress and should devise measures to reduce destitution and dependency in the future.").
Subsequent amendments in 1939 reiterated this congressional purpose. See H.R. REP.
No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1939) ("Old-age insurance is designed to prevent future oldage dependency; old-age assistance is designed to relieve existing needs. A contributory system
of old-age insurance keeps the cost of old-age assistance from becoming excessive and assures
support for the aged as an earned right.").
Neither the original Act nor ensuing amendments effected a substantial redistribution of
wealth. For a lucid analysis of the evolution of the "distributive premises" of Social Security
legislation, see William Simon, Rights and Redistributionin the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1431, 1448-66 (1986).
60. See S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935) ("Free pensions, moreover, have
tended to discourage thrift, and, while better than institutional care of old people, clearly have
some undesirable effects.").
61. See H.R. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 119-20 (1939) ("Many of those interested in the problem of social security are of the opinion that the existing system should not be
extended or liberalized until it has been in effect for a longer period. Especially is there need
for study into the ultimate costs involved. Care must be taken that unforeseen future liabilities
of great magnitude are not being placed upon the taxpayers of the country by reason of providing benefits not contemplated by the original law.").
62. H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1935) ("Preservation of health is a
prime necessity for economic independence, sickness being one of the major causes of
dependency.").
63. S.REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1935) ("The Social Security Act... will go
far toward realizing 'the ambition of the individual to obtain for him and his a proper security,
a reasonable leisure, and a decent living throughout life.' "); H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 16 (1935) ("While humanely providing for those in distress, [the Social Security Act]
does not proceed upon the destructive theory that the citizens should look to the Government
for everything. On the contrary, it seeks to reduce dependency and to encourage thrift and
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The ideal of community was expressed more narrowly in terms of family,
67
emphasizing security 66 and support.
The discursive practices of victimization constitute the formed routines of widows' disability. These practices embody ways of speaking.
They talk of disabled widows as victims. To the extent that it is apportioned among administrators, adjudicators, and lawyers, such talk is redundant. The incessant talk of widows as victims is a formed routine of
disability law. The integration of this practice routine into a regularized
strategy lends stability68 to the administration, adjudication, and advocacy of widows' disability.
The formative structures of widows' disability law undermine the
stability of their own formed practice routines. Although entrenched,

the structures retain an internal ideological tension that survives the imposition of hierarchy and the standardization of routine. To Unger, the
self-support."); Ball, supra note 2, at 19 (tracing the origins of social insurance to the tradition
of self-help).
64. S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935) ("desirability of providing old-age
security as a right and not as public charity"); Ball, supra note 2, at 19 ("In insurance, applicants demonstrate something positive-that they have worked sufficiently to be eligible and
thus have an earned right to the payment-then they receive payment based on their past
earnings from funds to which they have contributed."); Robert M. Cover, Social Security and
ConstitutionalEntitlement, in SOCIAL SECURrry: BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS, supra
note 2, at 69, 81 ("[T]he [Social Security] rhetoric of 'payment for' or 'earning of' benefits is
inexact."); Mashaw, Disability Insurance, supra note 89, at 153 ("Political commitment to
social insurance ideals and their programmatic elaboration as a set of individual rights or
entitlements are also important starting points for understanding the disability insurance
scheme.").
65. See S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) ("Monthly cash benefits for disabled widows and disabled dependent widowers"); S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 30
(1935) ("Old-age assistance is confined to payments in cash."); JOEL F. HANDLER & MICHAEL
SOSIN, LAST RESORTS: EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE AND SPECIAL NEEDS PROGRAMS IN PUB-

LIC WELFARE 240 (1983) ("One of the major reforms of the original Social Security Act
passed in 1935 was to insist that public assistance be in cash, to increase client dignity and
control by allowing welfare recipients to make their own household and budgetary choices.").
66. The Senate Report announced:
The principal causes of destitution and want of millions of American families, forcing
them to rely upon public charity for an existence, are well known. They are unemployment, dependency in old age, loss of the wage earner of the family, and illness. . . [The Social Security Act] constitute[s] a broad, practicable plan to
safeguard the security of the American family.
S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935). See also Ball, supra note 2, at 17, 20 ("[Social
Security] has become a base on which practically all families build protection against the loss
of earned income.").
67. S.REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1935) ("We think that children who are able
to do so should continue to support their aged parents and the legislation we are proposing is
framed with this thought in mind.").
68. Cf Kuypers & Bengston, supra note 6, at 7 ("A second feature of constructed meaning is the natural pressure to maintain a stable interpretation.").
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dominant-subordinate arrangements of practice roles and relationships
fail to insulate contexts from the anomalous, and thus disruptive, effects
of that tension. 69 Neither the administrative nor the advocacy contexts
of widows' disability are immune from disruption. This point is essential

to Unger's method of analysis. The most rudimentary features of the
disability determination process-application, reconsideration, hearing,
and appeal-are buffeted by ideological disruption. The basic aspects of
the advocacy process-interviewing, investigation, counseling, and
trial-are likewise unsettled.

The disruptive effects of ideological tension are alternately mitigated
and aggravated by the formed routines of discourse. Discursive routines
mitigate such effects by muting disabled widows' public declarations of

autonomy 70 and community,71 thereby stifling oppositional narratives of
69. Cf Frances Olsen, Feminism and CriticalLegal Theory: An American Perspective, 18
INT'L J.Soc. L. 199, 205-11 (1990) (outlining feminist strategies of ideological disruption).
70. In American culture, autonomy suggests "a radically individualistic concept ofself."
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Concept of the Self in Legal Culture, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV.517,
518 (1990) (emphasis in original); cf ALISON AssrTER, PORNOGRAPHY, FEMINISM AND THE
INDIVIDUAL 47-58 (1989) (defending a relationist notion of autonomy committed to otherdirected values of care and concern); DIANA T. MEYERS, SELF, SOCIETY, AND PERSONAL
CHOICE 135-71 (1989) (discussing autonomy and feminine socialization); Daniel Bar-Tal,
American Study of Helping Behavior,in DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF PROSOCIAL
BEHAVIOR 17 (Ervin Staub et al. eds., 1984) (observing that American individualistic values
de-emphasize "the functionality and importance of interdependent relationships").
For a philosophical defense of autonomy, see RICHARD DOUBLE, THE NON-REALITY OF
FREE WILL 27-61 (1991) (criticizing Frankfurtian conception of second-order volitions); GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 20 (1988) ("[A]utonomy is
conceived of as a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order
preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these
in light of higher-order preferences and values."); SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON
67 (1990) (noting the autonomous agent's ability to act in discordance with reason); Meir DanCohen, Conceptions of Choice and Conceptions of Autonomy, 102 ETHICS 221, 232 (1992)
("The core idea behind the ideal of autonomy is that of the self-governing person, who can
effectuate his will and thus exercise control over his life."); Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the
Will and the Concept of a Person, in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 65-80 (John M. Fischer ed.,
1986) (introducing the concept of "second-order volitions" to describe regulating second-order
desires).
71. Community embodies the values of solidarity and mutual aid. See ROBERT E.
GOODIN, REASONS FOR WELFARE 70-118 (1988); ia at 72 ("[A] social grouping will be said to
constitute a 'community' if and only if it embodies (1) a sense of solidarity and (2) a sense of
significance for all those who are within the group."); see also Ball, supra note 2, at 39 ("The
[Social Security] program is built on traditional values and concepts-self-help, mutual aid,
insurance, and incentives to work and save.") Compare Dov RONEN, THE QUEST FOR SELFDETERMINATION 56 (1979) ("Conscious aggregations are formed when an aspired-to point of
reference prompts activation of an identity or identities that emphasize the distinction between
'us' and 'them,' the obstacles to 'our' aspirations.") with Steven L. Winter, Contingency and
Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 1001 (1991) ("[C]ommunity is
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independence, 72 competence, 73 vulnerability, 74 and solidarity. 75 At the

same time, discursive routines aggravate the effects of ideological contest
by publicly confronting disabled widows with institutionally enforced
constructions of dependence, incompetence, and deviance. 76 This conlocated in and reproduced by a self that cannot be abstracted from its social context nor understood apart from it.").
72. See CAROLYN L. VASH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISABILITY 39 (1981) (defining independence to mean "freedom of decision making and the power of self-determination"); Charles
P. Sabatino & Vicki Gottlich, Seeking Self-Determination in the PatientSelf-Determination
Act, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE

REV.

639 (1991)

(considering possibilities of client self-

determination).
73.

See INDEPENDENT LIVING FOR PHYSICALLY DISABLED PEOPLE (Nancy M. Crewe

& Irving K. Zola eds., 1983); see also HERBERT H. HYMAN, OF TIME AND WIDOWHOOD 67
(1983) (finding no consistent evidence that widowhood damages personal competence in
achieving goals); Kuypers & Bengston, supra note 6, at 14 ("Feelings of personal power, of the
ability to influence one's environment, and of self-determination are characteristics of the competent person."); Irving Kenneth Zola, Developing New Self-Images and Interdependence, in
INDEPENDENT LIVING FOR PHYSICALLY DISABLED PEOPLE, supra, at 55 (recognizing that

disabled people "could have the expertise to help both themselves and others.").
74.

See HELENA ZNANIECKA LOPATA & HENRY BREHM, WIDOWS AND DEPENDENT

WIVES 25-209 (1986); DOROTHY C. MILLER, WOMEN AND SOCIAL WELFARE: A FEMINIST
ANALYSIS 115-34 (1990); see also RAE ANDRE, HOMEMAKERS 13 (1981) ("[A] physically or
psychologically disabled homemaker receives no federal support. She becomes dependent on
her husband or family."); HAVEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 25 ("[Disabled workers] are
concentrated in low-status occupations and are probably subject to some labor market discrimination, which depresses their earnings below those expected from their disability alone.");
Arlene Scadron, Conclusion, in ON THEIR OWN: WIDOWS AND WIDOWHOOD IN THE AMER-

ICAN SOUTHWEST 1848-1939, supra note 52, at 301, 304 ("Many [poor and middle-class widows] had to piece together several 'jobs'-serving as domestics and cooks, taldng in laundry,
sewing, and boarders, and running hotels and restaurants."); Ball, supra note 2, at 39
("[A]mong our most economically vulnerable groups are the retired aged, widows, orphans,
and the totally disabled. . . ."); Kuypers & Bengston, supra note 6, at 18 (finding that widow-

hood may increase vulnerability). Cf Robert L. Rubinstein, Women as Widows on Malo
(Natamambo), Vanuatu (South Pacific), in WIDOWS: THE MIDDLE EAST, ASIA, AND THE
PACIFIC 24, 39 (Helena Znaniecka Lopata ed., 1987) ("Widowhood creates vulnerabilities in
ties that eventually must be reproduced.").
75. See David Knoke, Networks ofPoliticalAction: Toward Theory Construction, 68 Soc.
FORCES 1041 (1990); Nicholas Gonzblez Yuen, Alienation or Empowerment? Law andStrategiesfor Social Change, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 551, 557-58 (1989) (emphasizing the importance of solidarity to the disabled in reducing social isolation); see also S. REP. No. 28, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1991) ("Many of th[e disabled individuals] denied, rightly or wrongly,
simply accept the decision and seek the assistance of family and friends."); NODDINGS, supra
note 15, at 40 (noting that "women often define themselves as both persons and moral agents
in terms of their capacity to care"); Piven, supra note 11, at 283 ("[Ploor women who depend
on welfare-state programs ... are not, as is often thought, simply atomized and, therefore,
helpless people. Rather, the structure of the welfare state itself has helped to create new solidarities and has also generated the political issues that cement and galvanize these
solidarities.").
76. See STEPHEN MURGATROYD, COUNSELLING AND HELPING 31-32 (1985) (defining
"confrontation" as a powerful means of illuminating the extent and nature of the discrepancy
between ideals and the world).
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frontation provides an opening for the assertion of oppositional narratives. 77 The opening emerges from the explicit unveiling of victimization.
The vividness of that disclosure provokes opposition.
Mitigating discursive routines-the institutional ways of speaking
that inhibit disabled widows from invoking experiences of autonomy and
community-falter when they are unable to compensate for or suppress
the disruptive effects of ideological clashes. 78 This inability marks the
deficiencies of structure- and context-preserving practices. These practices are grounded in the structure of ideals and the context of roles and
relationships. The victimization strategy evinced in widows' disability
advocacy illustrates the imperfections of such practices. Despite the authority of formative ideals and the sanction of formed routines, the practice of victimization fails to negate competing normative claims of
autonomy and community, or to silence accompanying oppositional narratives. Given the contestability of ideals and the revisability of contexts,
full negation or silencing is implausible.
The accumulation of uncompensated or unsuppressed oppositional
norms and narratives furnishes an alternative set of discursive practices. 79 Contingent analysis supplies a method of implementing these
practices that is both context-bound and context-revising.80 It is bound
by the content of formative structures and the organization of formed
routines. Yet, contingent analysis is also revisionist in that it divulges
ideals and practices capable of reconstructing the structures and routines
that dominate contexts. This dual tendency is well tailored to advocacy,
offering the ability to preserve as well as extend entitlement rights.
77. Although oppositional narratives defy traditional verification, they are validated in
everyday acts of widow independence, competence, vulnerability, and solidarity.
In searching for an alternative basis for objectivity, Unger asserts that the mind holds the
"capacity to discover truth-to reason in new ways or to have incongruous perceptions." UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 19, at 81. Accordingly, he claims the mind "can achieve
insights that it may not be able to verify, validate, or even make sense of within the established
criteria of validity, verification, or sense." Id
78. On the forms of opposition in discursive practice, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 149-56 (1972); but see Bryan S. Turner, The Rationalization of
the Body: Reflections on Modernity andDiscipline, in MAX WEBER, RATIONAL=TY AND MODERNIrY 222, 235 (Scott Lash & Sam Whimster eds., 1987) ("Foucault has not provided an
adequate explanation of how there are ruptures in dominant modes of discourse.").
79. See, eg., Piven, supra note 11, at 279 ("mhe institutional arrangements that achieve
social control are never entirely secure, for people discover new resources and evolve new
ideas, and sometimes these resources and ideas are generated by the very arrangements that,
for a time, seemed to ensure their acquiescence.").
80. For reference to these concurrent tendencies, see UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra
note 19, at 200.
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The indeterminate results of a contingent style of analysis impede
the transition from critique to politics.81 Unger seeks to escape this
postmodern dilemma8 2 through visionary argument, appealing to utopian notions of faith, transcendence, and redemption. 3 Such an appeal
would be inappropriate for a critique of this Article's narrow scope.
While Unger's emancipatory vision influences this project, my critique
offers only internal, deviationist reforms.8 4 This modest offering rests on
the judgment that lawyers must maintain their commitment to advocacy,
and yet also deviate from the ideological and discursive conventions restricting its practice. Deviation requires the deconstruction and reconstruction of the interior structure and context of such conventions, an
undertaking Unger declines. Nonetheless, adhering to his essential
framework, I look first to the formative ideals of disability law: benevolence and discipline.
81. See John Dunn, Unger'sPoliticsand the Appraisalof PoliticalPossibility, 81 Nw. U.
L. REV.732, 750 (1987) (noting the "epistemic opacity" of political action); Allan C. Hutchinson, Inessentially Speaking (Is There PoliticsAfter Postmodernism?), 89 MICH. L. REv. 1549,
1561 (1991) (book review) ("The postmodern imperative entails no necessary program of political action.").
82. For observations on this postmodern dilemma, see James Boyle, Modernist Social
Theory: Roberto Unger's Passion, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1066, 1081-83 (1985) (book review);
Drucilla Cornell, Toward A Modern/PostmodernReconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REv.
291 (1985); Neil Duxbury, Post-Modern Jurisprudence and its Discontents, 11 OxFoRD J.
LEGAL STUD. 589 (1991); Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Musi4 and Other Performing
Arts, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1597, 1627-53 (1991) (book review); David Luban, Legal Modernism,
84 MICH. L. REv. 1656 (1986); William H. Simon, Social Theory and PoliticalPractice: Unger's BrazilianJournalism, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 832, 866-68 (1987); Kate Soper, Postmodernism
and Its Discontents, 39 FEMINIST REV. 97, 101-02 (1991).
83. See UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 19, at 200-15. Compare Charles Davis,
Religion and the Making of Society, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 718, 720-25 (1987) (debating the
compatibility of modernity and religion) with Gerard F. Powers, CriticalLegal Bishops: Roberto Unger, the CatholicBishops andDistributiveJustice,2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
PoL'Y 201, 203 (1985) (identifying convergences in Unger's jurisprudence and American Catholic theories of rights and distributive justice).
84. For a discussion of "deviationist doctrine," see Roberto Unger, The CriticalLegal
Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561, 576-83 (1983). Cf Bernice L. Neugarten, Interpretive SocialScience andResearch on Aging in GENDER AND THE LIFE COURSE, supra note 11,
at 291, 292 ("The goal is not to discover universals, not to make predictions that will hold
good over time, and certainly not to control; but, instead, to explicate contexts and thereby to
achieve new insights and new understandings.").
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Benevolence describes the shared paternalism 8 5 of the lawyer8 6 and
towards the artifactually dependent and incompetent disabled
88
widow. Discipline8 9 characterizes the joint lawyer9 and state 9' devalustate8 7

85. For helpful discussions of paternalism, see DWORIN, supra note 70, at 121-29. See
also id at 124 ("One useful heuristic to guide our judgments about the justifiability of [paternalistic] intervention is to ask under what conditions does [sic] A's attempts to substitute his or
her judgment for B's constitute treating B as less than a moral equal."); DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION 12, 22 (1986) ("[A] paternalistic act is one in

which one person, A, interferes with another person, S, in order to promote S's own good.").
By definition, paternalistic intervention implies coercion. See, e.g., TIMO AIRAKSINEN,
ETHICS OF COERCION AND AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL LIFE 91

(1988) ("[Tlhe crucial factor in the definition of coercion is its cruel structure: the victim is
facing two bad alternatives, among which he cannot refuse to choose."); Virginia Held, Coercion and Coercive Offers, in COERCION 49, 50-51 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1972) ("Coercion is the activity of causing someone to do something against his will, or of
bringing about his doing what he does against his will.").
86. For denaturalized versions of benevolence, see William H. Simon, EthicalDiscretion
in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1083 (1988) and Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34
UCLA L. REv. 717, 721 (1987).
87.

See MORRIS JANowrrz, SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE WELFARE STATE 77 (1976)

("[W]elfare transfers and allocations have their specific normative definitions."). CompareJerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward A Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 78 ("Eventually, the law evolved into a paternalistic system that
treated blacks as lesser beings whom white masters and overseers needed to protect from their
own ignorant, sloven, and evil nature.") with R.F. Khan, Mental Retardationand Paternalistic
Control, in MORAL ISSUES IN MENTAL RETARDATION 57 (Ronald S. Laura & Adrian F.

Ashman eds., 1985) (objecting to paternalistic controls over the "mildly retarded").
88. Recent amendments to the Act recapitulate the ideal of benevolence. The 1967 Senate Report, for example, stated:
The committee's bill modifies the provision of the House bill which would provide
social security benefits for certain totally disabled widows (including surviving divorced wives) and totally disabled dependent widowers. (Present law does not provide social security benefits for widows and widowers on the basis of disability.) The
committee believes that there is a need to provide monthly benefits for the severely
disabled widow and dependent widower who are unable to support themselves by
working.
S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1967). Similarly, the House Ways and Means
Committee commented:
I]here is a need to provide monthly benefits for the severely disabled widow in her
fifties who cannot qualify for widow's or mother's benefits under present law. The
widows and widowers for whom benefits would be provided are unable to support
themselves by working.
H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1967); see also Nelson, supra note 5, at 227 ("The
welfare of the disabled depends on the virtue of benevolence within the community based on a
sense of common vulnerability and neediness.").
89. Discipline may take both discursive and material forms. For an exposition of discursive and material forms of discipline, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT:
THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 135-228 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979).
See also HENRY J. AARON, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 53-66 (1982) (analyzing the effects of social security on the labor supply); EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, DISABLED

POLICY 44 (1987) ("The higher the unemployment rate, the more people who would regard
themselves as disabled.");
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ation of the artifactually deviant 92 disabled widow. Both benevolence
WESTERN WELFARE STATE: A WEBERIAN PERSPECTIVE 156 (1981) ("[IThe limiting factor
in welfare state redistributions is that point at which initiative and enterprise are discouraged
with resulting loss in productivity."); HAVEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 91 ("A combination
of benefit level and allowed earnings must be found sufficient to satisfy the income needs of
recipients, but not cause a large reduction in work effort and program costs."); id at 97 (finding "consistent evidence of a statistically significant effect of disability benefits on the workstatus choice [of older workers]"); SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, No LONGER DISABLED: THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 1 (1988) ("[A]s
more beneficiaries were incorporated into the program and monetary awards were increased,
concern for costs and increasing worker dependency arose and the support for the steadily
expanding disability program began to erode."); KErrH C. PHEBY, INTERVENTIONS: DISPLACING THE METAPHYSICAL SUBJECT 85 (1988) ("[T]he notion of discipline also incorpo-

rates training and behavioral modification."); FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A.
CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 123-80 (1971)
(discussing enforcement of low wage work); GRAHAM ROOM, THE SOCIOLOGY OF WELFARE
9-40, 146-95 (1979) (comparing Marxist and liberal views of market discipline); Jerry L.
Mashaw, DisabilityInsurancein an Age of Retrenchment: The PoliticsofImplementing Rights,
in SOCIAL SECURITY: BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS, supra note 2, at 151, 154 [hereinafter Mashaw, Disability Insurance] (early program opposition fueled by the ideological "commitment to maintaining work incentives in a market economy"); Robert Morris, Re-Thinking
Welfare in the United States: The Welfare State in Transition,in MODERN WELFARE STATES:
A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 83, 105 (Robert R. Friedmann et al.
eds., 1987) (documenting continuing "[e]fforts to return all dependents to work status...
despite the condition of the labour market"); Amy S. Wharton, Labor Segmentation and GenderDivisions, in THE MARX-WEBER DEBATE 121, 137 (Norbert Wiley ed., 1987) ("Sharp and
persistent differences in labor market outcomes and opportunities have become a permanent
feature of the U.S. (and international) economy, affecting not only workers' life chances but
their politics and consciousness as well."); cf Jeffrey S. Lehman, To Conceptualize, To Criticize, To Defend, To Improve: UnderstandingAmerica's Welfare State, 101 YALE L.J. 685, 694
n.31 (1991) (book review) ("[I]n the United States, any simple link between social insurance
and 'work' is mediated by a more complicated conception of family rights and obligations.").
90. Cf Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 17, at 2118-30
("[D]iscipline occurs when the lawyer consistently excludes from his account of client story
the normative meanings embedded in client narratives."); Roberts, supra note 37, at 232
("Though served by the medical profession, people with disabilities are also devalued by it.").
91. Cf David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: EducationalRights
and the Construction ofDifference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 180-87 (discussing cultural meanings
of "handicap"); Ermanno Gallo & Vincenzo Ruggiero, The 'Immaterial'Prison:Custody as a
Factoryfor the Manufacture of Handicaps, 19 INT'L J. SOC. L. 273, 287 (1991) (asserting decommunication as a prison-produced psycho-physical handicap).
92. The historical image of a disability claimant is that of a married, heterosexual, wageearning white male. The disabled widow deviates radically from this normal image. Indeed,
her attributes are "discrediting." ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA 3 (1963) (using the term stigma
"to refer to an attribute that is deeply discrediting"); Deborah Kent, Disabled Women: Portraits in Fiction and Drama, in IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 47-63 (Alan
Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987) (surveying the negative stereotypes of disabled women in literature). She is unmarried, Kimberh6 Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex 4 Black Feminist CritiqueofAntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 165 n.72 ("units other than the norm are
treated as aberrant and unworthy of societal accommodation."); Martha L. Fineman, Images
of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274, 291 ("Single motherhood, therefore,
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and discipline rely on discursive practices of victimization. 93 Discipline
represents the stronger version of victimization, benevolence the weaker.
The ideals of benevolence and discipline form the discursive practices of widows' disability administration, adjudication, and advocacy.
These formed routines define the roles of disability administrators, adjudicators, lawyers, and clients. Furthermore, they organize the conduct
of client-state and client-lawyer relationships. 94 Ideals that depict disabled widows as dependent, incompetent, or deviant are structure-precould be considered deviant and threatening simply because it is a rejection of the primacy of
the sexual connection as the core organizing familial concept and the privacy basis for social
organization."), asexual, PHILOMENE GATES, SUDDENLY ALONE: A WOMAN'S GUIDE TO
WIDOWHOOD (1990); RUTH JEAN LOEwINSOHN, SURVIVAL HANDBOOK FOR WIDOWS

(1979), nonwage-earning, Jasoon Koo, Widows in Seoul, Korea, in WIDOWS: THE MIDDLE
EAST, ASIA, AND THE PACIFIC, supra note 74, at 56, 78 (discussing the "traditional [Korean
family] norm of restricting women to their domestic functions"); Sylvia A. Law, Women,
Work, Welfare, and the Preservationof Patriarchy,131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249, 1318 (1983) ("At
the same time that federal welfare and labor policy denies the value of women as wageworkers,
it also denies the value of the homemaking and childcare work that women have traditionally
done."); Lehman, supra note 89, at 693 n.30 ("[I]n American society, raising others' children
for pay is 'work,' but raising one's own children does not qualify as 'work.' "); Louise A. Tilly,
Family, Gender, and Occupation in IndustrialFrance: Past andPresent,in GENDER AND THE
LIFE COURSE, supra note 11, at 193, 194 (contending that the movement of production out of
the household in early industrial France made possible a development, elaboration, and generalization of a segregated housewife occupation in the household), female, EDWIN M. SCHUR,
LABELING WOMEN DEVIANT, 22-48, 51-132 (1983) (describing the categorical devaluation of
femaleness imposed through gender norms), and in this case, black. See Safflios-Rothschild,
supra note 35, at 39 (citing the "popular notion that disability, physical or mental (as well as
old age, poverty, the female gender, or blackness of skin color), entails biological inferiority").
Hence, she is not only deviant, but devalued. Cf VASH, supra note 72, at xvii (describing the
experience of devaluation as "being regarded as a lesser being, inferior, not very capable, not
very useful, possibly burdensome, unaesthetic, and, generally, one down"); Margaret Thornton, Feminism and the Contradictionsof Law Reform, 19 INT'L J. Soc. L. 453, 455 (1991)
("The public world of men is perceived to be a qualitatively superior world to that of the
private world of women: culture always trumps nature.").
93. See, e.g., Jack Katz, Caste, Class, and Counselfor the Poor, 1985 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 251, 254-59 (describing the rhetoric of moral and primordial social construction associated with the poor); Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEo. L.J. 1499, 1502-08 (1990) (explicating the rhetoric of law and poverty); see also
JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY:

WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA 25 (1991) (describing the ideology of "worthy" widows);
JAMES T. PATrERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY, 1900-1980, at 115-25
(1986) (comparing cultural perspectives on poverty); WALTER I. TRATrNER, FROM POOR
LAW TO WELFARE STATE 203 (4th ed. 1989) (arguing that state widows' pension laws "removed the stigma of charity for a large number of welfare recipients").
For a review of Supreme Court rhetoric in modern welfare adjudication, see RUSSELL W.
GALLOWAY, JUSTICE FOR ALL?: THE RICH AND POOR IN SUPREME COURT HISTORY 1790-

1990, at 143-47, 155-68 (1991); SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL
SERVICES PROGRAM AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 122-47 (1990).
94. On formed routines, see UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 19, at 4.
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serving.95 Practices that place disabled widows in dependent roles and
relationships are context-preserving. 96
Conversely, ideals that portray disabled widows as independent and
competent are structure-transforming. 97 Structure-transforming ideals
emancipate the disabled from benevolent and disciplinary constraints. 98
Similarly, practices that permit disabled widows to embrace independent
roles and collaborative relationships are context-transforming. 99 Context-transforming practices redefine client-lawyer roles and reorganize
client-state relations.
The contexts of widows' disability administration, adjudication, and
advocacy offer numerous transformative opportunities. The opportuni-

ties arise out of discursive anomalies provoked by the ideological contest
among administrators, adjudicators, lawyers, and clients.' 00 The anoma-

lies materialize as incoherent intervals of discourse, brief episodes of ambiguity, silence, or evasion. At stake in this contest of interpretive
communities are the ideals and discourses of widows' disability law.
In both client-state and client-lawyer contexts, ideological and discursive contest is spurred by the narratives of disabled widows. 1'0 Their
narratives challenge both the procedure' 0 2 and substance 0 3 of disability
95. On structure-preserving practices, see id. at 5.
96. On context-preserving practices, see id
97. On structure-transforming practices, see id at 5-6.
98. On Unger's theory of therapeutic emancipation, see ROBERTO UNGER, PASSION: AN
ESSAY ON PERSONALITY (1984). Cf Deborah Chaffin, Passion and the Ethicof Empowerment,
6 CARDOZO L. REV. 987, 991 (1985) (book review) (assailing Unger's failure to "demonstrate
the validity of attributing any normative force to his [existential] description"); RUSSELL
KEAT, THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL THEORY: HABERMAS, FREUD AND THE CRITIQUE OF POSI-

TIVISM 144-52 (1981) (assessing the conditions and problems of validating psychoanalytic

interpretations).
99. On context-transforming practices, see UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 19, at 56.
100. In his proposed semiotics of legal argument, Duncan Kennedy identifies a similar
tendency operating within doctrinal contexts. He defines this "nesting" tendency as "the reproduction of particular argumentative oppositions within the doctrinal structures that apparently resolve them." Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of LegalArgument,42 SYRACUSE L. Rnv.
75, 112, 97-103, 113-16 (1991).
101. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971, 982 (1991)
(addressing feminist narratives as a "distinctive form of legal argument").
102. On the legality of procedures governing disability benefit fraud and termination, see
Ross, supra note 93, at 1532-35 (discussing disability benefit fraud and termination). See also
Irving Ladimer, Hearing and Review of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Claims and Wage
Record Cases by the Social Security Board, 9 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 58, 64 (1940-41) (Social
Security hearing and review system "implies not only administrative fairness and application
of tests not otherwise available, but it introduces the element of psychological satisfaction to
the claimant.") (footnote omitted).
103. For discussions of the substantive legal and cultural import of women's narratives,
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law. The ambiguity of that challenge is ascribable to the elusiveness of
voice I°4 and to the difficulty of interpretive representation.10 5 This ambiguity will not be cured by subjecting disabled widows' narratives to uni10 6
vocal readings. The texts of narratives resist such totalizing readings.
Moreover, reading is itself a medium of discursive authority and production.107 The act of reading calls upon an interpretive authority-the subject-residing outside the text to engraft new meaning on the text. 10 8

Notwithstanding the epistemological complexity of textual construction, fruitful application of Unger's analytic scheme demands experimentation with narrative exposition.10 9 Indeed, narrative study serves
to clarify Unger's central concepts.1 10 Clarification is reached through
the contextual description, however problematic, of narrative-based
see Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images ofBattered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991); Carol Weisbrod, Divorce Stories: Readings, Comments and Questions on Law and Narrative, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 143.
104. Disentrenching ideological structures and their allied images releases a multiplicity of
voices. The voices fit a "myriad of possible categories," spanning differences of class, gender,
and race. Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path
Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and CriticalRace Theory, 1991 DuKE L.J. 296, 322. This
diversity renders voice elusive.
105. Kathryn Abrams elucidates this difficulty in studying the "truth" and "typicality" of
feminist narrative. Abrams, supra note 101, at 1020-52. See also Brendan Cassidy, Telling
Stories About Law, 2 LAW & CRITIQUE 63 (1991).
106. See Betsy B. Baker, ConstructingJustice: Theories of the Subject in Law and Literatur4 75 MINN. L. REv. 581 (1991); see also R. Radhakrishnan, NegotiatingSubject Positionsin
an Uneven World, in FEMINISM AND INSTITUTIONS 276, 277 (Linda Kauffman ed., 1989)
("The story we need to tell is of a world characterized by a non-synchronous and multi-temporal development: a world animated by plural subject positions that are simultaneous but not
synchronic.").
107. On the assignment and constitution of the subject, see Michel Foucault, The Ethic of
Carefor the Self as a Practiceof Freedom, in THE FINAL FOUCAULT 1-20 (James Bernauer &
David Rasmussen eds., 1988); Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REv.
1627 (1991).
108. The act of reading constitutes a re-marking or re-presentation of the text. JACQUES
DERRIDA, PosrrIONs 33, 60, 63 (1981) ("Reading is transformational.").
109. Experimentation is encouraged by Milner Ball's insight that "[tihere can be no set of
legal institutions, no nomos, no universe of meaning, no formative context (entrenched or
disentrenched), no empowered democracy-and no theory-apart from a locating, animating
narrative." Milner S. Ball, The City of Unger, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 625, 659 (1987); see also
Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 254, 313 (1992)
("Narration is the analytical device through which we realize the aspirations of a practicebased, nonpropositional account of legal knowledge.").
110. See Kathryn Abrams, Feminist Lawyering and Legal Method, 16 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 373, 393-94 (1991) (book review) (observing that the lawyer's presentation of a multiplicity of women's experiences and perspectives "makes the dominant [legal] understanding
appear less natural or necessary, and more the contingent product of one group's power to
make its perspective the norm").
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transformative movements l1 1 and breaks. 112 In the next section, I describe the transformative movements and breaks reverberating throughout the administration and adjudication of widows' disability claims.

II. Administration and Adjudication
Cataloguing the ideological and discursive breaks incited by oppositional disability narratives is a complex, and perhaps futile, endeavor.

Certain anomalies and disruptions may resist classification. Moreover,
those that prove conducive to classification may nonetheless fail to indicate the decisive moment of breach-the moment that signifies a challenge to the procedure and substance of disability law. The background
of formative ideals and formed practices, in fact, may be too deeply

rooted and multilayered to isolate single, unambiguous breaks. Instead,
what emerges from the backdrop of widows' disability law may be more
accurately and fruitfully described as an ongoing contest, a discursive
series of strategic moves and counter moves to institute a vision of disa1 13
bility and the disabled.
In 1985, Marjorie Hill, a black 1 4 fifty-year-old widow, entered this
contest when she filed concurrent applications for disability benefits

under the OASDI I15 and

SS1116

programs of the Social Security Act.' 17

111. See Ananta Gir, Narrativesof Creative Transformation: ConstitutingCriticalMovements in ContemporaryAmerican Culture, 14 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 331 (1989); Patterson, supra note 109, at 313 ("On a narrative account of legal knowledge, understanding
emerges not as a conservative notion but as the focus of interpretive activity.").
112. See, e.g., David Kennedy, Spring Break, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1377, 1422 (1985).
113. The incoherence of that vision stems in large part from the frustrated state effort to
"fuse or harmonize the ethical structure of social insurance with that of a market economy."
Mashaw, DisabilityInsurance, supra note 89, at 155-56. Numerous state agents-administrators, adjudicators, federal judges-are engulfed in this effort. Id. at 153 ("iTihe story of disability politics in the decade from 1975 to 1985 reveals that the ideology of entitlements or
rights, implied by social insurance, gives a crucial political role to two sets of institutional
actors-administrative law judges and the federal judiciary.").
114. On the status of black widows, see FAMILY ISSUES IN CURRENT GERONTOLOGY 52
(Lillian Troll ed., 1986) (citing the greater impoverishment of black widows); E. Percil Stanford & Shirley A. Lockery, Aging and SocialRelations in the Black Community, in INDEPENDENT AGING, supra note 6, at 164, 166 (noting that in 1980, approximately 32% (1,221,000) of
all American blacks 55 years of age or older were widowed). See also Toinette M. Eugene,
Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: The Call and Responsefor a LiberationalEthic of
Care by Black Feminists, in WHO CARES?: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ETHIC OF CARE 45, 46 (Mary M. Brabeck ed., 1989) ("[B]lack women are
not special specimens of womenhood; rather, they are women who have been given less protected and more burdensome positions in society.").
115. 40 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1988); see BERKOWITZ,supra note 89, at 41-151 (history of
the Disability Insurance program); Ball, supra note 2, at 35-36 ("The essence of OASDI is that
while people work, they and their employers make contributions earmarked for Social Security; and when earnings are lost because of retirement in old age, long-term total disability, or
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In her applications, Mrs. Hill claimed to suffer from a combination of
severe physical impairments including coronary heart disease, pulmonary disease, status posthysterectomy and cholecystectomy, uncontrolled
hypertension, and severe pain.118
Adjudicators 1 9 denied both applications, initially as well as upon
reconsideration. 120 Whereupon Mrs. Hill timely requested and appeared
at a de novo hearing. 12 1 After conducting initial and supplemental hearings, an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued two decisions. The first
found Mrs. Hill disabled and therefore eligible for SSI benefits. In
awarding SSI benefits, the ALl concluded that Mrs. Hill's impairments
death, benefits are paid."); Lehman, supra note 89, at 692 ("Social insurance recipients never
have to make a public declaration of poverty; they never 'become' poor, not even for an instant."); Mashaw, DisabilityInsurance,supra note 89, at 153 ("Social Security disability insurance is part of the state's basic commitment to safeguard its citizens against interruption of
income from productive employment because of events beyond their control.").
116. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d (1988). For historical commentary, see Gordon G. Chang,
Note, The Supplemental Security Income Program: The "Revolution" Needs Reform, 62 CoRNELL L. Rnv. 314 (1977); Leonard S. Rubenstein et al., Protecting the Entitlements of the
Mentally Disabled: The SSDI/SSI Legal Battles of the 1980s, 11 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
269 (1988). See also Lehman, supra note 89, at 698 ("Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
(like its predecessor programs Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled) gives cash assistance to people whom we never expect to be selfsufficient in the future .. ").
117. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988); Plaintiff's Complaint at 3, Hill v. Sullivan, 125 F.R.D. 86
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Civ. No. 87-4344) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Complaint].
118. Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 117, at 3.
119. The term "adjudicators" refers to both federal and state bureaucratic officials. Federal officials are affiliated with the Office of Hearings and Appeals within the Social Security
Administration of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). State
officials are associated with a local Office of Disability Determination (ODD). The ODD is the
designated state agency responsible for OASDI disability determinations at the initial and reconsideration stages of review. 42 U.S.C. § 421(a) (1988); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1503 (1991). See
generally BERKOWITZ, supra note 89, at 80 ("Because administrators at the various stages
brought different perspectives and incentives to the process, the administrative structure underlying disability insurance was unstable.").
120. A widow disability claimant is entitled to pursue a three stage administrative review
process. Upon the denial of her initial claim, she may request reconsideration. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.909(a) (1991). Next, the claimant may obtain a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (1988); 20 C.F.R. § 404.929 (1991). Last, the
claimant may seek review by an Appeals Council. 20 C.F.R. § 404.967 (1991). Once the
claimant has exhausted her administrative remedies, she may seek judicial review in federal
district court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988). See BERKOWrrz, supra note 89, at 81 ("The state
disability examiners base their eligibility determinations on a paper record that does not contain so much as a picture of the applicant and on pages and pages of rules stored in flexible
notebooks and known as the 'Program Operating Manual System.' "); MEzEY, supra note 89,
at 48-53 (describing process of administrative adjudication).
121. Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 117, at 3-4; see Mashaw, DisabilityInsurance,supra
note 89, at 163 ("[T]he imagery of the hearing process as the major bulwark protecting claimants' rights against error or maladministration at the state agency level remains strong.").
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not only prevented her from performing her past relevant work, but also
1 22
limited her residual functional capacity to "less than" sedentary
work. 123
The AL's second decision found Mrs. Hill not disabled and therefore ineligible for OASDI widows' insurance benefits. In denying widows' benefits the ALJ concluded that "none" of Mrs. Hill's impairments
"singly or in combination meet or equal any of the Listing" of
124
impairments.
In 1987, Mrs. Hill requested administrative review of the ALJ decision denying her widows' benefits. 125 Without further investigation or
hearing, adjudicators declined to grant review.126 Hence, the ALJ's unreconciled decisions became the final bureaucratic judgment of the juridi127
cal state.
The finality of that judgment disguises the continuing contest over
the meaning of widows' disability. 128 That latent controversy entangles
disability administrators, adjudicators, lawyers, and clients. The administrative and adjudicative functioning of the bureaucratic 29 state provide
122. Sedentary work is the least physically demanding of the five job classifications-the
other four being light, medium, heavy, and very heavy work-that HHS uses to determine the
physical exertion requirements of work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 (1991).
Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting
or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although HHS defines a sedentary job as one that involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required
occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) (1991).
HHS rulings elaborate on the capabilities necessary to perform sedentary work, adding
that sedentary work requires the capacity both to stand or walk two hours and to sit for six
hours in an eight-hour day. Soc. Security Rul. 83-10, S.S.R. 179 (Cum. ed. 1983).
123. Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 117, at 3-4.
124. Id. at 4.
125. HHS delegates administrative review to an Appeals Council. 20 C.F.R. § 404.967
(1991).
126. Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 117, at 4.
127. For an account of such bureaucratic inconsistencies, see Daniel J. Gifford, Need Like
Cases Be Decided Alike? Mashaw's BureaucraticJustice, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 985,
995 ("[Administrative] decisional differences do not necessarily establish either maladministration or injustice.").
128. The internal structure of widows' disability law is characterized by the competition
between two sets of formative ideals: benevolence-discipline and autonomy-community. Each
set of ideals presents a vision of disability irreconcilable with the other. The visions oscillate in
the formed practices of administration and adjudication. See, e.g., Mashaw, DisabilityInsurance, supra note 89, at 156 ("[Ihe institutional structure of implementation is as heavily
weighted toward generous provision and rights protection for social insurance beneficiaries as
it is toward managerial control of a potentially unruly program.").
129. For helpful discussions of the administrative and adjudicative operations of the bureaucratic state, see JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983); JERRY L. MASHAV ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY
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one of the three 130 primary juridical contexts for encoding ideological
and discursive struggle into legal rules and regulations. The outcome of
that struggle determines the award and denial of widows' disability
13 1
benefits.
The natural and necessitarian logics of widows' disability determinations fail to immunize the discourse of widows' disability administration
and adjudication from internal controversy. For immunity to adhere,
132
administrators and adjudicators must sustain a coherent discourse.
While continuity is a basic element of coherence, alone it is insufficient to
immunize discourse. Coherence requires discursive integration and
unity. That unity is absent due to the opposing narratives of disabled
widows.
To ensure discursive dominance, disability administrators and adjudicators silence opposing widow narratives. 133 The practice of silencing
HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING
SYSTEM (1978); Deborah A. Chassman & Howard Rolston, Social Security Disability Hearings: A Case Study in Quality Assurance and Due Process, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 801 (1980);

Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Welfare State and Mass Justice: A Warningfrom the SocialSecurity
DisabilityProgram, 1972 DUKE L.J. 681; Richard E. Levy, SocialSecurity DisabilityDeterminations: RecommendationsforReform, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 461; Jerry L. Mashaw, Conflict
and Compromise Among Models of Administrative Justice, 1981 DUKE L.J. 181; Jerry L.
Mashaw, How Much of What Quality? A Comment on Conscientious ProceduralDesign, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 823 (1980); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side ofDue Process: Some
Theoretical andLitigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness,and Timeliness in the
Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974); see also Frank S.
Bloch, Representationand Advocacy at Non-Adversary Hearings: The Needfor Non-Adversary
Representativesat Social Security DisabilityHearings,59 WASH. U. L.Q. 349 (1981) (exploring
the role of independent nonadversary representation at disability hearings); Frank R. Lindh,
An Examination of the Proposed "Closed Record" Administrative Law Judge Hearing in the
Social Security DisabilityProgram, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 745, 773 (1984) (speculating on
the potential improvement in the consistency and replicability of decisionmaking flowing from
a closed record hearing).
130. The two other contexts comprise legislative and judicial institutions. See Susan U.
Philips, The Judge as Third Partyin American Trial Court Conflict Talk, in CONFLICT TALK:
SOCIOLINGUISTIC INVESTIGATIONS OF ARGUMENTS IN CONVERSATIONS 197-209 (Allen D.
Grimshaw ed., 1990); Mark Tushnet, The Constitutionof the BureaucraticState, 86 W. VA. L.
REV. 1077 (1984); Jack B. Weinstein, Equality and the Law: SocialSecurity Disability Cases in
the FederalCourts, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 897 (1984).
131. See HAVEMAN ET AL.,supra note 2, at 179 ("[D]ecisions in disability insurance programs have been intimately related to government policy toward low-income or unemployed
people in general.").
132. Cf Stephen Kalberg, The Role of IdealInterests in Max Weber's ComparativeHistorical Sociology, in A WEBER-MARX DIALOGUE 46, 57-58 (Robert J. Antonio & Ronald M.
Glassman eds., 1985) ("[Bureaucratic] legitimacy is accorded and procedures carried out not
simply as a result of expedient adaptation but also due to a value-rational belief in the legitimacy of this type of [means-ends] domination and correctness of its procedures.").
133. State silencing strategies are consistent with fiscal austerity regimes. Overthrowing
such regimes does not ensure the repudiation of such strategies. Cf Mashaw, DisabilityInsur-
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permeates the disability determination process, enforcing the ideals of
benevolence and discipline and excluding the alternative ideals of autonomy and community. Sanctioned as a necessary aspect of the determination process, 134 the practice of silencing persists in historically overt and
covert forms of regulatory policy.135
Administrators and adjudicators overtly silence disabled widows
under the aegis of the Social Security Act. 136 The original 1935 Act
made no provision for widows' disability benefits.13 7 Nor was there proance, supra note 89, at 156 ("SSA will be the 'heavy' whenever fiscal restraint is on an administration's political agenda.").
134. See, eg., MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 225 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978) (describing the impersonal and functional attributes of bureaucracy); see also
ROGERS BRUBAKER, THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY 21 (1984) (discussing the formalistic impersonality of bureaucratic administration); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 56-61
(1983) (characterizing impersonal domination).
135. See, e.g., Mashaw, DisabilityInsurance,supra note 89, at 156 ("The politics of disability insurance is a micropolitics in which ideologically charged issues of social insurance adequacy versus market incentives may be transformed into technical issues of implementation.").
136. Congress enacted the Social Security Act in 1935. Social Security Act of 1935, ch.
531, 49 Stat. 621 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1988)).
For histories of the Social Security Act, see W. ANDREW ACHENBAUM, SOCIAL SECURrrY: VISIONS AND REVISIONS 13-60 (1986); MARTHA DERTHICx, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 295-315 (1979); PETER J. FERRARA, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE INHERENT
CONTRADICTION 16-74 (1980); MICHAEL B. KATz, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 234-43 (1986); SYLVESTER J. SCHIEBER, SOCIAL
SECURITY: PERSPECTIVES ON PRESERVING THE SYSTEM 7-44 (1982); CHARLES I. SCHOTTLAND, THE SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM IN THE UNITED STATES 19-79 (1963); SOCIAL SECURITY: THE FIRST HALF-CENTURY 3-28, 279-98 (Gerald D. Nash et al. eds., 1988). See also
S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935) ("program of attack upon the principal causes
of insecurity in our economic life").
137. The statutory omission of women represents a linguistic codification of inferior status.
Legal codification is a political and economic decision. Shelley Bannister & Dragan Milovanovic, The Necessity Defense, Substantive Justice and OppositionalLinguistic Praxis, 18 INT'L
J. SoC. L. 179, 180 (1990) ("The particular legal codification of reality ...can be seen as a
political economic decision.").
For discussions of widows' historical status under the Social Security Act, see Mary E.
Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination,SocialSecurity, and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's ConstitutionalLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264 (1989); Grace Ganz Blumberg,
Adult DerivativeBenefits in SocialSecurity, 32 STAN. L. REV. 233 (1980); Barbara A. Burnett,
Family Economic Integrity Under the Social Security System, 7 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 155 (1978); Judith F. Fournelle, Social Security Disabled Widow's Benefits: A Guide
for Legal Assistance Advocates, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 259 (1979); Karen C. Holden, Supplemental OASI Benefits to Homemakers Through Current Spouse Benefits, A Homemaker
Credit,and Child-CareDrop-Out Years, in A CHALLENGE TO SOCIAL SECURITY 41-72 (1982);
Robert J. Lampman & Maurice MacDonald, Concepts Underlying the Current Controversy
About Women's Social Security Benefits, in A CHALLENGE TO SOCIAL SECURITY, supra, at 2139 (1982); Peter W. Martin, The Art of Decoupling: Keeping Social Security's Promise Up-toDate, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 748 (1980); Peter W. Martin, Public Assurance of an Adequate
Minimum Income in Old Age: The ErraticPartnershipBetween Social Insurance and Public
Assistance, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 437 (1979); Peter W. Martin, Social Security Benefits for
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vision for the payment of dependent derivative benefits to a widow, 138
though benefits could accrue to her indirectly through a deceased
139
spouse's estate.
In 1939 Congress amended the Act to include a widow's nondisability benefit payable upon her retirement. 140 The amendments required
Spouses, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 789 (1978); Alicia H. Munnell & Laura E. Stiglin, Women and
a Two-Tier SocialSecurity System, in A CHALLENGE TO SOCIAL SECURITY, supra, at 101-23;
Jacob Perlman, Changing Trends Under Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, 1935-1950, 4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 173 (1950-5 1); Marjorie Dick Rombauer, MaritalStatus and Eligibilityfor FederalStatutory Income Benefits: A HistoricalSurvey, 52 WASH. L. REv. 227 (1977);
Jane C. Sherburne, Note, Women and Social Security: Seizing the Moment for Change, 70
GEO. L.J. 1563 (1982); see also S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1935) ("There is
great need for expansion in actual operation of the mothers' pension laws and in many States
for the liberalization of the pensions."); H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935)
(estimating "above 350,000 families on relief the head of which was a widowed, separated, or
divorced mother and whose other members were children under 16"); ANDRE, supra note 74,
at 15 ("The Social Security system is primarily designed to benefit paid workers, and most
women have not been active members of the paid labor force."); Beth B. Hess, Aging Policies
and Old Women: The Hidden Agenda, in GENDER AND THE LIFE COURSE, supra note 11, at
319, 323 ("Public programs have been shaped by assumptions based on the life experience of
men.").
138. Cf S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1935) (recognizing the needs of dependent children in "families with female heads who are widowed, divorced, or deserted").
139. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 203, 49 Stat. 620, 623. See H.R. REP. No.
728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1939). The House Report stated:
The present law is, therefore, limited in its scope in that it does not provide current
monthly benefits to the surviving wife of an aged annuitant, nor to the surviving
widow with dependent children. The payment of these survivorship benefits and supplements for the wife of an annuitant are more in keeping with the principle of social
insurance than the 3 1/2-percent lump-sum payments now provided. Under a socialinsurance plan the primary purpose is to pay benefits in accordance with the probable
needs of the beneficiaries rather than to make payments to the estate of a deceased
person regardless of whether or not he leaves dependents. There is ample precedent
for such provision, since 15 out of 22 old-age insurance systems of foreign countries
make provision for survivor benefits.
See also Johanna Brenner & Barbara Laslett, Gender,Social Reproduction, and Women's SelfOrganization: Considering the U.S. Welfare State, 5 GENDER & Soc'y 311, 314 (1991) ("In
the New Deal... the debate over state policy focused overwhelmingly on men, particularly
men as workers and family providers."); Helen S. Carter, Legal Aspects of Widowhood and
Aging, in ON THEIR OWN: WIDOWS AND WIDOWHOOD IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST
1848-1939, supra note 52, at 271, 285 ("It was common practice during the late 1800s and
early 1900s for the male-dominated legislatures of the territories and states of the United States
to provide for a 'widow's allowance.' ").
140. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 202, 53 Stat. 1360, 1363. For
historical background, see MARTHA DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 26063 (1979); Roy LUBOVE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 1900-1935, at 91-112 (1968).
See also Ball, supra note 2, at 25 ("Social Security [in 1939] became a program of family
protection, providing not only old-age benefits for workers but also benefits for wives, widows,
and children."); H.R. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1939). The House Report
explained:
This title amends title II of the Social Security Act. It revises and extends the pres-

HASTINGS LAWV JOURNAL

[Vol. 43

the widow to elect payment of primary or secondary benefits. Primary
benefits flowed from a widow's individual earnings account. 14 1 Secon-

Iad

ent provisions for old-age insurance benefits. It includes benefits for qualified wives
and children of individuals entitled to old-age insurance benefits and for qualified
widows, children, and parents of deceased individuals, who, regardless of age at
death, have fulfilled certain conditions. It also provides a lump-sum payment on
death where no monthly benefits are then payable ....

The Social Security Act now provides a certain amount of survivor protection in the
form of lump-sum payments. These are small and inadequate in the early years of
the system and entirely unrelated to the needs of the recipients. However, eventually, they will be rather costly and may not provide protection where most needed.
The new plan will eliminate most lump-sum benefits and will substitute monthly
benefits for those groups of survivors whose probable need is greatest. These groups
are widows over 65, widows with children, orphans, and dependent parents over 65.
The monthly benefits payable to these survivors are related in size to the deceased
individual's past monthly benefit or the monthly benefit he would have received on
attaining age 65.
In case of a widow, the monthly benefit is three-fourths of the deceased's
monthly benefit or prospective benefit. In the case of an orphan or dependent parent,
it is one-half of the deceased's monthly benefit or prospective benefit.
Ia at 11.
The Report explicitly addressed the problem of system-wide cost controls.
The basic problem confronting the committee was how to provide more adequate
and effective benefits,... without increasing the future cost of the old-age insurance
system. The committee has solved this problem in two principal ways, as follows:
...Monthly benefits to wives, children, widows, orphans, and surviving dependent parents are substituted for the present 3 1/2-percent lump sums payable to the
estates of deceased workers.
Id at 7.
141. On primary benefits, see MERTON C. BERNSTEIN & JOAN BRODSHAUG BERNSTEIN,
SOCIAL SECURITY: THE SYsTEM THAT WORKS 18-19 (1988). The House Report commented:
A widow's insurance benefit for a month is equal to three-fourths of the monthly
primary insurance benefit of her husband, but, if she is or becomes entitled to a
monthly primary insurance benefit under subsection (a) which is less than threefourths of the monthly primary insurance benefit of her husband, then her widow's
insurance benefit for the month in which she becomes entitled to such primary insurance benefit, and for each month thereafter, is equal to the difference between threefourths of her husband's monthly primary insurance benefit and her monthly primary insurance benefit.
..Widow's insurance benefits are payable beginning with the month in which
the widow becomes eligible for them, having met conditions (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5)
above. All of such conditions may be met in a single month, or part in one month
and part in another month or months. Benefits end when the widow remarries, dies,
or becomes entitled to a monthly primary insurance benefit equal to or exceeding
three-fourths of the monthly primary insurance benefit of her husband.
H.R. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1939).
Primary benefits were often unavailable or meager due to the economic disadvantages
women suffered. See JOHN MYLES, OLD AGE IN THE WELFARE STATE: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PUBLIC PENSIONS 135 (1989) ("As wage-earners, women have typically been
concentrated in low-wage job ghettos and, because they have traditionally played the role of
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dary benefits accrued from her spouse's account. 142 At the retirement
age of sixty-five, the widow elected to claim benefits from one of these
two reserves. 143 Her election barred the accumulation of benefits from
child-rearers, have been less likely to accumulate the years of service necessary to maximize
their pension benefits.").
142. On secondary benefits, see BERNSTEIN & BERNSTEIN, supra note 141, at 19-21. See
also H.R. REP. No. 1461, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 7, 10 (1939) (technical amendments to lumpsum death payment and marriage provisions). Congress defined widows' entitlement to secondary benefits as follows:
A widow of a fully insured individual, who has attained age 65 and who was living
with such individual when he died, is eligible for a monthly benefit which when added to her primary insurance benefit, if any, is equal to three-fourths of a primary
insurance benefit of her husband.
H.R. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1939). In section 202(d) of the amended act
Congress enumerated the conditions of entitlement.
[M]onthly "widow's insurance benefits" for an aged widow (defined in see. 209 (j))
whose husband died a fully insured individual (defined in see. 209 (g)). The purpose
of these widow's benefits, which are based on the wages of the deceased husband, is
to assure the widow of a monthly amount equal to three-fourths of the amount to
which her husband was entitled, or would have been entitled if he had, before his
death, met the conditions for a primary insurance benefit under subsection (a). A
benefit is payable to the widow for each month, upon condition that she (1) is at least
65 years of age, (2) has not remarried, (3) has filed application for the benefits, (4)
was living with her husband at the time of his death, and (5) is not herself entitled to
a monthly primary insurance benefit which is equal to or greater than three-fourths
of the monthly primary insurance benefit of her husband.
Id at 36, 37; see also FERRARA, supra note 136, at 230-43 (documenting gender discrimination
in the social security benefit structure).
143. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 202, 53 Stat. 1360, 1363. Recognizing the stringency of its eligibility conditions, Congress included a limited provision applicable to caretaker widows.
Section 202 (e) ...provides for: "widow's current insurance benefits," which are
based on the wages of a husband who died a filly or currently insured individual (as
defined in sec. 209 (g) and (h)). The purpose of this subsection is to extend financial
protection to the widow regardless of her age, while she has in her care a child of the
deceased husband entitled to child's insurance benefits. It provides assurance for
such a widow, before she becomes 65 years of age, of a monthly amount equal to
three-fourths of the amount to which her husband would have been entitled if, before
his death, he had met the conditions for a primary insurance benefit under subsection
(a). When she becomes 65 such widow, if her husband was a fully insured individual,
will become entitled to a widow's insurance benefit under subsection (d). If her husband was currently (but not fully) insured, she will continue to be entitled to her
widow's current benefit under subsection (e) so long as there is a child of her husband
who is entitled to receive child's insurance benefits. A benefit is payable to the widow
for each month, upon condition that she (1) has not remarried, (2) is not entitled to
receive a monthly widow's insurance benefit under subsection (d) or a monthly primary insurance benefit which is equal to or greater than three-fourths of a monthly
primary insurance benefit of her husband, (3) was living with her husband at the time
of his death, (4) has fied application for the benefits, and (5) at the time of filing such
application has in her care a child of the deceased husband entitled to receive child's
insurance benefits. By "in her care" is meant that she takes responsibility for the
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both accounts. 144
In 1956 Congress lowered the widows' statutory retirement age to
sixty-two, but did not otherwise lessen eligibility requirements. 145 In
1965 Congress lowered the age to sixty. 146 More notably, in 1967 Congress enacted a disability benefit provision for widows aged fifty to
sixty.147 Established under the OASDI program, the provision affords
148
insurance benefits to disabled widows of individual wage earners.
welfare and care of the child, whether or not she actually lives in the same home with
the child at the time she files application.
H.R. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1939).
144. See HELENA ZNANiECKA LOPATA, WOMEN AS WIDOWS 42 (1979) [hereinafter
LOPATA, WOMEN AS WIDOWS] ("[Social Security] programs for widows of insured workers
operate on the assumption that only a portion of the income needs to be replaced after the
death of the husband."); Judith Treas, Women's Employment and Its Implicationsfor the Status of the Elderly of the Future, in AGING, SOCIAL CHANGE 561, 568 (Sara B. Kiesler et al.
eds., 1981) ("[Ihe 1939 Amendments to the Social Security Act introduced new considerations emphasizing income adequacy rather then equity.").
145. Social Security Act Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, § 102, 70 Stat. 807, 809; cf
MEzEY, supra note 89, at 41 ("[A]bout twenty years after the disability insurance program was
begun, it appeared that the Social Security Administration's enthusiasm for growth faded and
was replaced by an increasingly restrictive attitude toward disability entitlement.").
146. Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 307, 79 Stat. 286, 373
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1) (1988)); see also 1971 Advisory Council on Social
Security: Reports on the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance and Medicare Programs 41 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 Advisory Council on Social Security] ("The 1965 Advisory
Council on Social Security recommended that benefits be provided to an insured worker's
totally disabled widow regardless of her age if she became disabled before her husband's death
or before her youngest child became 18, or within a limited period after either of these
events.").
147. Social Security Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 104, 81 Stat. 821,
828 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1) (1988)). The provision also applied to widowers.
See also H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1967) (noting that the House Ways and
Means Committee's "bill would provide social security benefits for certain totally disabled
widows (including surviving divorced wives) and totally disabled dependent widowers who are
not old enough to qualify for the benefits now provided for aged widows and dependent widowers"); S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1967) ("About 70,000 totally disabled
widows and widowers under age 62 would immediately become eligible for cash benefits.
About $71 million in additional benefits would be paid out during the first 12 months of operation."). Still, the 1971 Advisory Council on Social Security was unsatisfied with the 1967 age
limits:
[T]here is no justification for withholding benefits until the disabled widow reaches
age 50. The need of a disabled widow younger than age 50 may be greater than that
of an older widow; her husband, having died at an early age, may have had less
opportunity to accumulate savings or provide for future needs.
1971 Advisory Council on Social Security, supra note 146, at 42 ("Disabled vfidows and disabled dependent widowers should be eligible for benefits without regard to age, and the benefits
should not be reduced by reason of their beginning before age 65.").
148. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (1988). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.335, .337, .338, .344-.347 (1991).
The legislative history of the 1967 enactment discloses congressional disagreement over
the appropriate definition of disability applicable to widows and widowers. The House initially
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Until 1990, a widow's entitlement to disability insurance benefits
turned on evidence that her physical or mental impairment reached a
proposed "a more restrictive definition of disability for disabled widows and widowers than
exists in present law for disabled workers[.]" H.R. REP. No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 52
(1967). According to that definition, "a widow or widower would not be found to be under a
disability unless his or her impairments are of a level of severity deemed sufficient to preclude
an individual from engaging in any gainful activity." Id A Senate amendment eliminated this
new, more restrictive definition of disability; however, the conference agreement retained the
special test provision of the House bill. Id; see also S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 45
(1967). Under the conference version, "a person would be disabled only if the disability is one
that, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, is
deemed to be severe enough to preclude any gainful activity." H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1967).
The Senate report indicates growing congressional concern regarding the "rising cost" of
the disability insurance program.
The committee recognizes and shares the concern expressed by the Committee on
Ways and Means regarding the way this definition has been interpreted by the courts
and the effects their interpretations have had and might have in the future on the
administration of the disability program by the Social Security Administration. The
allocation to the disability trust fund has increased from 0.50 percent of payroll in
1956 to 0.70 percent today, and will be increased to 0.95 percent by the committee's
bill. In 1965 the Congress adopted an increase in the social security taxes allocated
to the disability insurance trust fund; a large part of which was needed to meet an
actuarial deficiency of 0.13 percent in the system. Again this year the Administration has come to the Congress asking for an increase in the taxes allocated to that
fund to meet an even larger actuarial deficiency, which has reduced the 0.03 percent
surplus, estimated after the 1965 amendments, to a 0.15 percent deficiency. The
studies of the Committee on Ways and Means indicate that over the past few years
the rising cost of the disability insurance program is related, along with other factors,
to the way in which the definition of disability has been interpreted. The committee
therefore includes in its bill more precise guidelines that are to be used in determining
the degree of disability which must exist in order to qualify for disability insurance
benefits.
S. RFP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1967). See also MEZEY, supra note 89, at 39
("[A]s costs continued to increase, there were some stirrings of congressional unrest over the
size and expense of the disability program in the latter part of the 1960s.").
Moreover, the Report demonstrates the substantial discretion delegated to HHS in establishing the test for widow disability.
The bill would also provide benefits (as discussed in the statement on benefits for
disabled widows and widowers) for certain disabled widows (including surviving divorced wives) and disabled dependent widowers under a test of disability that is
somewhat more restrictive than that for disabled workers and childhood disability
beneficiaries. The determination of disability in the case of a widow or widower
would be based solely on the level of severity of the impairment. Determinations in
disabled widow and widower cases would be made without regard to nonmedical
factors such as age, education, and work experience, which are considered in disabled
worker cases. Under this test, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
would by regulation establish the severity of impairment which may be deemed to
preclude an individual from engaging in any "substantial gainful activity" (as opposed to "gainful activity" as provided in the House bill). An individual whose impairments meet the level of severity established by the regulations of the Secretary
would generally be found to be disabled, although, of course, if other evidence estab-
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level of severity deemed sufficient to preclude her from engaging in any
gainful activity. 149 The Social Security Act defines an individual's imlishes ability to engage in substantial gainful activity despite such impairments, he
would not be found disabled; and individuals whose impairments do not meet this
level of severity may not in any case be found disabled.
S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-50 (1967). See also H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 31 (1967).
The restrictive scope of the House provision, coupled with HHS regulations, adversely
affected disabled widows even though they suffered an already disproportionate share of poverty in 1967. According to the 1971 Advisory Council on Social Security,
[S]urveys of social security beneficiaries have shown that, as a group, women getting
widows' benefits had less regular income other than social security than did most
other classes of beneficiaries. About two-thirds of the widow beneficiaries had incomes of less than $1500 in the entire year of 1967. About 69 percent of the widows
were classified as poor.
1971 Advisory Council on Social Security, supra note 146, at 33 (footnote omitted).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B) (1988); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1577 (1991) ("The impairments must be of a level of severity to prevent a person from doing any gainful activity."). The
widow standard of proof also extends to widowers and surviving divorced spouses. Widower
application followed generally from the Supreme Court's extension of equal protection principles. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (survivor's benefits); Weinberger v. Viesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (mother's insurance benefits).
In 1990, Congress amended the Act, repealing the special disability standard for widows
and widowers. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508 § 5103,
104 Stat. 1388, 1388-251 (1990). The House Conference Report reviewed the history of the
widow disability standard.
A widow(er) or surviving divorced spouse with no child in care and who is
under age 60 but at least age 50 may be eligible for widow(er)'s benefits as a disabled
widow(er).
Generally, disability is defined as an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity (defined in regulations as earnings of more than $500 per month, effective
January 1, 1990) by reason of a physical or mental impairment. The impairment
must be medically determinable and expected to last for not less than 12 months or
to result in death. A person (other than a disabled widow(er)) may be determined to
be disabled only if,
due to this impairment, he or she is unable to engage in any kind
of substantial gainful work, considering his or her age, education and work experience, which exists in the national economy.
The definition of disability which is applied to widow(er)s, however, is stricter
than that which is applied to workers and to Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
disability applicants. First, a widow(er) must have a disability severe enough to prevent him or her from engaging in "any gainful activity" (little or no earnings at all)
rather than substantial gainful activity (ordinarily, earnings of more than $500 per
month). Second, for a disabled widow(er) the three vocational factors used in determining a worker's disability-age, education, and work experience-are not considered. Therefore, the disability must be established based on medical evidence alone.
The stricter test of disability for disabled widow(er)s was established in the Social Security Amendments of 1967, which created this new entitlement to benefits.
In explaining the reasons for the more restrictive rules, Ways and Means Committee
Chairman Wilbur Mills stated on the House floor, "We wrote this provision of the
bill very narrowly, because it represents a step into an unexplored area where cost
potentials are an important consideration.
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pairment as a physical or mental condition resulting from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities demonstrable by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 150 Congress'
1984 amendments require consideration of the combined effect of all of
an individual's impairments without regard to whether any single impairment, if considered separately, would rise to a level of medical severity

sufficient to warrant eligibility for benefits.151
By comparison, during the same period from 1967 to 1990, an individual wage earner's entitlement to disability insurance benefits hinged
on proof that her physical or mental impairment attained a degree of
severity leaving her unable to engage in her previous work and, considering her age, education, and work experience, unable to perform any other
kind of substantialgainful work existing in the national economy.15 2 In

ascertaining the existence of substantial gainful work, it is statutorily irrelevant whether a specific job vacancy exists in the immediate area
where the wage earner lives for which she would be hired if she apH.R. REP. No. 964, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 926 (1990).
By amendment, the Senate moved to repeal the stricter test of disability. The Senate
amendment declared:
Providing benefits to widow(er)s on the basis of disability has been found not to
be a significant cost to the trust fund. Therefore, the provision would repeal the
stricter definition of disability that must be met by a disabled widow(er) age 50-59 in
order to qualify for widow(er)'s benefits and instead apply the definition of disability
used for workers.
Id. at 926-27.
The Senate report concurred.
The largest change in the Social Security benefit structure enacted in 1990
amended the eligibility standard to disabled widows and widowers. The provisions
repealed the stricter definition of disability long applied to these individuals. Based
on legislation introduced by Senator Heinz, disabled widows will not [sic] qualify
under the same definition of disability that is applied to all other disabled individuals.
Prior to this change, a more stringent test of disability resulted in the denial of benefits to approximately 5,000 applicants each year.
The previous, more restrictive test that had to be met to establish eligibility for
widows/widowers benefits was that they could not engage in "any gainful" activity."
This meant that they had to be completely incapacitated to the extent that no work
whatsoever could be accomplished. This standard was repealed in favor of the same
test that other workers must meet, which is that they cannot engage in "substantial
gainful activity," currently defined by regulation as $500 per month.
This landmark legislative provision removes a major inequity in the Social Security program, and will assist many thousands of deserving older Americans in the
future.
S. REP. No. 28, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1991). See generally Social Security Benefits for
Widows and Spouses: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on SocialSecurity of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-20 (1990).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3) (1988).
151. Id. § 423(d)(2)(B).
152. Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
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plied.15 3 According to the Act, work counts within the national economy when it exists in significant numbers either in the region where the
154
wage earner lives or in several regions of the country.
To implement these contrasting entitlement standards, administrators promulgated a multistep disability evaluation process.15 5 The first
three steps of the evaluation process have applied to both widows and
wage earners from the start. Step one is a threshold step inquiring
whether the claimant is working and, if so, whether that work constitutes
substantial gainful activity. A finding that the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful activity dictates a determination of not disabled regardless of the claimant's medical condition, age, education, or work experience. If no such finding is made, the claimant continues to step
two.156

Step two is a severity step evaluating whether the claimant suffers
any physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. Evidence of insignificant limitations compels a determination of not
disabled. That determination is unaffected by factors of age, education,
and work experience. If the claimant manifests significant impairmentrelated limitations, she continues to step three.15 7
Step three is an equivalence step evaluating whether the claimant's
physical or mental impairment meets a twelve month duration requirement158 and a set of body system criteria compiled in a Listing of Impairments, 159 or equals such criteria, without considering age, education, or
work experience.1 60 To meet a listed impairment, the claimant must submit medical findings of a condition "shown in the Listing of that impair153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1991). Adjudicators may, however, halt the evaluation process at any point at which they find a claimant disabled or not disabled. Id § 404.1520(a).
156. Id. § 404.1520(b).
157. Id § 404.1520(c).
158. To satisfy the duration requirement, the claimant's impairment "must have lasted or
must be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months." Id § 404.1509. The
claimant is permitted to waive this requirement when her impairment "is expected to result in
death." Id.
159. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (1991). See also Titles II and XVI: The Sequential Evaluation Process, Soc. See. Rul. 82-56, S.S.R. 111 (Cum. ed. 1982); BERKOWrTz, supra
note 89, at 102 ("Not until 1979 did [the Social Security Administration] publish a list of
impairments along with the specific numerical values of clinical tests required for disability
insurance and a specific set of rules that explained the application of vocational considerations
to disability determination.").
160. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).
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ment."1 61 Medical findings encompass symptoms, signs, and laboratory
findings. 162 The term equals, by contrast, implies an equivalence determination. The evaluation of equivalence compares the claimant's impairment-related symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings with medical
criteria indicative of a listed impairment. If the asserted impairment is
not listed, the comparison centers on a materially similar impairment.
Alternatively, if multiple impairments are alleged but none meets or
equals a listed impairment, the comparison enlarges its scope to consider
whether the combination of impairments is medically equal to any listed
163
impairment.
To demonstrate equivalence, each comparison of impairments must
adduce medical findings at least equal in severity and duration to the
listed medical criteria. 164 If the wage earner claimant is unable to muster
medical evidence deemed adequate to meet this level of severity, she
nonetheless continues to step four. 165 The similarly situated widow
claimant, however, was barred from concluding the disability evaluation
process.166 For the widow claimant lacking adequate medical evidence,
step three was a denial step.
Step four is a function step assessing the claimant's residual functional capacity as well as the physical and mental demands of her past
work. Residual functional capacity is a medical assessment of what the
claimant can still do in a work setting, despite impairment-caused physical and mental limitations. 67 It is a functional measure of the claimant's
remaining physical1 68 and mental1 69 capacity for work. That measurement is matched against the demands of the claimant's past work to determine whether she can still do such work. If the wage earner claimant
is unable to perform her previous work, she continues to step five. 170
161. Id. § 404.1525(d).
162. Id. § 404.1528.
163. Id. § 404.1526(a).
164. Id.
165. Id § 404.1520(e).
166. Id §§ 404.1577-.1578.
167. Id. § 404.1545(a).
168. Physical capacity is assessed in terms of the claimant's physical ability (e.g., strength)
to accomplish work activities on a regular and continuing basis. The activities include walking, standing, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, reaching, handling, and other physical functions. The claimant's limited ability to do these activities may be found to reduce her ability to
do work. Id. § 404.1545(b).
169. Mental capacity is an assessment of the claimant's mental ability to understand, to
carry out and remember instructions, and to respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers,
and work pressures in a work setting. Id § 404.1545(c).
170. Id. § 404.1520(e).
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Step five is a vocational step considering whether the claimant's

residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience
enable her to perform other work in the national economy. If the claimant is unable to perform other work, she is determined to be
17 1
"disabled."
Prior to January 1991,172 administrators and adjudicators applied
only steps one through three of the five-step disability evaluation process
to widow claimants.173 This truncated evaluation excluded considerations of residual functional capacity as well as age, education, and work
experience.174 As a consequence, the evaluation process was reduced to a
determination of (1) whether a widow's impairment presented specific
clinical findings1 75 matching those enumerated in a listed impairment or
representing some condition medically equivalent to a listed impairment,
and (2) whether the impairment satisfied the appropriate duration requirement. 176 The widow claimant subjected to this determination and
unable to produce specific clinical findings of a listed or unlisted impairment was deemed not disabled, even though her impairment may have
risen to a level of severity equivalent to a listed impairment.
171. id § 404.1520(0.
172. On May 22, 1991, HHS issued a ruling announcing its intention to "apply the 5-step
sequential evaluation process and consider residual functional capacity in determining disability for widows, widowers, and surviving divorced spouses for months prior to January 1991."
Title II: Determining Entitlement to Disability Benefits for Months Prior to January 1991 for
Widows, Widowers and Surviving Divorced Spouses Claims, Soc. Sec. Rul. 9 1-3 p, 56 Fed.
Reg. 23,589 (1991).
Previously, on September 18, 1990, HHS issued acquiescence rulings to comply with
First, Second, and Ninth Circuit holdings requiring the consideration of residual functional
capacity in determining widows' and widowers' disability entitlement. See Soc. Sec. Acq. Rul.
90-6(1), 55 Fed. Reg. 38,398 (1990); Soc. See. Acq. Rul. 90-5(2), 55 Fed. Reg. 38,400 (1990);
Soc. See. Acq. Rul. 90-7(9), 55 Fed. Reg. 38,402 (1990).
173. This instance of state stringency proved not to be an isolated incident. See, e.g.,
MEZEY, supra note 89, at 41 ("The Agency's stricter approach to disability entitlement was
also evidenced in increased denials on the basis of the no severe impairment stage of the sequential evaluation and, with a further revision of the regulations in 1980, a new formulation
of the standard used to evaluate pain.") (footnote omitted); Carolyn Weaver, Social Security
DisabilityPolicy in the 1980s and Beyond, in DISABILITY AND THE LABOR MARKET 29, 45
(Monroe Berkowitz & M. Anne Hill eds., 1989) (examining the "crisis in administration and
adjudication" following congressional passage of the 1980 periodic review legislation).
174. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1577 (1991).
175. Medical findings include symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings. Symptoms are
descriptions and statements of the claimant's physical or mental impairments. Signs are observations---corroborated by medically acceptable clinical diagnostic techniques--of the claimant's anatomical, physiological, and psychological abnormalities. Laboratory findings are
anatomical, physiological, and psychological claimant-specific phenomena confirmed by medically acceptable laboratory diagnostic techniques. Id. § 404.1528(a)-(c).
176. Id. § 404.1578.
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This outcome was ratified by internal administrative rulings governing the consideration of medical equivalency and the evaluation of
symptoms, especially pain. 177 The equivalency ruling declared the administrative policy and designated the criteria for determining disability
78
when a claimant's impairment met or equaled a listed impairment.
Policy statements proclaimed the Listing of Impairments to be "the basic
1 79
frame of reference for the medical evaluation of all disability claims.'
The statements presumed that "the severity of each listed impairment
generally preclude[d] the effective performance of any gainful work activity."' 8 0 They did not, however, equate that "level of severity" with the
claimant's residual functional capacity.' 8'
To the contrary, the ruling prohibited consideration of residual
functional capacity in determining medical equivalence.1 8 2 The ruling
expressly stated: "[I]t is incorrect to consider whether the listing is
equaled on the basis of an assessment of overall functional impairment."' 8i 3 Even when the claimant asserted a number of impairments in
combination, "[t]he functional consequences of the impairments (i.e.,
RFC [residual functional capacity]), irrespective of their nature or ex18 4
tent, cannot justify a determination of equivalence."'
The pain ruling announced the administrative policy and outlined
the consideration accorded to the claimant's symptoms, particularly
pain, in evaluating the severity of her impairment and her functional ca177.. See Titles II and XVI: Finding Disability on the Basis of Medical Considerations
Alone-The Listing of Impairments and Medical Equivalency, Soc. Sec. Rul. 83-19, S.S.R. 89
(Jan. 1983 ed.) [hereinafter SSR 83-19]; Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms, Soc. Sec.
Rul. 82-58, S.S.R. 120 (Cum. ed. 1982) [hereinafter SSR 82-58]; see also PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM (POMS) INSTRUCTIONS DI 24505.015, DI 24501.025, DI 24510.030
(1986); DONNA P. COFER, JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE:
A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURrrY HEARING PROCESS 125 (1985) ("[T]he states follow this

manual whose provisions are neither published nor subject to rulemaking under the APA.");
MEZEY, supra note 89, at 58 ("Unlike regulations and rulings, the POMS is an internal
Agency document; it is not published in the Federal Register and does not have the force of
law.").
178. SSR 83-19, supra note 177, at 89.
179.

Id. at 90 ("The listing permits adjudicators to quickly and readily identify those per-

sons who clearly have disabling impairments.").
180. Id. ("The listing contains over 100 examples of medical conditions which ordinarily
prevent an individual from engaging in any gainful activity.").
181. Id. ("When certain functional limitations are specified for a listed impairment, they
relate only to the degree of dysfunction for that particular listing section and only to the specific function identified.").
182. Id. at 91.
183. Id. ("The level of severity in any particular listing section is depicted by the given set
of findings and not by the degree of severity of any single medical finding-no matter to what
extent that finding may exceed the listed value.").
184. Id. at 91-92 (emphasis in original); cf. POMS, supra note 177, at DI 24505.015(C).
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pacity limitations.1 85 The ruling defined symptoms in terms of the claimant's own subjective perceptions of the effects of a physical or mental
impairment. 186 In addition to pain, common symptoms also included
18 7
shortness of breath and weakness.
Policy statements emphasized that the claimant's symptoms were
"not controlling for purposes of evaluating disability."18 8 Although conceding that "[s]ymptoms can sometimes suggest a greater severity of im18 9
pairment than is demonstrated by objective medical findings alone,"
the statements rejected independent reliance on symptoms as a basis for
establishing a severe impairment.1 90 Absent additional medical findings
of impairment severity, policy statements mandated the denial of a claimant's disability application, notwithstanding the intensity of her symptoms or related functional limitations.19 1
The wage-earner claimant suffering a severe impairment and significant impairment-related symptoms, such as pain, escaped this administratively mandated denial. Even if her impairment and symptoms did
not meet or equal the medical criteria for a listed impairment, she advanced to step four of the disability evaluation process.192 At step four,
adjudicators assessed her residual functional capacity. In making that
assessment, adjudicators admitted that the functionally limiting effects of
193
the claimant's symptoms "[could] play a significant role."
For the widow claimant, by contrast, the evaluation of medical
equivalence and functional limitation was sharply curtailed. Despite
proof of a severe impairment and associated symptoms, without the support of clinical signs and laboratory findings delineated by the Listing of
Impairments, the claimant's symptoms "[could not] be persuasive that
the Listing is met or equalled." 194 Further, "[n]o alleged or reported intensity of the symptoms [could] be substituted to elevate impairmentseverity to equivalency."1 95
185. SSR 82-58, supra note 177, at 120.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id at 122.
190. Id. at 121.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 120-21.
193. Id. at 121-22.
194. Id. at 121.
195. Id. (emphasis in original). The ruling expressly instructed:
[I]f pain is present and is a requisite for a listed impairment, but one (or more) of the
requisite clinical or laboratory findings for meeting the Listing is missing or are of a
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Relying on these administrative rules and regulations, adjudicators
deemed Mrs. Hill not disabled for the purposes of widows' disability benefits, even though an ALJ found her incapable of performing any relevant
categories of work. 196 This conclusion approved an administrative policy
of determining medical equivalence without weighing the combined effect and impact of a widow's multiple impairments and pain related
symptoms, or assessing and considering her residual functional capacity.
Consistent with that policy, adjudicators dismissed Mrs. Hill's
claims of medical equivalence with a summary finding that her impairments did not "meet or equal" any listed impairment. 197 Their failure to
weigh the combined effect and impact of Mrs. Hill's multiple impairments and pain, and to assess and consider her residual functional capacity, silenced narratives crucial both to the vindication of her widow's
disability entitlement and to the public recognition of her autonomy and
community. Confronting and disrupting that practice in its original administrative and succeeding judicial contexts is the critical objective of an
enabling strategy of advocacy.1 98 Before embarking on this enabling
strategy, it is imperative to understand the basis for the well-accepted
victimization strategy pressed by lawyers for disabled widows. In the
following section, I examine the ideals and practices fostering such a victimization strategy.
I.

Victimization Strategy

The ideals of traditional widows' disability advocacy conform to the
logic of administrative and adjudicative silencing. The imperative of silencing summons the deployment of structure-preserving and contextpreserving practices. 199 The product of this convergence is a victimizalesser value, complaints of "severe," "extreme," or "constant," pain will not compensate for the missing medical findings and permit an "equals" determination.
Id. (emphasis in original).
196. Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 117, at 3-4.
197. Id
198. Unger argues that critical understanding turns on "see[ing] the settled from the angle
of the unsettled." UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 19, at 65. He explains:
The settled is the region or the moment where relationships become fixed and,
through their fixity, take on a specious aura of necessity. The unsettled is the experience that discloses the perilous, uncertain, malleable quality of society. By seeing the
settled unsettled or by looking toward the disturbances that take place in its vicinity,
we begin to understand how the settled really works and what it really is.
Id.
199. Cf Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social
Change, 52 U. PIT. L. Rnv. 723, 730 (1991) ("[T]he very effort to make legal arguments may
require accepting assumptions and terms of debate that advocates most deeply wish to challenge.") (footnote omitted).
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tion strategy. 200 Formed by the ideals of benevolence and discipline, the
strategy reproduces images of widow dependence, incompetence, and deviance in daily discourse. That discourse inhibits counter narratives of
widow autonomy and community.
A.

Structure-Preserving Practices

Structure-preserving practices fortify the ideals of benevolence and
discipline against contest from oppositional narratives. Fortification
squanders opportunities to realign ideological hierarchy and reorganize
client-lawyer roles and relations. Hierarchy welds the ideals of benevolence and discipline to the strategy of victimization. 20 1
Three practices rationalize this fusion.2 02 The first relies on disclaimer. Put simply, the lawyer denies privileging benevolent and disciplinary ideals. Instead, she invokes a series of natural or necessitarian
defenses, all consistent with a victimization strategy. 20 3 Disability lawyers rely on disclaimer to disavow expressions or acts of paternalism and
devaluation, preferring to mention widows' natural state of dependence
and incompetence 2°4 or the necessity of portraying claimants in that
200. Cf KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY (1988) (discussing the social
construction of discrimination victims).
For the private bar, economic incentives may encourage the use of victimization strategies. See SAFILIOS-RoTHsCHILD, supra note 40, at 260 ("Because the lawyer has a vested
interest (the size of his fee) in presenting his client's disability as maximum, he is often portrayed as being preoccupied with his client's being labeled considerably or totally and permanently disabled."). The public bar is similarly preoccupied, though for altruistic, rather than
economic, reasons.
201. Hierarchy controls latent controversy over the election of ideals and practices. Without hierarchy, disability practice would degenerate into a situation of direct client-lawyer and
client-state struggle. Cf Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law, supra note 20, at 693 n.212
(recipient mother physical assault of Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants
and Children (WIC) program staff member).
202. Unger describes these framework-denying devices as techniques of avoidance. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 19, at 133-35.
203. Cf Safilios-Rothschild, supra note 35, at 40 (claiming that rehabilitation professionals
often "define the self-concepts, goals, and inner motivations of disabled persons and determine
their 'real' wishes and potential.., either without asking the individuals about their problems,
preferred solutions, and alternatives or by openly disregarding all information received from
the disabled persons themselves about desirable goals and solutions").
204. See SAFILIos-ROTHsCHILD, supra note 40, at 123 ("Through the 'spread' phenomenon of perceptual association, the nondisabled tend to create consistently and on the whole
usually negative impressions about the disabled person, who is then necessarily viewed as inferior in terms of all possible attributes simply on the basis of his visible or known but nonvisible
disability.") (footnote omitted). Cf Bogdan & Biklen, supra note 6, at 16 (defining handicapism as a "set of assumptions and practices that promote the differential and unequal treatment
of people because of apparent or assumed physical, mental, or behavioral differences") (citations omitted).
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guise. 20 5 In the lexicon of disability advocacy, widows are naturally dependent upon the largess of a spouse or the state. Their dependence is of
two kinds: economic and psychological. This dual dependence is ingrained and irrevocable.
In the same vocabulary, widows are naturally incompetent, that is,
they are by intrinsic disposition physically and mentally unable to manage independent, self-sufficient lives. This incapacity logically depletes
their decisionmaking and self-help skills. Coinciding with their natural
state of dependence, widows' parallel state of incompetence is
irreversible.
Even when disability lawyers reject the notion of a naturalorder of
widow dependence and incompetence, they readily take up the cloak of
dependence and incompetence in their advocacy. Their justification is
bluntly instrumental: to gain an advantage in obtaining or safeguarding 20 6 widows' benefits. The advantage they seek appertains to discourse
and to images. By wrapping their clients' disability claims in the imagery
and language of dependence and incompetence, they appeal to the ideological inclinations of administrators and adjudicators. Under both natural and necessitarian logics, therefore, disability lawyers implement the
same cluster of ideals and discourses.
A second practice rests on idealization. Here, the lawyer justifies
7
the ideals of benevolence and discipline on the grounds of efficiency. 20
Easily invoked and manipulated,20 8 efficiency epitomizes an instrumental
logic guided by considerations of time management and resource saving.
This logic obeys two recurring institutional mandates of disability administration and adjudication: time abatement and resource conservation. 20 9
205. See Safilios-Rothschild, supra note 35, at 40 ("Mhe goals and solutions arrived at by
the experts often serve to keep the disabled within the constraints of the inferior and dependent
role reserved for the disabled as a category and to discourage any significant deviations from
it.").
206. Disabled widows are subject to periodic review to determine whether they have experienced any medical improvement in their impairments and, if so, whether such improvement is related to their ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1579(a).
207. See Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 17, at 2130 (discussing
temporal and emotional measures of efficiency).
208. See Stanley S. Herr, Representationof Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and
Control, 17 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 609, 639 (1989-90).
209. See BERKowrrz, supra note 89, at 229 ("Rising disability insurance costs precipitated a major effort to reduce incentives to go on the disability rolls, producing first a major
reform of the Social Security Disability Insurance program (in 1980) and then a major reform
of the reform (in 1984).").
In 1990, a bipartisan congressional Special Committee on Aging investigated the Social
Security Administration's disability determination system. The investigation found the system
to be "erring on the side of bureaucratic injustice: individuals who are disabled are being
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Disability lawyers cite efficiency in excluding widows from the planning
and conduct of hearing and litigation strategy. Measuring advocacy efficiency in terms of the investment of lawyer time and resources, they contend that the inclusion of widows in hearing and litigation strategy slows
2 10
the pace and drains the stock of advocacy.
A third practice depends on concession. In this instance, the lawyer
admits the contingency of benevolent and disciplinary ideals, but retains
her adherence to those ideals, pronouncing widow narrative discontinuities as temporary. The fact that such discontinuities may upset clientlawyer and client-state discursive routines is discounted, given their mini-

mal scale and brief duration.
The chief requirement of concession is classifying client-lawyer narrative discontinuities as temporary. Without a rhetorical taxonomy
available to classify and evaluate discursive conflicts, closer inspection of
the conflict, both as to form and substance, might prove obligatory. Burdened by this obligation, disability lawyers might not so easily discount
or minimize the incongruity of their own natural or necessitarian discourse when matched against the oppositional narratives of disabled
widow clients.
denied benefits." S. REP. No. 28, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1991) ("According to SSA's own
studies, while the number of people who received benefits in error has not changed appreciably, the number of people who are denied in error has increased by over one-third in the last 5
years."). The Senate Report recited the findings of the investigation:
The Senate study identified a severe budget crisis facing the Disability Determinations Services (DDSs), which are administered by the States for SSA. The majority of State DDS directors stated in a survey that they had inadequate funds to
perform their duties properly. Budget shortfalls forced the DDSs to take shortcuts,
delay responses, and go without needed medical evidence which might help them
make fairer decisions.
The study found that these problems leave the DDSs in the tenuous position of
doing little more than crisis management. The survey of the State disability determination directors shows that 72 percent of the States do not have adequate staff to
process their caseloads in a timely manner and that the situation is growing progressively worse. Many disability examiners are now forced to cut corners, eliminating
all consultative examinations and discontinuing any reviews of pending Continuing
Disability Review (CDR) cases.
Unfortunately, the impact of staff reductions implemented during the 1980's,
inadequate budgetary resources, and the sheer administrative complexity of the disability determination process have left the system unable to properly fulfill its mission.
Ia
210. Cf Tremblay, A Tragic View, supra note 20, (manuscript at 33) ("It seems to be a fair
inquiry, and an important ethical inquiry, to wonder whether the lawyers who choose to educate clients less about the complexities of their case in order to have time to offer some representation to other excluded clients are not modelling a more effective poverty law practice.").
See also Tremblay, A Community-Based Ethic, supra note 48, at 1110-29 (describing the rationing of care in subsidized law practice).
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Structure-preserving practices blunt challenges to a victimization
strategy of advocacy. Their appeal lies in their restraint. 2 11 Asserted
separately in terms of role requirements or in combination with relational
requirements, these practices make limited claims of desirability, couching their defense of client-lawyer role and relation configurations in natural or necessitarian claims. These claims count on the reinforcement of
entrenched hierarchy to prevail. 2 12 Hierarchy is integral to natural and
necessitarian defenses of structure-preserving practices. With hierarchical client-lawyer roles and relations already firmly in place, there is no
need to mount a strong claim of desirability. Hierarchical roles and relations, it is argued, are simply the natural or necessary order of things.
The conventions of advocacy supply proof of this "common sense" observation. To construe the client-lawyer relation otherwise is evidently
to misapprehend an elementary and immutable ordering of the social
world. At bottom, it is the dominant-subordinate positions of client-lawyer hierarchy that arrange the roles and relations of advocacy as well as
the context-preserving practices which sustain them.
B. Context-Preserving Practices
Context-preserving practices circulate benevolent and disciplinary
ideals in the discourse of widows' disability advocacy. The natural and
necessitarian logic of that victimization discourse is evident in both the
Hill hearing2 13 and litigation 214 strategies.
211.

See, eg., Phil Brown, Public Policy and the Rights of Mental Patients, 6

MENTAL

DISABILITY L. REP. 55, 56 (1982) [hereinafter Brown, The Rights ofMental Patients](describ-

ing the restraint of federal community health program advocacy as compared to "communitybased struggles for the control of human services programs and facilities").
212. The entrenchment of hierarchy undermines the liberal notion of the client as an autonomous self-directed subject, thus rendering the modality of consent problematic. Compare
Safilios-Rothschild, supra note 35, at 41 ("[T]he disabled are said to accept their disability
when they accept not only their strictly functional limitations but also the stereotyped 'appropriate' role that implies their being different from the nondisabled and thereby deviant.") with
MICHAEL P. MALONEY & MICHAEL P. WARD, MENTAL RETARDATION AND MODERN SOCI-

ETY 286 (1979) ("The data that are available ...strongly indicate a broad negative response by
mentally retarded persons to being called 'mentally retarded.' ").

213. Cf Kristin Bumiller, Fallen Angels: The Representation of Violence Against Women
in Legal Culture, 18 INT'L J. Soc. L. 125 (1990) (rape trial).
214. Cf Naomi R. Cahn,Defining Feminist Litigation, 14 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 1 (1991)
(women's rights litigation).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43

(1) HearingDiscourse
The narratives and images elicited at Mrs. Hill's hearing comport
with the administrative ideals of benevolence and discipline. 2 15 Consistent with the administrative regulations symbolic of those ideals, Mrs.
Hill's lawyers devised a strategy of victimization 2 16 calculated to show
her as physically dependent and incompetent and, therefore, socially
2 17
devalued.
The Hill lawyers commenced their victimization strategy with Mrs.
Hill's testimony of spousal and state dependence.
Q What is your marital status, Miss [sic] Hill?
A I'm a widow.
Q How long have you been widowed?
218
A I think it's about 19 years.
Q What income or resources do you have?
2 19
A Public assistance.

To bolster the image of dependence, they highlighted Mrs. Hill's
sparse work history. 220 In the opening statement, the Hill lawyers em215.

See MARVIN SCHWARTZ, THE TRIAL OF A SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CASE 4-

41(1983).
216. See, eg., Ronald R. Gilbert &J. Douglas Peters, The Social Security DisabilityClaim,
16 A.B.A. LAW NOTES 1, 3 (1980) ("[I]t is important for the claimant's attorney to ask questions that highlight the strongest claim or claims for disability."); Toby Golick & Judson Jennings, How to Handle a Disability Insurance Case, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 222, 222 (1972)
("[I]n order to obtain benefits without difficulty in practice, a claimant must be extremely
disabled.").
The claimant may contribute to this strategy. See Fred Davis & James Reynolds, Profile
of a Social Security Disability Case, 42 Mo. L. REv.541, 542 (1977) ("[The private sector
experience has indicated a clear but subtle psychological incentive on the parts of persons
covered by disability insurance policies to create or encourage conditions which would make
them eligible for benefits.") (footnote omitted).
217. Discourse that defines claimants in terms of deviance is encouraged by a decade of
increasingly restrictive congressional legislation, judicial interpretation, administrative
rulemaking, and cost containment policies. See Bruce K. Miller, Opposing the President'sSocial Security Cutbacks: The Issues at Stake for Poor People, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 181
(1979); Jonathan Stein & Richard Weishaupt, A Sign of the Times, or Why We Are Winning
FewerDisability Cases, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.24 (1981).
Claimant witnesses may unwittingly embrace this discourse. See Anthony J. Russo, The
Social Security Disability Programs: Representing Claimants Under the Changing Law, 14
STETSON L. REV. 131, 154 (1984) ("The witness may inadvertently exaggerate or denigrate the
extent of the illness to the ALJ because he doesn't understand what the judge needs to
know.").
218. Record at 33, Hill v. Sullivan, 125 F.R.D. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Civ. No. 87-4344)
[hereinafter Record] (hearing held on April 8, 1986).
219. Id. at 35.
220. See Jerome Smith, Social Security Appeals in DisabilityCases, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 13,
21 (1976) ("It is wise for an attorney to discuss with the claimant his past and current attempts
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phasized Mrs. Hill's "[v]ery limited work history. ' 2 2 1 They also insisted
that because her work history was "unskilled" Mrs. Hill possessed "no
'222
transferrable skills."
223
Q When did you last work, Miss [sic] Hill?

A

1971[.]

Q And in what position did you work...?
A Billing clerk.
Q [C]ould you describe your job as a billing clerk for us?
A I used to record the amount of contributions that was sent in
Q How many days a week did you work as a billing clerk in
1971?
A Think it was about 3 days a week.
Q How many hours a day?
A Four.
Q And how long did you continue in your position as a billing
clerk?
224
A Worked there about 4 months.
Q

...Why did you leave work?

A My health.
Q Have you since tried to return to work?
A Yes, I, yes.
Q And could you describe what efforts you've made to return to
work?
A I went to volunteer service, Division of Volunteer Service.
Q Could you specify dates for us? When did you go?
A '84.
Q

What did you do ...for Volunteer Services?

A Record the days that the people came into work so they could
get the coffee.
Q And how long did you work for Volunteer Services [?]
A 2 months.
Q And why did you leave after 2 months?
225
A My health.

to work. Many administrative law judges feel that effective evidence of disability is found in
unsuccessful work attempts.").
221. Record, supra note 218, at 31.
222. Id
223. Record, supra note 218, at 35-36.
224. Id. at 36.
225. Id. at 37.
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Q ... Were there any other health problems that caused you to
leave work?
A Yes.
Q Please describe them.
A My hypertension.
Q ... [Hjow did that affect you at that point?
A I was getting dizzy and sick. And when I take my medication
I fall asleep at the desk.
Q ... [S]ince your attempt to return to work in 1984, have you
made any additional attempts to return to work?
A No, I haven't.
Q Why not?
2 26
A Again, because of my health.
To further diminish Mrs. Hill's work history, the Hill lawyers
sought to maximize the physical demands of her work, but minimize its
economic value.
Q ... [Clan you describe for us exactly what you did during the
course of a day? Let us begin, for example, with the time you
spent sitting or standing or walking on the job.
A About a half an hour [sitting] for a time and then I'll go to the
bathroom and get a rest.
... [How many hours did you spend sitting during the entire
period?...
A ... I think it's maybe about 3 hours.
Q ... [Hiow much time did you spend standing and walking?
...The remainder of the time?
Q

A

Yes.

227

Q Now, what kind of machinery or tools did you use on the job?
A Pens, paper, no typewriter.
Q Did you have to do any kind of lifting or carrying on the job?
A No.
Q Did you have to do any kind of grasping or use your hands to
manipulate pens?
A Yes.
Q ... Did you require any training for these jobs?
A No.
Q Could you return to either of those jobs?
A No.
Q Why not?
226.
227.

Id. at 37-38.
Id. at 38-39.
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A ...[T]hey wouldn't accept me back.
Q Why?
22 8
A I'm a risk, a health risk.

Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
A

229
...[C]ould you do the work on a full-time basis?
No.
By full-time I mean an 8 hour a day, 5 days a weekNo.
Why not?
It would be too strenuous for me.
Could you explain why?
One, I cannot use my hands like I used to. TwoHow do you mean you can't use your hands like you used to?
Well, when I write too long, my right hand gives out.
You are right-handed?
Yes I am.
Any additional problems that would prevent you tfm going
back on a full-time basis?
My health.

I'm on30 quite a bit of medication and it makes me very
2
tired.

Q ...[D]uring the course of a day, how do you feel because of
the medication?
A Tired, listless.
Q Do you ever suffer from dizziness?
A Yes.
Q Do you ever suffer from nausea?
A Yes.
Q ... [P]rior to 1971 did you hold any other jobs?
23 1
A No.
Having adduced evidence of Mrs. Hill's scant work history and her
imputed dependence on spousal support and state public assistance, the
Hill lawyers focused on demonstrating her physical incompetence to
work.2 32 Proof of incompetence was gleaned from Mrs. Hill's testimony
228.

Id. at 40.

229.

Id. at 41. This question was prompted by the ALJ's brief colloquy with Mrs. Hill:
Q Ma'am, could you do the work?
A Yes.

Id. at 40.
230. Id. at 41.
231. Id. at 42.
232. See David S. Bloomfield, Disability Claims Under the Social Security Act: A Practitioners' Guide to Administrative Procedures, 6 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 371, 384-85 (1977) ("The
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concerning the functional impact of her impairments,
manifold pain.

234
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233

especially her

Q ...How long do you have to sit before you experience [back]
pain?
A About a hour or so.
Q Then how long will it stay with you?
A It will stay with me until I go laydown [sic].
Q

... How often during the day, typical work day that you

A
Q
A

spend at home, do you have to lie down and rest? How many
hours during that day?
Oh, about 4 or 5 hours.
And the remaining hours of the day, what do you do?
Get up sometimes I'll go to my sister's house.
How do you get there?
I'll walk and sometime I take a cab.
How far is your sister's house from your home?
I think it's about 5 blocks, I'm not quite sure about that, but I
think it's about 5.
How long does it take you to walk 5 blocks from your home
to your sister's?
About 45 minutes.
Have you actually timed that trip?
Yes I did.

Q

...[A]re you walking constantly during that period?

A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q

A
Q
A
Q
A

Well, I have to stop and rest sometimes.
Why do you have to stop and rest?
Because I get shortness of breath and pain in my chest.
Would you describe that shortness of breath for us?
It's like a ball coming up in my throat and it cuts off the
circulation.
Q How often do you suffer from shortness of breath?
A I get them everyday.
Q Without exertion?
function of an attorney at the hearing level should be to establish the manner in which these
particular medical findings affect the particular client's ability to work.").
233. Heavy reliance on claimant testimony is a function of the "fractured nature of health
care delivery systems for the poor." Charles K. Barber, Social Security Disability Hearings:
SecuringAdditional Medical Evidencefor the Indigent Claimant, 37 ADMIN. L. REv. 479, 480
(1985). See also Mark S. Coven, Problems with the Disability Adjudicatory Process, 15
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 26, 26 (1981) ("Physicians in the community have little understanding
of the provisions and requirements of the disability insurance claims, applicants are often erroneously stamped with the welfare label, and physician cooperation is frequently difficult to
obtain.").
234. Mrs. Hill complained of daily chest, back, and abdominal pain. She also mentioned
shoulder and groin pain. Record, supranote 218, at 43-44, 45-46. Indeed, she stated: "I don't
go without pain. I have pain everyday." Id. at 50.

April 1992]
A

DISABLED CLIENTS, DISABLING LAWYERS
yes.

235

To emphasize the functional severity of Mrs. Hill's multiple impairments, the Hill lawyers proffered a particularized showing of her physical
restrictions. The accumulation of these restrictions accentuated the
images of Mrs. Hill's incompetence.
Q ... How long in that 8-hour day do you, ... think you can
stand?
A An hour or two.
Q And what happens? What makes you sit down?
A Terrific pains.
Q ... [W]hat do you do when these pains hit?
A I go get my pills, put a nitroglycerin under my tongue, and I
go lay down.
Q ... [Iow long do you have to lay down?
A I go to sleep ....
Q How long can you sit in an 8 hour day... ?
A Without twitching, about 2 hours.
Q And then what happens?
236

A

I start having pains.

Q
A

How much can you lift at one time in terms of weight?
I think I could approximately lift 5 pounds.

Q

Could you pick up a 5 pound bag of sugar once every hour...

A
Q
A
Q
A

No.
... [D]o you have any problems bending?
Yes, I do.
What kind of problems do you have?
Pain in the stomach and the back.

A And dizziness.
Q Do you have any problems climing [sic] stairs?
A Yes.
Q What kind of problems?
237
A I get out of breath. I have pains of the chest.
The detailed summary of Mrs. Hill's physical restrictions established her workplace incompetence. The Hill lawyers then extended the
238
range of Mrs. Hill's incompetence to her household.
235.
236.
237.
238.
work[.]"

Id. at 44-45.
Id at 47.
Id. at 48-49.
In contrast, the HHS Medical Adviser testified that Mrs. Hill "could do houseId. at 56.
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Q Let's discuss household chores for a few minutes. Now you
A
Q
A
Q
A

testified that you live with your daughter and your
granddaughter?
Yes.
Who does the shopping around the house?
My daughter does.
Do you do any shopping at all?
Well, if I go my sister's, I may pick up one or two things, but
nothing heavy.

Q Who does the cleaning in the house?
A My daughter does.
Q Do you do any cleaning at all?
A No, . . . straightening, cause I've always maintained my
home.
Q ... Who does cooking in the house?
A My daughter.
Q ... [What do you do all day?
A I sleep, read, look at television.
Q Do any housework?
A Itry.
239
A Sometimes I wash dishes. Sometimes I will try to cook.
The ideals and images forming the discursive practice of the Hill
hearing strategy also shaped the litigation strategy. That strategy
adopted the same ideals of benevolence and discipline, and the corresponding images of dependence, incompetence, and deviance in formulating its discursive practices. To the extent that those practices further
muted Mrs. Hill's narratives, they made victimization strategy an even
24 °
more powerful instrument of silencing.

(2) Litigation Discourse
The Hill litigation strategy of victimization shifted the primary locus of discourse from Mrs. Hill to her lawyers. Under both a natural and
necessitarian analysis, the shift from an allegedly client-centered to a
lawyer-centered discourse accords with the move from an administrative
to a judicial context. This contextual move carries a different set of discursive practices apportioned to the technical complexities of litigation.
Those complexities rule out the inclusion of anything but the most con239. Id. at 50-51.
240. Cf Safilios-Rothschild, supra note 35, at 44 ("The stereotyped beliefs about the limited mental and physical capacities of the disabled and the inferior status assigned to them
have had a considerably negative effect on the self-confidence and self-esteem of the
disabled.").
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trolled client narratives. On this analysis, even the restricted narratives
typical of Mrs. Hill's administrative hearing are unacceptable.
The nullification of Mrs. Hill's narratives in litigation is an accredited advocacy strategy devised to fit the ideals and discourses of the Social Security Act. Nullification permits disability lawyers to stress the
victimization of disabled widows and thereby appeal to the ideal and discourse of paternalism. The supplicating plea to paternalism avoids the
risk of judicial misconstruction posed by accenting oppositional
narratives.
The necessitarian logic of victimization was an integral part of the
Hill litigation strategy. That logic mandates both overt and covert lawyer acts of silencing. Overt acts exclude the client from participation in
litigation activities such as investigation, planning, drafting, trial, and negotiation. Covert acts exclude the client's narratives from full exposition
in the discursive routines of pleadings, motions, and memoranda.
The Hill lawyers mastered each method of exclusion. Indeed, nowhere did Mrs. Hill participate in the core activities of litigation. Subsequent to the exhaustion of administrative remedies and commencement
of the civil action, Mrs. Hill's participation was confined largely to status
conferences and ministerial tasks24 1 related to the amendment of the
original complaint and her standing to serve as class representative on
243
behalf of similarly situated widows. 242 After discharging these tasks,
Mrs. Hill was periodically apprised of litigation developments. Active
consultation concentrated instead on the investigation of new medical
evidence. 244
Nor did Mrs. Hill's lawyers integrate her narratives into the discursive texts of the litigation pleadings, motions, and memoranda.
Although they compiled a voluminous litigation record, the Hill lawyers
collected only two documents-the administrative hearing transcript and
an affidavit 245-containing fragments of Mrs. Hill's narratives. Like her
hearing testimony, Mrs. Hill's affidavit is effectively muted by the discourse of victimization. The two page affidavit announces that Mrs. Hill
241. Typical ministerial tasks assigned to Mrs. Hill included the review and execution of
documents drafted by the Hill lawyers.
242. See Plaintiff's Notice of Motion for Class Certification at 2, Hill v. Sullivan, 125
F.R.D. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Civ. No. 87-4344).
243. The lawyers also obtained Mrs. Hill's consent to additional plaintiff intervention. See
Proposed Notice of Motion for Intervention-Class Action at 1.
244. In the event of a federal district court remand to HHS, the new medical evidence
would speed the redetermination of Mrs. Hill's widow's benefit claim. 20 C.F.R. § 404.983.
245. The affidavit was drafted in support of a preliminary Hill motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. See Ex Parte Order for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis at 2.
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is the plaintiff in a civil action seeking to annul a federal agency's decision denying her application for widows' disability insurance benefits because she is disabled and unable to work. The affidavit identifies her
residence and household composition. Additionally, it tabulates her
meager income and resources. Albeit the main purpose of the affidavit,
this tabulation stresses a narrative of dependence, rather than an alternative narrative of economic vulnerability. The salience of this distinction
hinges on the misleading but common sense conflation of dependence
and victimization. While it is possible to dismantle the notion of dependence, rendering it less evocative of passivity and helplessness, the better
option is to select a more exact notion, in this instance, economic
vulnerability.
The discursive routines of the Hill pleadings, motions, and memoranda are no less stringent in silencing Mrs. Hill's narratives. The pleadings, for example, articulate three central narratives: dependence,
incompetence, and deviance. Dependence is verified by Mrs. Hill's public source of income and marital status.24 6 Incompetence is confirmed by
her physical impairments. 247 Deviance is validated by her inability to
work. Only in the original complaint is there mention of Mrs. Hill's multigenerational household. 248 Without the predicate of family support,
Mrs. Hill's ideal of community and narrative of solidarity are extinguished. It is the predicate of family that implies the intersecting communities of widows and the disabled. 249
The Hill motions and memoranda either countenance or repeat the
narratives of dependence, incompetence, and deviance. The motion for
class certification, for instance, fails to refer explicitly to subordinate narratives, sacrificing a valuable opportunity to find mutual vulnerability
and solidarity in the narratives of similarly situated widows. The motion
for intervention, by contrast, includes a four page affidavit of a proposed
plaintiff-intervenor that reveals the potential vitality of oppositional nar246. By the commencement of the Hill action on June 19, 1987, HHS had begun issuing
Mrs. Hill monthly SSI benefits. See Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 117, at 3; Plaintiff's First
Amended Complaint-Class Action at 6, Hill v. Sullivan, 125 F.R.D. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Civ.
No. 87-4344) [hereinafter Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint-Class Action]. The SSI grant
enabled Mrs. Hill to forego public assistance.
247. Mrs. Hill's impairments are briefly catalogued in one paragraph of the Hill complaints. See Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 117, at 3; Plaintiff's First Amended ComplaintClass Action, supra note 246, at 6.
248. See Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 117, at 3.
249. See PATRICIA SIMPSON, LIVING IN POVERTY (1990) (claiming the continued integrity of extended family networks in poor communities).
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25 0
ratives, particularly the narratives of vulnerability and solidarity.
Although the affidavit presents the narratives in an inchoate form, they
are powerfully spoken. The narrative of solidarity is articulated in a
statement regarding the plaintiff-intervenor's reliance on "friends, relatives, and neighbors" to drive her to the doctor.251 The narrative of vulnerability is expressed in a statement concerning the plaintiff-intervenor's
housing. She states:
I have been unable to afford to rent my own apartment. Instead, I live
in my mother's cramped, one-bedroom apartment with both my
mother and my adult son. My mother sleeps in the bedroom, while my
son and I sleep in the living room. There is no space2 52in the living room
to put a bed and therefore I must sleep on a sofa.

The motions for summary judgment and supporting memoranda retreat from these alternative narratives, 253 reasserting the images of widows' dependence, incompetence, and deviance. The image of
dependence, in both spousal and state forms, is mentioned repeatedly.
The Hill lawyers describe Mrs. Hill as "the widow of David Hill, a wageearner who had paid into the Social Security Trust Fund to provide security for himself and his family."' 254 They extend this dependent status
to the entire plaintiff class, asserting that:
Many class members, like Marjorie Hill, are widows who depended
upon the income of their deceased spouses for support and, as a result,
are not eligible for Social Security benefits based on their own work
records. Their deceased husbands worked for years and contributed to
for
the Social Security Trust Fund to provide a modicum of security
2 55
their families in the event of their own death or disability.
The Hill lawyers reinforced the image of widows' dependency by
stressing Mrs. Hill's subsistence reliance on state public assistance, adare
ding that "[d]isabled widows denied [widows' disability] benefits
'256
often reduced to poverty or near poverty levels of subsistence.
The image of incompetence is also reiterated. The Hill lawyers introduce this image to delineate the limits of Mrs. Hill's household activi250. See Affidavit of Proposed Plaintiff-Intervenor at 1-4, Hill v. Sullivan, 125 F.R.D. 86
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Civ. No. 87-4344).
251. Id. at 4.
252. Id. at 3.
253. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on ClassWide Claims at 5-11, Hill v. Sullivan, 125 F.R.D. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Civ. No. 87-4344);
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 3-16, Hill v.
Sullivan, 125 F.R.D. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Civ. No. 87-4344).
254. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on ClassWide Claims, supra note 253, at 5.
255. Id. at 9.
256. Id. at 9-10.
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ties. They assert: "Due to constant pain and shortness of breath, [Mrs.
Hill] is unable to perform basic household activities such as cleaning,
cooking, and shopping. '2 57 Next, they extend the image of incompetence
to sedentary work, maintaining that "Mrs. Hill's combined impairments
and pain are sufficiently severe to leave her unable to perform even sedentary work. '2 58 In their concluding argument, they extend the reach of
incompetence to address the dispositive subject of gainful activity. Here,
they contend: "Mrs. Hill's testimony, documented by treating physician
opinion and medical records, demonstrated that she lacks the functional
capacity to engage in any gainful activity on a sustained basis without
'25 9
chronic pain and disabling physical limitations.
The image of deviance is similarly recapitulated. In this instance,
the Hill lawyers mix gender, caretaker, nonwage-earner, and impairment
imagery to stigmatize Mrs. Hill. They assert: "Mrs. Hill presents a limited history of employment because of her ongoing responsibilities as a
mother of four children and because of the disabling impact of her medi'260
cal impairments, spanning more than twenty five years.
The Hill lawyers' mastery of victimization strategy and its component methods of overt and covert client silencing is manifest in the exceptional results of their litigation efforts. At the district court level, they
prevailed in opposing the United States Department of Health and
Human Services' (HHS) motion to dismiss. 261 Moreover, they obtained
class certification 262 and intervention. 26 3 Seven circuit courts of appeals
have similarly granted preliminary and permanent forms of relief in favor
of disabled widows. 264 Numerous district courts have also granted
265
relief.
257. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, supra
note 253, at 4.
258. Id at 22.
259. Id at 27.
260. Id at 7.
261. Hill v. Sullivan, 125 F.R.D. 86, 88, 90-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
262. Id. at 88, 93-96.
263. Id. at 88, 96.
264. See Marcus v. Sullivan, 926 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1991); Finkelstein v. Sullivan, 924
F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1991); Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1990); Davidson v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 912 F.2d 1246 (10th Cir. 1990); Ruffv. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 915
(9th Cir. 1990); Cassas v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 893 F.2d 454 (1st Cir. 1990);
Kier v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1989).
265. See Parks v. Sullivan, 766 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Laffin v. Sullivan, 759 F.
Supp. 479 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Robinson v. Sullivan, 733 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Begley v.
Sullivan, Civ. 3-88-0841, slip op. (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 20, 1990); Maxey v. Sullivan, No. CIV.A.
88-1004-T, 1989 WL 99310 (D. Kan. Aug. 8, 1989); Rizzo v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 708 F. Supp. 520 (W.D.N.Y. 1989); Crowder v. Sullivan, No. 87-C-I 1229-4250, 1989
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The triumph of the Hill litigation strategy, together with its predecessor and successor suits, follows the direction of necessitarian logic.
The necessitarian route re-entrenches benevolent and disciplinary ideals
of widows' disability. This logic is not inescapable. Victimization strategies of advocacy exhibit both reversionist and revisionist tendencies.
Reversionist tendencies are best indicated by the habitual lawyer readoption of natural and necessitarian logics to guide disability advocacy. Revisionist tendencies are detected in the regular switching of ideals and
discourses in all three juridical contexts, again most prominently in advocacy. These cycles are marked by conceptual shifts that break down and
reconsolidate the meaning of ideals and practices. 266 The shifts are continuing, acted out in the daily routines of client-lawyer roles and rela2 67
tions. As such, the shifts are recognizable.
The disintegration and reinvention of the ideals and practices of victimization dispel the illusion that all practices associated with dominant
structures and routines must be rejected. 2 68 The impulse to reject traditional practices springs from impatience with the intermediate stages of
reconstruction. Enacting change is a piecemeal endeavor.2 69 Hierarchical roles must be carefully disassembled and recombined, relational positions extricated and reassigned.
These transformations will cause tensions in the discursive routines
of disability advocacy. Some lawyers will respond defensively to these
tensions, others defiantly.2 70 Others will compensate by reverting to natWL 65149 (E.D. Wis. 1989); Carathers v. Bowen, No. 85-C-6560, 1987 WL 12944 (N.D. Ill.
1987); Williams v. Bowen, 660 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Headlee v. Heckler, 708 F.
Supp. 1167 (D. Colo. 1987); Williams v. Bowen, 636 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Boyd v.
Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 626 F. Supp. 1252 (W.D.N.Y. 1986); Hamby v. Heckler,
607 F. Supp. 331 (W.D.N.C. 1985); Taggart v. Heckler, 576 F. Supp. 624 (W.D. Ark. 1984).
266. Unger describes periods of breakdown and reconsolidation as central to Marx's social
theory. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 19, at 205-06.
267. See SUSAN M. OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DisABLED PERSONS (1984); Marshall B. Kapp, Book Review, 10 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILrY L. REP. 76, 77 (1986) (attesting that "mutual cooperation and the sharing of authority and
responsibility among partners, rather than de facto client dependence, is the optimum attorney/client relationship").
268. The theme of disintegration is central to Unger. He contends that "the disintegrating
traditions [of social thought] have forged many of the instruments required for their transformation." UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 19, at 143.
269. On the piecemeal nature of institutional and imaginative change, see UNGER, SOCIAL
THEORY, supra note 19, at 157. See also Lucie White, Paradox,Piece-Work and Patience, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1992).
270. Cf Alan Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 1121, 1156 (1983) ("The more basic an element of the culture, the more diffident a
member of the group will be in modifying it and the more violent will be the attack by the
group on anyone who suggests change.").
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ural or necessitarian practices. 27 1 The hope is that many will revisit narratives to transform dominant discourse.
IV.

Enabling Strategy

The transformation of victimization strategies into enabling strategies of disability advocacy requires the development and implementation
of an alternative set of ideals and practices. Progress in such applied
development is unlikely to follow a prescribed sequence. Rather, progress is more likely to advance through experimental variations within
traditional advocacy structures and routines. 272
To consolidate experimental variations into a sustained strategy and
vision of advocacy, disability lawyers must compile two sets of alternative practices: structure-transforming, and context-transforming. Structure-transforming practices seek to subvert the dominant ideals of
disability advocacy by redefining client-lawyer roles. The goal of redefinition is to interrupt lawyer cycles of ideological reversion. Reversion
cycles reintroduce natural and necessitarian logics into advocacy. Attendant to this reintroduction is the reinstallation of hierarchical clientlawyer roles. Reasserting her dominant role, the lawyer reverts back to
traditional ideals to justify long-standing discursive practices.
Context-transforming practices seek to disrupt the dominant routines of disability advocacy by reorganizing client-lawyer relations. The
aim of reorganization is the alteration of established divisions of labor.
Traditional divisions distinguish between task-definition and task-execution. Task-definition refers to the lawyer's function of making tasks.
Task-execution pertains to the client's job of following tasks.
A.

Oppositional Narratives

The development of structure-transforming and context-transforming disability advocacy practices is prodded by the oppositional narratives of disabled widows. 273 The narratives I assemble here are
271. Cf Minow, supra note 199, at 732 ("Working within existing legal rules makes it
difficult to resist the patterns that our experiences as outsiders should lead us to protest.").
272. The fields of homelessness and community development have proven to be fertile
grounds for experimentation. See Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861
(1992); Ronald Slye, Community Institution Building: A Response to the Limits of Litigation in
Addressing the Problem of Homelessness, 36 VILL. L. REv. 1035 (1991); Lucie E. White, Representing "The Real Deal," 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 271 (1990-91). See generally Symposium,
Buffalo Change and Community, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 313 (1991).
273. See Piven, supra note 11, at 269 ("There is at least a developing agreement that ideas
pattern action, and that oppositional ideas underlie oppositional action.").
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cumulative, representing an aggregate discourse informed by the Hill litigation and amplified by additional disability advocacy spanning a six
274
year period.
The concurrent administration of Marjorie Hill's OASDI and SSI
claims 275 ensnared five interrelated narratives. Had disability administrators considered Mrs. Hill's OASDI claim in isolation, without the
fuller inquiry of residual function capacity and work ability demanded by
SSI determinations, 276 her narratives would be absent. Even with the
closer scrutiny and factual findings required in SSI determinations, Mrs.
277
Hill's narratives are barely heard.
The first of Mrs. Hill's administratively silenced narratives addressed the meaning and valorization of work.278 This is the narrative of
uncounted work;2 7 9 it describes the devaluation of widows' domestic and
household labor devoted to the care of children and family. 280 As a
mother 281 and spouse, 282 Mrs. Hill engaged in years of uncounted domes274. During this six year period, I represented disabled widows both as a legal aid lawyer
and as a clinical law professor.
275. Widows may file concurrent claims under the OASDI and SSI programs. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.350 (1991).
276. SSI determinations include assessment and consideration of the claimant's residual
functional capacity and work ability. Id § 416.920(e)-(f).
277. Mrs. Hill's narratives may have been not only silenced, but also engulfed by the process of victim role enactment. See SCHUR, supra note 10, at 69 (on the social-psychological
experience of role engulfment). Schur explains that "[a] major aspect of role engulfment ...is
the difficulty that the deviating individual experiences in trying to alter his situation, or to
reduce the 'engulfment[.]'" Id at 73.
278. See JEANNE BOYDSTON, HOME AND WORK: HOUSEWORK, WAGES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF LABOR IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, at xviii (1990) ("[Conceptions of gender] shape
our perception of what constitutes work, of who is working, and of the value of that labor.")
(footnote omitted).
279. On the history of American women's unpaid domestic labor, see id.; WENDY
KAMINER, WOMEN VOLUNTEERING: THE PLEASURE, PAIN, AND POLITICS OF UNPAID

WORK FROM 1830 TO THE PRESENT (1984); Nona Y. Glazer, Servants to Capital: Unpaid
Domestic Laborand Paid Work 16(1) REv. RADICAL POL.ECON. 61 (1984); Susan T. Reisine

& Judith Fifield, Defining Disability for Women and the Problem of Unpaid Work 12
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 401 (1988).
280. See FAMILIES AND WORK (Naomi Gerstel & Harriet Engel Gross eds., 1987); Donna
Hodgkins Berardo et al., A Residue of Tradition: Jobs, Careers,and Spouses' Time in Housework, 49 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 381, 388 (1987); Jonathan Gershuny & John P. Robinson,
Historical Changes in the Household Division of Labor, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 537 (1988); Nona Y.
Glazer, Paidand Unpaid Work- Contradictionsin American Women's Lives Today, in WOMEN
IN THE WORKPLACE: EFFECTS ON FAMILIES 169-86 (Kathryn M. Borman et al. eds., 1984);
see also SHEILA LEWENHAK, THE REVALUATION OF WOMEN'S WORK 18 (1988) ("The exclusion of unpaid work from the definition of work eventually occurred with the separation of
home and family from the market.").
281. Cf Piven, supra note 11, at 269 ("[Women] valued the family, they celebrated maternity and the nurturing services they provided their children and their men, and they honored
the family bonds that seemed to guarantee them and their children a measure of security in
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tic labor. 283 At her hearings, she testified: "I've always maintained my
home. ' 28 4 She also stated: "I would like to go back to [part-time]
work.1 2 5 Asked why she had not attempted to return to work, Mrs. Hill
answered: "Just couldn't because I'm more weaker and I see more
28 6
fatigue."
A second excluded narrative concerned Mrs. Hill's attempt to maintain her independence and self-sufficiency. This is the narrative of independence. It asserts her willingness to engage in independent, self-reliant
living. She testified: "I straightenn" the house.28 7 Additionally, she
stated: "Sometimes I wash dishes. Sometimes I will try to cook.

' 28 8

A third excluded narrative pertained to Mrs. Hill's functional capacity. This is the narrative of mental and physical competence. The
narrative declares Mrs. Hill's modest ability to care for her own daily
needs. 2 89 In testimony, Mrs. Hill asserted a daily functional capacity to
stand "an hour or two,'

290

to sit "about two hours," 291 to "lift 5

pounds, ' 292 and to walk "about five blocks" (with periodic stops along
the way to rest).2 93 She described frequently traveling to her "sister's
house" on foot and by taxi. 294 En route, she commented: "I may pick
' 295
up one or two things [shopping], but nothing heavy.
exchange for their services."); Nancy Folbre, The Unproductive Housewife: Her Evolution in
Nineteenth-CenturyEconomic Thought, 16 SIGNs 463, 465 (1991) ("Ihe moral elevation of
the home was accompanied by the economic devaluation of the work performed there.").
282. See Piven, supra note 11, at 270 ("[W]omen also developed a traditional moral economy, a moral economy of domesticity, reflecting both their universal life tasks of motherhood
... and their more particular experience within a Western patriarchal family that made them
dependent on male wages.").
283. See Becker, supra note 137, at 281 ("Social Security, as currently structured, is incapable of giving women credit for both wage employment and domestic production and
reproduction.").
284. Record, supra note 218, at 50.
285. Idm at 52.
286. Id. at 74.
287. Id. at 50.
288. Id. at 51.
289. Cf M. Brinton Lykes, The CaringSef." Social Experiences of Power and Powerlessness, in

WHO CARES?:

THEORY, RESEARCH, AND EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE

ETHIC OF CARE, supra note 114, at 165, 173 (illustrating how women's traditional tasks may
be reconstructed as instruments of female power).
290. Record, supra note 218, at 47.
291. I
292. Id. at 48.
293. Mrs. Hill estimated that a five block walk required "[a]bout 45 minutes," adding that
she had "to stop and rest sometimes." Id. at 45.
294. Mrs. Hill testified that she did not travel by subway "too often" because the stairs
proved "too much" for her. Id. at 52.
295. Id. at 50.
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A fourth excluded narrative struck upon Mrs. Hill's economic vulnerability. 296 This is the narrative of vulnerability. It articulates Mrs.
Hill's need for the economic subsidy afforded by widow disability benefits, 29 7 but decries the implication of dependency. 298 As before, the distinction to be made here turns on the demeaning status customarily
associated with the notion of dependence. Like many disabled widows,
Mrs. Hill acknowledged her economic need and vulnerability. This acknowledgment, however, is not tantamount to an admission of dependence. The narrative of vulnerability spoke of her reliance on public

assistance for income and other resources. 299 It did not speak of a
broader state-affiliated reliance based on helplessness.
A fifth excluded narrative referred to Mrs. Hill's connection to her
family,3 00 especially her twenty-seven-year-old daughter and eight-yearold granddaughter with whom she lived. 30 1 This is the narrative of solidarity.30 2 Mrs. Hill testified that her daughter assumed the responsibili296. On the economic sources of widows' vulnerability, see LOPATA, WOMEN AS WIDOWS, supra note 144, at 336 ("Social Security cannot replace a man's earnings[.]"); ON THEIR
OWN: WIDOWS AND WIDOWHOOD IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 1848-1939, supra note
52, at 301, 303 (underscoring the "critical importance of a woman's economic situation in
determining her experience of widowhood."); Donald J. Treiman, The Work Histories of Women and Men: What We Know and What We Need to Find Out, in GENDER AND THE LIFE
COURSE, supra note 11, at 213, 229 ("[lIt is evident that most women experience little upward
mobility over the course of their careers, and that upward mobility prospects are particularly
poor for married women with children.").
297. See HAVEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 179 ("DI and SSI have become important
potential sources of aid to those most vulnerable to economic downturns--older workers, the
impaired, the unskilled.").
298. See Piven, supra note 11, at 277-78 ("T]he [income maintenance and insurance] programs that make women a little less insecure also make them a little less powerless. The availability of benefits and services reduces the dependence of younger women with children on male
breadwinners, as it reduces the dependence of older women on adult children.").
299. Record, supra note 218, at 35.
300. See Mitchell Rosenthal, Psychosocial Evaluation of Physically Disabled Persons, in
PSYCHOSOCIAL INTERVENTIONS WITH PHYSICALLY DISABLED PERSONS, supra note 5, at 43,

46 ("Disability has a significant impact upon family members, who can greatly influence the
rehabilitation process.").
301. Record, supra note 218, at 33; see also LOPATA, WOMEN AS WIDOWS, supra note
144, at 177-203 (documenting the contribution of children to the widowed mother's support
systems); Elizabeth Mutran, IntergenerationalFamily Support Among Blacks and Whites Response to Culture or to SocioeconomicDifferences, in FAMILY ISSUES IN CURRENT GERONTOL-

ocy, supra note 114, at 189, 201 ("Black families do appear to be more involved in exchanges
of help across generations.").
302.

Cf INDEPENDENT AGING, supra note 6, at xiii ("Autonomy and a connectedness or

sense of belonging to a social group, such as the family, comprise a major proportion of wellbeing as perceived by the elderly."); Eugene, supra note 114, at 57 ("A primary moral value of
black people is articulated in the overarching and enduring black feminist position: solidarity
among black women and black men is essential for survival.").
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ties of household shopping, cleaning, and cooking. 30 3 Moreover, Mrs.
Hill's sister testified that she accompanied Mrs. Hill shopping as well as
3 °4
to movies and plays.
From a traditional advocacy standpoint, Mrs. Hill's five silenced

narratives appear inconsequential, except insofar as they amply demonstrate the functional severity of her physical impairments. 30 5 In this respect, they supply material corroboration of her claim of entitlement to
widows' disability benefits. 30 6 This view, however, underestimates the
significance of Mrs. Hill's narratives. Under a transformative strategy,

the narratives provide the groundwork for an alternative vision of client
autonomy and community. To surface, that vision must be rescued from

the traditional strategy of client victimization.
Proposing to build a transformative strategy on the foundation of
client narrative doubtless invites objection. 30 7 Disability lawyers may object, for example, that narratives present only partial recitations of a
fuller, perhaps inaccessible, client story. Hence, they may discount the
narratives as misleading. Moreover, lawyers may argue that client narra30 8
tives are often contradictory and therefore unreliable.
Even when client narratives seem accurate, coherent, and whole,
disability lawyers may object that a narrative-based advocacy strategy is
303. Record, supra note 218, at 50; see also QURESHI & WALKER, supra note 34, at 175
("[T]o depend on others for help with some of the routine activities of daily living is experienced as a loss of independence by elderly women, but much less so by elderly men."); Carla
Masciocchi et al., Supportfor the Impaired Elderly: A Challenge for Family Care-Givers,in
INDEPENDENT AGING, supra note 6, at 115, 117 ("The family is the primary and largest unit

of service for the impaired aged[.]").
304. Record, supra note 218, at 65; see also Stanford & Lockery, supra note 114, at 171
("The [black] family has not only depended upon the nuclear group for services, but it has
looked toward the community-at-large as a part of that support network.").
305. The experience of functional severity is reinforced by victimization strategies.
Salilios-Rothschild remarks:
[T]he disabled is made to feel that his efforts to localize the handicapping effects of
his disability, to make maximum use of his capacities, and to avoid self-devaluation
are futile, since the majority of the nondisabled will not easily permit him such a
"localization" and will tend to see him through the effect of psychological "spread."
SAFLIOs-RoTHSCHILD, supra note 40, at 123 (footnote omitted).

306. That material showing, however, is irreversible. See id. at 71 ("[T]he label of disability ... carries the connotation of permanency and irreversibility regardless of the degree of
severity of the condition.").
307. See Kathryn Abrams, Lawyers andSocial Change Lawbreaking: ConfrontingA PluralBar, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 753, 782 (1991) (questioning "what it means to embrace a critical
client perspective and how it should be expressed in practice.").
308. Cf SAFILIos-RoTHSCHILD, supranote 40, at 262 ("[A]t the end of [workers' compensation] procedures, the disabled person may be thoroughly confused and uncertain about what
he can do and what he cannot do, who he is, and what his prospects for the future are, and
may finally become-unnecessarily-a true invalid, psychologically and physically.").
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too costly. They may insist that the uncertain process of culling out suppressed narratives requires an overinvestment of lawyer time,30 9 and thus

results in an inefficient allocation of scarce organizational resources to
equally, if not more, deserving client communities. Further, they may
observe that the narrative-oriented slowing of the disability determination process may provoke administrative intransigence and conflict.
They also may note that the delays 3 10 caused by institutional intransigence and the antagonism 3 11 aroused by lawyer-state conflicts may prove
detrimental to the client.

Additionally, disability lawyers may contend that overreliance on
narratives may divert the lawyer from her primary task of marshaling
"relevant" evidence in support of the client's widow disability claim,

thereby compromising the client's main objective. Notwithstanding lawyer speculation regarding cost-efficient resource allocation, institutional
delay, or retaliation, this last objection highlights the double bind imposed by a narrative-based advocacy strategy.
Indeed, if the lawyer pursues a narrative advocacy strategy, she not
only risks misallocating the community delivery of legal services and in-

curring the retaliatory ire of state administrators and adjudicators, she
also risks losing the case. At the same time, if the lawyer fails to conduct
a narrative advocacy strategy, she risks reverting to a victimization strat309. The plain response to this argument is to reduce the demands on lawyer time through
institutional restructuring of client participation opportunities. Cf Sussman, supra note 1, at
254 ("Since bureaucracies do not tend to be patient, and by nature focus on efficiency, it is
essential to confront directly the problem of building organizational patience into the structural apparatus."); Lawrence E. Schlesinger, StaffAuthority and PatientParticipationin Rehabilitation, in SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF DISABILITY, supra note 1, at 167, 170

("When time pressures are reduced, patient participation can be increased.").
310. Delays may occur at the levels of hearing, appeal, and payment. See John H. Hasen,
Delay in the Social Security Appeals Process: The Potentialfor Individual Litigation After
Heckler v. Day, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 523 (1986); Sherry Leiwant, Delays in Social Security and SSI HearingsAre the Worst in a Decade 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 539 (1987); Shu

Fan Lee, Note, Administrative Delays Involving Social Security Disability Claims: Heckler v.
Day Revisited, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 191 (1988); Andrew Lloyd Merritt, Note, JudicialResolution of
Systemic Delays in SocialSecurity Hearings,79 COLUM. L. REV. 959 (1979); Angela J. Paolini,
Note, Administrative Law-Supreme Court Defers to CongressionalIntent in Social Security
DisabilityBenefit Delays, 60 TUL. L. REV. 205 (1985).
311. See COFER, supra note 177, at 40-41; JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BUREAUCRACY 27-28 (1986); JOEL F. HANDLER, PROTECTING THE SOCIAL SERVICE CLIENT: LEGAL AND STRUCTURAL CONTROLS ON OFFICIAL

DISCRETION 50 (1979); Helen Bolderson, DisabilityBenefits and AdministrativeLaw Judges in
the United States ofAmerica, 1985 J. SOC. WELFARE L. 96, 98-101; Joel F. Handler, Continuing Relationships and the Administrative Process: Social Welfare, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 687;
Michael Lipsky, BureaucraticDisentitlementin Social Welfare Programs,58 Soc. SERV. REV.
3 (1984); William H. Simon, The Rule of Law and the Two Realms of Welfare Administration,
56 BROOK. L. REV. 777 (1990).
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egy predicated on client silencing and rationalized on the grounds of
widow dependence, incompetence, and deviance.
Erecting a strategy on these grounds falsifies the social world.
Moreover, it denigrates the ideals and discourses of disabled widows.
Further, it deprives disabled widows of the opportunity to determine
how they will be represented in public. This cumulative disparagement
weakens the integrity of the diverse disabled widow community, impairing its willingness and ability to organize and mobilize politically.
For many disability lawyers, the resolution of this double bind is
found in the award of widow disability benefits. For them, the material
outcome itself provides sufficient resolution. Together with a growing
number of teachers, scholars, and advocates studying the theoretics of
practice, I find no satisfactory resolution in material outcomes. My own
dissatisfaction is fed by anecdotal and empirical evidence of growing client dissatisfaction with conventional advocacy practices, material benefits notwithstanding.3 12 But neither am I confident in expounding
alternative resolutions, however appealing. Instead, like many, I offer
tentative observations and proposals in the hope of contributing to a
daily process of continuing investigation and contingent resolution.
Oppositional narratives are contingent forms of client discourse that
contest the absolute interpretive structures and routines of traditional
lawyer advocacy. Because of the hazards of overt discursive contest, the
narratives are often veiled. Even the opaque rhetoric of widows' narra312. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Casper et al., ProceduralJustice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 483, 503 (1988) ("[P]rocedural and distributive justice play a role in litigant satisfaction even when the stakes are quite high."); James L. Gibson, InstitutionalLegitimacy,
ProceduralJustice, and Compliancewith Supreme CourtDecisions: A Question of Causality, 25
LAW & Soc'y REv. 631, 634 (1991) ("Procedural perceptions may matter in specific concrete
contexts, even when they do not in more abstract and diffuse contexts."); William M. O'Barr &
John M. Conley, Lay Expectations of the Civil JusticeSystem, 22 LAW & Soc'y REv. 137, 159
(1988) ("[P]rocess is at least as important in the minds of litigants as the substantive issues in
their cases."); William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 661, 699 (1985) (speculating
that litigant "expressive satisfaction" with informal dispute resolution procedures may substitute for rights enforcement); Tom R. Tyler, A PsychologicalPerspective on the Settlement of
Mass Tort Claims, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 203-04 (Autumn 1990) (finding mass
tort litigants primarily concerned with procedural issues, such as the opportunity to express
their views to third parties); Tom R. Tyler, "hat Is ProceduralJustice?: Criteria Used by
Citizens to Assess the Fairnessof Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 103, 128 (1983)
("[Those affected by the decisions of third parties in both formal and informal settings react to
the procedural justice of the decisionmaking process at least as much, and often more, than
they react to the decision itself."); Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, ProceduralJustice,
InstitutionalLegitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A
Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW & Soc'y REv. 621, 626 (1991) ("[P]rocedural justice strongly influences institutional legitimacy and, through it, the acceptance of institutional decisions.").
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tives offers alternative versions of the sociolegal meaning of disability.
Their descriptions and explanations disclose an experience of disability
characterized by struggles to maintain independence, 3 13 competence, and
solidarity. This traditionally unheard version adds contextual thickness
to client-lawyer discourse.
Recognizing the contingency of sociolegal description undermines
natural and necessitarian defenses of dominant disability advocacy ideals
and practices. The disintegration of these long held justifications results
from the assertion of enabling ideals contained in oppositional widows'
narratives. Suppressed by traditional discourse, these counterideals exemplify the values of autonomy 314 and community. 3 15 The emergence of
openly competing values leads to a contest of disability ideals aligning
3 16
benevolence and discipline against autonomy and community.
The outcome of this contest is determined in the discursive settings
of disability advocacy. The form and content of that discourse coincides
with the constituent elements of client-lawyer narratives. Narratives depicting disabled widows as independent and competent are traditionally
excluded from this discourse, whereas narratives portraying disabled
widows as dependent and incompetent are usually encoded in the discourse. Structure- and context-transforming practices seek to integrate
excluded narratives into the discursive practices of traditional advocacy.
313.

Cf

DISABLED

FRANK BOWE, REHABILITATING AMERICA: TOWARD INDEPENDENCE FOR
AND ELDERLY PEOPLE 133 (1980) [hereinafter BOWE, REHABILITATING

AMERICA] ("People with disabilities and senior citizens are also persons with abilities.");
WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 8 ("[A] 'disabled person' is also an able person.") (emphasis in

original).
314. But cf Cass Sunstein, Routine and Revolution, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 869, 892 (1987)

(" 'Context smashing' and 'self-assertion' are not intrinsic goods; their desirability depends on
a substantive conception distinguishing between contexts that promote autonomy, welfare, or
virtue and those that do not."); H. Jefferson Powell, The Gospel,4ccordingto Roberto: A Theological Polemic, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1019-22 (rejecting Unger's vision of individual emanci-

pation through redemptive self-assertion).
315. For commentary on the difficulty of deciding group membership and perceiving
group norms, see Aviam Soifer, On Being Overly Discrete andInsular: Involuntary Groupsand

the .4nglo-American Judicial Tradition, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 381, 406-08 (1991); Carol
Weisbrod, Groups in Perspectives, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 437, 440-42 (1991).

316. Unger argues for a conception of community that permits "heightened mutual vulnerability" and the "partial reconciliation of self-affirmation and attachment." UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 19, at 44; see also Drucilla Cornell, Beyond Tragedy and

Complacency, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 693, 696-98 (1987) ("In order to achieve reciprocity, the
individual's striving must culminate in the recognition of her own fundamental intercon-

nectedness with others.").
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B. Structure-Transforming Practices
Structure-transforming practices interfere with the cycles of lawyer
reversion responsible for reproducing the formative ideals of benevolence
and discipline, as well as the formed discourses of client dependence, incompetence, and deviance. They are variable, open-ended practices subject to ongoing review. 3 17 Although innovative, they carry forward the
traces of benevolence and discipline.
The partial repetition of formative ideals through structure-transforming practices is unavoidable. The formative influence of existing
ideal structures continues even during transformative breaks. These
structures are too implanted to be dislodged fully or permanently. As
practices evolve, some of the traces may be abandoned, others modified.
The remnants that persist generate profound ideological conflicts over
the primacy of benevolence and discipline. The conflicts resist easy containment. Notwithstanding lawyer sentiment, it is mistaken to expect a
divisive transformative practice to preserve a mythical harmony of disability advocacy ideals and routines. The roiling of contested ideals and
discourses cannot be disguised by false sentiment.
Yet, this sentiment fuels two of the principal objections to structuretransforming practices. The first objection denounces client-lawyer ideological conflict as unproductive. This objection perceives any divergence
from benevolent and disciplinary ideals as inefficient, and therefore, irrational. Unsurprisingly, lawyer task-definition and client task-execution
are the measures of efficiency. These measures, of course, reflect the tenacity of reversionist tendencies rather than the patience of revisionist
challenges.
A second objection condemns conflict for fear that unchecked ideological clashes will eradicate client-lawyer as well as lawyer-community
trust. This fear compounds two points of lawyer apprehension:
politicization and populism. Lawyer qualms about politicization emanate from the worry that ideological battles will abrade lawyers' standing
as neutral craftsmen. Lawyer consternation regarding populism arises
from skepticism of popular, community-based movements and a preference for elite, vanguard leadership.
The consolidation of these objections amounts to an authoritative
defense of the ideals of benevolence and discipline. That defense reimposes the social hierarchy of lawyer dominance and client dependence as
317. See UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 6, at 166 ("In the most general terms, the
less entrenched or naturalized a set of arrangements becomes, the more the activity of reproducing these arrangements resembles the practice of subjecting them to permanent review and
occasional transformation.").
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a necessary corrective to prevent conflict.318 The quick resort to benevolence and discipline as a practical necessity demonstrates the prevailing
influence of formative ideals and formed routines, as well as the deepseated fear of ideological conflict. 3 19 Halting the reversion cycle of benevolence and discipline requires the redefinition of client-lawyer
roles. 320
(1) Role Redefinition
Like any revisable sociolegal contexts, the contexts of disability advocacy-interviewing, investigation, counseling, negotiation, hearings,
and litigation-furnish interior spaces for ideological and discursive contest. Certain of these spaces are susceptible to lawyer-client role redefinition.3 2 1 That susceptibility indicates a plasticity of institutionalized

roles.3 22 This plasticity is not unlimited. 323 The constraints of structurepreserving ideals circumscribe the institutional space available for defini324
tional experimentation. Nonetheless, such experimentation is viable.

318.

For criticism of necessitarian interpretations of historical situations, see UNGER,

FALSE NECESSITY,

supra note 6, at 215.

319. Ideals and practices furnish the resources employed in client-lawyer contest. Schur
mentions the decisive relevance of such resources in shaping the outcomes of client-lawyer
interactions. He states:
[I]n relations between actual or suspected deviators and agents of social controlparticularly in the latter's efforts to attach negative labels to the former, in both
informal and formal interaction-the parties' stocks of relevant resources and their
relative capacities to wield or resist power are clearly important in shaping outcomes.

supra note 10, at 66.
320. See FRANK BOWE,

SCHUR,

HANDICAPPING AMERICA: BARRIERS TO DISABLED PEOPLE

131-32 (1978) (describing role reversal simulation and training).

321. See Martin L. Hoffman, The Development of Empathy, in

ALTRUISM AND HELPING

41, 46-47 (J. Philippe Rushton & Richard M. Sorrentino eds., 1981) (defining role-taking as the most developmentally advanced mode of empathic arousal). In role-taking, "the person imagines how he or
she would feel if in the other's place." Id. at 47.
322. To Unger, plasticity is an institutional quality favorable to change. See UNGER,
PLASTICITY INTO POWER, supra note 19, at 153. He assesses the plasticity of social life according to "the relative ease with which people can subject their forms of production and
exchange, of machine design and work organization, to the logic of problem solving." Id. at
210, 210-14; see also Helena Znaniecka Lopata, Role Changes in Widowhood: A World Perspective, in AGING AND MODERNIZATION 275-303 (Donald 0. Cowgill & Lowell D. Holmes
eds., 1972) (analyzing the role shifts in the lives of widows).
323. See, e.g., Yuen, supra note 75, at 577 (noting the "rigid and ritualized patterns" of
lawyer and client roles).
324. See WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 342 ("Role playing is a widely accepted approach for
effecting change both in behavior and attitudes."); see, e.g., Alice Schlegel, Hopi Family Structure and the Experience of Widowhood, in ON THEIR OWN: WIDOWS AND WIDOWHOOD IN
THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 1848-1939, supra note 52, at 42, 44 ("Hopi terms [for widow or
widower] are descriptive and do not place the individual into a socially distinct category with
markedly different role expectations and behavior patterns.").
BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL, PERSONALITY, AND DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES
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The very act of definitional experimentation constitutes a rejection
of dependent client roles and an affirmation of independent client capabilities, 32 5 especially the capacity for self-help. 326 The accumulation of
role experiments gradually precipitates a lawyer reversion crisis. The crisis is marked by the lawyer's inability to revert to a traditionally benevolent and disciplinary role.327
(2) Reversion Crisis

At bottom, the crisis of reversion is lawyer induced. It is a crisis
propelled by self-subversion.3 2 8 To spark its onset, the lawyer must
continually experiment with alternative roles. The relative plasticity of
disability advocacy contexts facilitates self-subverting role experimenta-

tion. 329 The roles of interviewer, investigator, counselor, negotiator, and
advocate all supply lawyer role subverting opportunities. 330

Tailoring specific acts of self-subversion to the changing contexts of
disability advocacy hinges on definitional tactics. To be sure, formative
325. See UNGER, PLASTICITY INTO POWER, supra note 19, at 12 ("[E]xperiments encourage the individual to treat his settled character as the incomplete and corrigible expression
of a self.").
326. Elizabeth Midlarsky extends the concept of self-help to others. She asserts:
it is quite likely that especially for persons such as the elderly, the handicapped, and
other members of "recipient groups," should the opportunity be provided for them to
be effective helpers, then this strategy may enhance mental health and generally lead
to positive psychosocial outcomes as well as benefits for society.
Elizabeth Midlarsky, Competence and Helping: Notes Toward a Model, in DEVELOPMENT
AND MAINTENANCE OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supranote 70, at 291, 305. Cf Roberts, supra
note 37, at 240 ("The peer counseling model should get wider currency since people with
disabilities are demonstrably more effective in counseling each other.").
327. Cf Dennis Krebs & Cristine Russell, Role-Taking and Altruism: When You Put
Yourself in the Shoes ofAnother, Will They Take You to their Owner'sAid?, in ALTRUISM AND
HELPING BEHAVIOR, supra note 321, at 137, 161 (contending that "role-taking is an information-gathering process that is not in itself intrinsically altruistic, but that the cognitive states it
produces and the moral reasoning it mediates may give rise to altruistic motivation").
328. Cf Frances M. Slaney, Psychoanalysisand Cycles of "Subversion" in Modern Art and
Anthropology, 14 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 213, 231 (1989) (cautioning that "the modernist intensification of representing the Western self was based upon the absorption of 'exotica' from others") (emphasis in original).
329. See EISENBERG, supra note 38, at 102 (subdividing role-taking into three types of
perspective-taking: perceptual, cognitive, and affective). Two of these types are germane to
client-lawyer relations: the cognitive and the affective. Eisenberg defines cognitive perspective-taking as "the ability to predict and understand another's thoughts, motives, intentions,
and behaviors." Id. She defines affective perspective-taking as "the ability to infer another's
feelings and emotional reactions." Id. (citations omitted).
330. See Ervin Staub, Promoting Positive Behavior in Schools, in Other EducationalSettings, and in the Home, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR, supra note 321, at 109, 122
("Because it is enactive, what is done in the course of role playing appears to function-and to
be experienced by people-as similar to the actual performance of behavior.").
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ideals and formed routines are the preponderant influences on the definition of the disability lawyer's role. These influences, however, cannot
quiet contest over the substance of that definition. Definitional tactics
are a device to counter and dilute such influences. Two role subverting
definitional tactics are crucial to lawyer self-subversion: denaturalization33 t and personalization. Denaturalization tactics call for the lawyer
to renounce her professional claims of insight concerning client capabilities and, to a lesser extent, juridical-legislative, administrative, and judi332
cial-conduct.
The natural and necessitarian pretenses enclosing these claims shield
lawyer judgments of client dependence, incompetence, and deviance, as
well as predictions of juridical behavior, thus securing the formative ideals of benevolence and discipline against attack. 333 Consequently, however false her judgments of client character or inaccurate her predictions
of juridical action, the lawyer's claim of insight is trusted and thereby
defended.3 3 4 Denaturalization subverts the lawyer's character judgments
and institutional predictions by repudiating the pivotal claim of insight.
Personalization tactics build on the results of denaturalization. After the lawyer's professional claims of insight are self-impeached, the secondary tactics of personalization attempt to return the power of making
judgments and predictions to the client. 335 These tactics will flounder if
not joined with the counter ideals and discourses of disabled widows.
The ideals of autonomy and community and the narratives of independence, competence, vulnerability, and solidarity enable disabled widows

to assert the power to make judgments in their private lives. Personalization tactics harness that power and extend it to the public world. Due to
the corrosive traces of benevolent and disciplinary ideals in the public
331. Unger notes two different approaches to the denaturalization of social life. The first
involves the "emancipation of [collective] experiences of practical or passionate connection
from the constraints of an entrenched scheme of social division and hierarchy." UNGER,
FALSE NEcEssrry, supra note 6, at 125. The second entails the "effacement of the contrast
between fighting within a structure of social life and fighting about such a structure." IL at
126.
332. See, e.g., Paul R. Harrison, Power, Culture and the Interpretation of Democracy, 11
PRAXIS INT'L 340, 345 (1991) ("Foucault accords to humans the capacity to consciously 'put
into question' the meanings they have attached to the world. They are no longer merely
thought of as the effects of rules or of power.").
333. See WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 422 ("The helping relationship itself tends to reinforce
the attitude that the expert has the answers, or at least should have the answers.").
334. See, eg., Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Robert G. Meadow, ResourceAllocation in Legal
Services, 5 LAW & PoL'Y Q. 237, 243 (1983) ("[Ihe legal services client must trust the lawyer
to know what is wrong as well as what to do about it.").
335. Cf Safilios-Rothschild, supra note 35, at 50-51 (maintaining that actual control of the
rehabilitation decisionmaking process by the disabled involves a significant shift of power).
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discourse of disability advocacy, only a partial restoration of such power
is plausible. Even a partial reinstatement of discursive power may relativize the formative images of widow dependence, incompetence, and deviance, and thus convince advocates of the contingency of those images'
base. 336 By reacquiring the discursive power to declare her own insights

in public, the disabled widow personalizes her role, 337 infusing it with the
33 8
values of independence and competence.

C. Context-Transforming Practices
Context-transforming practices undertake to reorganize the clientlawyer relations of traditional disability advocacy by reintegrating the
339
private productive capabilities of disabled clients into public settings.
Client productive capabilities consist of two main properties: independence and competence. The best means of reintegrating and safeguard34°
ing those properties is to encourage their exercise.
Reorganizing disability practice relations to encourage the exercise
of client independence and competence is hampered by reversion cycles
to benevolence and discipline. Such cycles impede experimentation with
alternative relational arrangements. 34 1 This impediment flows out of the
336. Cf Schlesinger, supra note 309, at 169 ("[W]e are suggesting bringing the patient in
the authority process and reducing the discrepancy between his power and that of the [hospital] staff.").
337. Cf Safilios-Rothschild, supra note 35, at 51 ("There is... considerable evidence that
whenever disabled persons have a say in, or even better, determine their own rehabilitation
goals and plans, they are highly motivated and reach the peak of their potential.") (citation
omitted).
338. In this way, disability lawyers may secure two perspectives of disability. Cf Jeanne
L. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: FeministMethodologies and the Logic of Imagination, 70 TEx. L. REv. 109, 206 (1991) ("Seeing two perspectives of the same thing may be
more adequate than seeing only one perspective.").
339. Unger contends that empowerment calls for the development of practical productive
capabilities and the diminution of dependence and depersonalization. See UNGER, FALSE NECESSrITY, supra note 6, at 210.
340. Cf BOWE, REHABILITATING AMERICA, supra note 313, at 5 ("Disabled people are
more able than they are disabled; the difference between those who become self-sufficient and
those who do not is less a function of the severity of the disability than it is a reflection of the
power and timeliness of the rehabilitation intervention."); JAMES W. MCDANIEL, PHYSICAL
DISABILITY AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 158 (1969) (endorsing restoration of client responsibility
and decision-making participation in rehabilitation programs); Rosenthal, supra note 300, at
43 ("[Rehabilitation] goals are complementary and often identical: to assist the physically
disabled individual and family regain as much independence as possible in order to achieve a
high quality of life, regardless of the specific nature of physical impairments that accompany a
given disability.").
341. Cf. Schlesinger, supra note 309, at 169 ("[I]f the staff has the strengths to leave certain areas of decisionmaking open and not to rush in to fill the power gap, patients will eventually increase their participation.") (citation omitted).
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relations of benevolence and discipline, especially the exclusion of clients
from participation in practice routines involving the definition and execu342
tion of advocacy tasks.
The self-subverting tactics of denaturalization and personalization
are inadequate guarantees of client participation in essential practice routines. Although such tactics may trigger a reversion crisis, they fail to
ensure that clients enter into participatory routines of independent task
definition and execution. This irresolution invites the creation of transitional forms to reorganize provisional client-lawyer relations and divisions of labor.
The risk in creating short-term, transitional forms of client-lawyer
organization is that such makeshift schemes may acquire longer life.
This unanticipated effect narrows the prospects of relational reorganization. Absent the assurance of a sequential progression from transitional
to permanent forms of reorganization, disability lawyers employing
transformative practices must resist the temptation to adhere to particular forms based solely on the short-term results of advocacy. Additionally, they must withstand the tendency to opt for interim stability in
favor of the fluctuations of renewal.
Reservations about the uncertainty and tumult of constant renewal
suggest the need to reorganize client-lawyer relations in a manner that
preserves the material interests of disabled clients, but continuously revises lawyer practices. 343 The tactics available to accommodate these
and the
competing imperatives conjoin the lawyer's technical knowledge344
client's practical capabilities to fashion a collaborative relation.
(1) Relational Reorganization
Reorganizing the traditional client-lawyer relations and task divisions of disability advocacy to redistribute decisionmaking power is a
342. Cf id at 169 ("One method of making the patient more active, more productive, and
more involved in the rehabilitation process is to increase his participation in the decisionmaking system.").
343. For Unger, each new occasion for revision reveals both new ambiguities and new
requirements for change. See UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 6, at 452.
344. Appraising the vanguardist style of military warfare, Unger endorses the "development of revisable operating procedures, sustained by a hierarchy that combines, at every level,
supervision and coordination from above with initiative and discretion from below." UNGER,
PLASTIcrrY INTO POWER, supra note 19, at 159. Whether this endorsement dictates a specific
collaborative arrangement is unclear. At a minimum, Unger's vanguardist model implies a
form of mutual compensation. Cf INDEPENDENT AGING, supra note 6, at xiii ("[W]hen independence is limited because of health, economic status, social situation, mental functioning,
and the like, compensation to offset such liabilities is feasible.").
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fundamental transformative practice. 345 Collaborative reorganization injects flexibility into the formed routines of practice. The introduction of
more flexible practice routines softens the rigid distinction between law346
yer task-making and client task-executing.
Collaboration tactics 347 attempt to loosen, rather than abolish, client-lawyer divisions of labor. 348 The tactics permit the increased exercise
of disabled widows' productive capabilities and the preservation of their
material welfare. 34 9 Contextual instability 350 heightens the tension already surrounding the concurrent enlargement of client capabilities and
the safekeeping of client welfare. This tension will not be resolved by the
lawyer's application of technical expertise or the client's vindication of
disability rights.35 1 Resolution depends on the recognition of client-law345. Commenting on a like transformation in the rehabilitation context, Constantina
Safilios-Rothschild states:
The main issue pointed out by the disabled and by some rehabilitation practitioners is
the need to diminish the social distance between experts and nonexperts and thereby
to decrease the degree of control exerted by the former over the latter. The existing
social distance is legitimized by a model specifying that the expert has all the pertinent and valid information while the nonexpert has none. Hence, the decision of th
expert can be legitimately imposed upon the nonexpert client without any challenge
or scrutiny on the part of the client and his significant others.
Safilios-Rothschild, supra note 35, at 47 (citation omitted).
346. On the fixity of this distinction, see UNGER, PLASTICITY INTo POWER, supra note 19,
at 187.
347. Unger employs the comparable notion of "tactical partnership." UNGER, FALSE NEcnssrry, supra note 6, at 426. He argues that tactical partnerships include alliances of coordinate and inferior groups against common superiors. Id.; ef WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 417-41
(advocating a specialist-client relationship based on the principles of active client participation
and comanagement).
348. The social distance established by divisions of labor cannot be fully overcome, but it
may be diminished. Citing the rehabilitation context, Safilios-Rothschild remarks:
In order to diminish the social distance between expert and nonexpert, the [rehabilitation] model must be changed to assume only a difference of degree and type of
knowledge between expert and nonexpert. Thus, the nonexperts would be legitimized to contribute their knowledge of their own idiosyncratic reactions, preferences,
and choices as supplementary to the scientific expertise.
Saflilios-Rothschild, supra note 35, at 47.
349. Cf WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 309 ("[Tlransforming the helping relationship from a
one-sided affair to a relationship of interdependenceprovides a basis for reducing inferiority,
strengthening responsibility, and achieving a healthy balance between needs for dependency
and independence.") (emphasis in original).
350. Unger equates instability with "a heightening of the intensity and a broadening of the
scope of conflict over the uses of governmental policy," understanding it "as a resurgent threat
to the individual's most vital interests in material security and welfare." UNGER, FALSE NEcEssrrY, supra note 6, at 464.
351. Unger's claim that welfare rights enable the individual to accept destabilizing conflicts "without feeling they jeopardize his basic safety," UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note
6, at 469, both overestimates the immunizing power of rights and underestimates the retributory power of the state actors, such as administrators and adjudicators. For criticism of Un-
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yer collaborative tension as an opportunity to adjust fixed relations and
352
divisions of labor.
The opportunity to reorganize the rudimentary tasks of the client-

lawyer relation arises throughout disability advocacy. In fact, reorganizational opportunities are abundant, abiding in the client-lawyer relations
involved in, for example, interviewing, investigation, counseling, planning, and hearing examination. Dispersed among a succession of advocacy tasks, this transformative opportunity is attended by client-lawyer
and client-state conflicts. The motivation behind such conflicts is the impounding of discursive authority: the power to declare formative ideals.
In effect, these conflicts are the transaction costs of relational reorganization. To minimize such reorganization costs, lawyers must devise con353
flict containment and conversion tactics.
Containment tactics explicate the conflicts internal to the routines of
disability advocacy by exposing their benevolent and disciplinary basis. 3 54 Traced back to their formative ideals, the conflicts reveal the assumptions of client dependence, incompetence, and deviance. 355
Pinpointing these assumptions as the source of client-lawyer and clientstate conflicts illuminates the natural and necessitarian character of dominant practice routines and relations. This contextual insight does not,
however, emancipate clients from context-preserving practice routines.
The purpose of containment tactics is to illuminate, rather than convert,

conflict situations.
Conversion tactics exploit client-lawyer and client-state conflicts to
expand client productive capabilities. 35 6 Such tactics start from the point
ger's concept of immunity rights, see Horst Eidenmuller, Unger'sSystem of Rights: Part2, 10
LAW & PHIL. 119, 140-42 (1991).
352. The mental patients' rights movement illustrates the partial reorganization of advocacy relations and tasks. See, eg., Brown, The Rights of Mental Patients,supra note 211, at
56-57 ("Clients receiving medical and psychiatric care have become more aware of professional failures and abuses, as well as their own abilities to seek redress, restructure care-giving,
and provide self-care."); Phil Brown, The Mental Patients' Rights Movement and Mental
Health Institutional Change, 11 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVS. 523 (1981) (discussing the changes
in mental health care due to liberation movement and patients' rights litigation).
353. The discursive tactics of containment and conversion exert alternately confining and
liberating effects. See James Gray Pope, The Past ofLaborLaw-And Its Future, 39 UCLA L.
REv. 481, 496 (1991) (book review) ("[L]egal discourse can be either limiting or liberating
depending upon its specific content.").
354. On the containment of social conflict, see UNGER, PLASTIcrrY INTO POWER,supra
note 19, at 169.
355. Cf Roberts, supra note 37, at 243 ("Assumptions that disability necessarily means
dependence, nonproductivity, and powerlessness have to be rooted out.").
356. Cf Marlene Ross et al., Community-Based ResidentialServices For Mental Health
Clients, 3 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 150, 150 (1979) (arguing for the development of program models that maximize "individual client growth and the development of individualized
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of conflict, assaying its dimensions and refining the issues in controversy.
A recurrent example concerns the disability lawyer or adjudicator's refusal to allow a disabled widow to speak freely either independent of or
in response to questions. In both client-lawyer and client-state contexts,
such conflicts subsume contests over the primacy of ideals and discourses. To penetrate this internal contest, conversion tactics investigate
the external signs of conflict: images, language, gestures. These signs
pervade the offices and hearing rooms of disability lawyers and adjudicators. Although equivocal and frequently enigmatic, the signs nonetheless
betray the wavering hierarchy of dominant-subordinate relations. Having uncovered evidence of relational hierarchy, conversion tactics seek to
upend it. In the example given above, one tactic would be to encourage
the client to speak in a rambling fashion without lawyer intrusion or,
alternatively, to invite the client to present her own opening statement or
conduct portions of direct and cross examinations. In sum, conversion
tactics are a means of publicly exposing, naming, and reordering
hierarchy.
Participating in practical situations of conflict allows clients to locate and revise the counterproductive restrictions of formed routines and
relations. Revision converts these restrictions into broader normative
controversies. 357 In this sense, conversion is a maneuver to amplify the
meaning of client-lawyer and client-state conflicts.
(2) Redivisions of Labor
The double exercise 35 s of containment and conversion tactics to elucidate and seize conflicts as a means of reorganizing client-lawyer relations threatens the formative compromise of traditional practice routines.
That compromise concerns the definition and execution of tasks. Under
its overarching terms, the lawyer commands the prerogatives of professervice plans to assist and teach clients to live as normal a life as possible in the mainstream of
the community[,]" and that recognize each person's capacity "to learn, grow and develop, no
matter how severely disabled") (emphasis in original).
357. See, ag., Piven, supra note 11, at 271 ("[C]aretaking values sometimes armed women
to challenge or defy the dominant values of the public world, and particularly the values of the
market[.]").
358. Unger refers to the "double exercise" of reason and labor in imaginative effort. See
UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 6, at 146. But he cautions: "The double exercise is

fully successful only when it does more than execute the task, solve the problem, or analyze the
perception: it generates a changed task, problem, or image--one that lends itself to further
practical or conceptual work." Id.
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sionalism, claiming the insight and competence to define tasks for client
35 9
execution.
The organization of disability advocacy relations according to
spheres of lawyer task definition and client task execution reifies traditional ideals of benevolence and discipline. 36° Unger mentions two variants of task definition and execution available in organizational settings.
The rigid variant sharply restricts the kinds of activities assigned and the
categories of people eligible. The flexible variant loosens those restrictions, departing from social hierarchy and affording the opportunity to
experiment with alternative arrangements of task definition and execution. According to Unger, effacing the contrast between the conceptual
labor of definers and the executions of operators "disturbs" the commitments of social compromise. Those commitments constrict the recombination of traditional client-lawyer roles and the substitution of
transformed relations. 361 Construing client-lawyer and client-state conflicts as transformative opportunities relaxes ideological strictures,
362
denaturalizing existing relations even as they are reproduced.
The denaturalization of traditional client-lawyer relations disturbs
ensconced divisions of labor. The keynote of this division is the separation of lawyer task-defining and client task-executing activities. 363 Reorganizing the division of lawyer-client tasks is a contingent process. There
is a wide range of task-defining and task-executing combinations and sequences available. Two obvious examples drawn from widows' disability
advocacy regard the conduct of investigations and hearings. The tasks of
defining and executing the investigation of employers, doctors, and witnesses or the planning of opening and closing statements, direct and cross
examinations, and objections are all susceptible to revision in multiple
combinations and sequences. The great variety of alternative stratagems
available recommends a series of provisional modes of organization en64
compassing small adjustments as well as large shifts.3
359. For a discussion of professionalism and claims of specialized knowledge, see UNGER,
FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 6, at 148.
360. See id at 146.
361. On the constraints of formative contexts limiting internal recombination and substitution, see id. at 166.
362. See id ("The extent to which arrangements are disentrenched-that is, available for
effective challenge-influences the character of the activities that reproduce them.").
363. For a discussion of task-defining and task-executing activities in economic production
and warfare, see UNGER, PLASTICITY INTO POWER, supra note 19, at 158-59; cf. MenkelMeadow & Meadow, supra note 334, at 252 (data "suggest[ing] very strong support for professional rather than client dominance of legal services attorney resource decisions").
364. See UNGER, PLASTICITY INTO POWER, supra note 19, at 192 (stressing the invention
of "structures that make structures easier to change").
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Task Definition

Redistributing the power and expanding the sphere of task definition
is a precondition for the provisional reorganization of traditional client-

lawyer relations. This expansion contemplates the inclusion of disabled
widows as task definers, rather than rote task followers. 365 That inclusion cabins the role of disability lawyers to more confined, technical fumctions where specialized knowledge is indispensable. Functional lawyer
confinement offers clients greater room to exercise independence and
competence. This exercise generates alternative ideals and practices of
advocacy. Self-help and mutual aid ideals and practices are already being actualized in community networks established by widows. 366 The accommodation required to reconcile autonomy and community in
367
sustaining these networks is within the social power of widows.

b. Task Execution
The ideals and practices conceived by disabled widows engaged in
independent task definition are neither comprehensive nor permanent.
Indeed, they are endlessly revisable. The potential for revision is mani365. Cf NODDINGS, supra note 15, at 73 ("The cared-for plays a vital role in the caring
relation.").
366. See LUCIA H. BEQUAERT, SINGLE WOMEN ALONE & TOGETHER 49-50 (1976)
(describing the Widow-to-Widow Project); ScoTr CAMPBELL, WIDOWER 5 (1987) (Widowto-Widow Program "outreach would come from another widow, from a woman who had successfully accommodated her own loss and wanted to help others"); HELPING EACH OTHER IN
WIDOWHOOD 1-72 (Phyllis R. Silverman et al. eds., 1974) (background and organization of
the Widow-to-Widow program); ALFRED ALLAN LEWIS & BARRIE BERNS, THREE OUT OF

FOUR WIVES 157-66 (1975) (discussing widow consciousness-raising groups); LOPATA, WoMEN AS WIDOWS, supra note 144, at 385 ("The ideal solution to the multiple problems of the
different types of widows would be the creation of neighborhood networks in congested cities
and community networks in smaller locations."); PHYLLIS R. SILVERMAN, WIDOW-ToWIDOW 196 (1986) ("A mutual-help model may be particularly suitable for meeting women's
needs, since it is at base a relational model and usually offers further learning and growth
opportunities through the medium of 'linking relationships.' "); WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 25
("Self-help groups, where they exist, can provide the support that comes from sharing mutual
problems and taking steps to overcome them; they can foster the pride that comes with appreciation of one's own dignity and worth.") (citations omitted); Helena Znaniecka Lopata, Midowhood: World Perspectives on Support Systems, in WIDOWS: THE MIDDLE EAST, ASIA, AND
THE PACIFIC, supra note 74, at 1, 7 ("Service supports can be supplied to widows informally
through an exchange system with people other than members of the household."). Cf HELENA ZNANIECKA LOPATA, WIDOWHOOD IN AN AMERICAN CITY 237 (1973) ("The Porgy
and Bess image of the black woman immersed in frequent and mutually beneficial interaction
with neighbors is not representative of the black Chicago area widow.").
367. Cf EDWARD L. DECI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 218 (1980)

("Organizations that encourage self-determination will also encourage some accommodation."); Lykes, supra note 289, at 175 ("An analysis of the social character of the diversity of
women's lives expands the range of behaviors that constitute 'ethical action' and demonstrates
the complexity of women's social location.").
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fested daily in routine task execution. The advocacy routines of benevolence and discipline enforce the execution of tasks through a "context'3 68
transcending norm of rationality.
It is misguided to attribute client acceptance of this norm to unvarnished lawyer power. The rationality of benevolence and discipline is the
ingrained product of context-preserving routines evinced in interviewing,
counseling, and litigation. The routines follow a sequence of discursive
moves denominating when and where the client may speak, and what she
may say. The localized effects of the moves are reflected in client task
execution. Perhaps the most telling example of client task execution is
silence.
The benevolent and disciplinary assignment of task-executing duties
to disabled widows stabilizes the practice routines of disability advocacy. 369 The routines are steadied by the repeated reenactment of task
execution. When execution is disrupted, the interruption is recast as a
structure-respecting dispute. 370 That construction is intelligible as a defensive reaction intended to control client-lawyer and client-state conflict. Insulation from conflict, however, is never full. Like other
stabilizing forces, control generates destabilizing opportunities. 37 1 These
opportunities arise out of resistance to control itself, for power and resistance are interdependent.
The false assurance of benevolent and disciplinary control is the residue of the lawyer's projection of dependent, incompetent, and deviant
client images. 372 The ambiguity of these images lends uncertainty to
their application in the multiple practice settings of disability law. 373 The
368. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 6, at 249.
369. Cf QURESHI & WALKER, supra note 34, at 70 (noting proclivity of professional staff
to "underestimate the capacity of [disabled] residents to look after themselves and manage
their own affairs," and to "adopt summary judgments about residents' abilities or mental states
or limit freedom in order to maintain an orderly regime and thereby increase the level of
dependency experienced by elderly people in their care") (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted).
370. In structure-respecting disputes, the client departs from the script of her assigned
role, but does not deviate from the role itself. Hence, the reproduction of the institutionalized
social relations of the lawyer and client through the practical and conceptual activities of advocacy continues uninterrupted. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 6, at 247.
371. Id. at 272 (positing the nexus between stabilizing force and destabilizing
opportunities).
372. See EISENBERG, supranote 38, at 108 ("[T]he effect of attributions regarding controllability and behavior is largely mediated by the actor's affective response to the personal attributions he or she makes."). Controllability includes internal (ability) and external
(environmental) factors of dependency. See Meyer & Mulherin, supra note 38.
373. On the concealed ambiguities of ideal images, see UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra
note 6, at 272.
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unsettling of practice routines ensues from client-lawyer disagreements
regarding the content of the task to be executed 374 and the form of task
375
execution.
Quarrels over the form and content of client tasks confirm the tensions inherent in disability advocacy. The benevolent and disciplinary
practice routines used to defuse those tensions and reinstate traditional
divisions of labor render the contexts of advocacy disabling. 376 Furthermore, these formed routines produce the very tactics that may destabilize
and transform those contexts. 377 Led by the subordinate ideals of auton-

omy and community, 378 such tactics affirm practical visions of client in379
dependence, competence, vulnerability, and solidarity.

Conclusion
Before hailing the transition from victimization to enabling strate-

gies of widows' disability advocacy, it is appropriate to entertain two
closing objections. Chief among these objections is the instrumental argument that victimization advocacy strategies work. The outcome of the

Hill litigation strongly supports this argument.
In Hill, widows' disability lawyers formulated an advocacy strategy
conforming to the ideals and practices of benevolence and discipline in
order to alleviate administratively decreed silencing in the disability determination process. Because a federal court shared the same ideals, the
strategy prevailed. Indeed, the court certified the Hill plaintiff class, invalidated two administrative regulations, awarded relief to the named
374. Unger characterizes such disagreements as "horizontal conflicts" over social ideals
and their range of practical application. For Unger, these "border disputes" push "familiar
ideals onto slightly unfamiliar social territory." IM at 273.
375. Unger refers to disagreements over the appropriate form of social practices as "vertical" conflicts. The conflicts may arise from discrepancies in the practical realization of ideals
or from aspirations to higher ideals. See id. at 274.
376. Unger points out the "paradox of contextuality: our need to settle down to a particular context and our inability to accept any context in particular as fully satisfactory." Id at
342.
377. Id. at 277. Unger explains that stabilizing devices present opportunities as well as
constraints. Id.
378. The contest of normative values within disability advocacy limits the full embrace of
autonomy and community ideals. Professing a minimalist version of these ideals on feasibility
grounds, however, merely perpetuates the dominant ideals of benevolence and discipline. It is
perhaps better, therefore, to promote alternative ideals unambiguously in alternative practice
routines.
379. See UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 6, at 367 ("Our inherited practices of
internal argument (in legal doctrine, moral casuistry, and partisan debate) must incorporate
more of the characteristics we traditionally attribute to visionary thought.").
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plaintiff and a plaintiff-intervenor, and remanded class member claims
38 0
for remedial administrative proceedings.
Measured by any standard of instrumental litigation, these results

should be applauded. Simultaneously, it must be acknowledged that the
results fall short of the goals of alleviating administrative silencing, realizing autonomy, rebuilding community, and mobilizing political
power. 381 At best, the Hill litigation moderated the administrative regulations and policies that overtly silence widow disability claimants.

While moderation increases the likelihood that widow claimants will obtain disability benefits, it also instigates more covert administrative acts
3 82
of silencing.
The foreseeability of covert institutional silencing is attributable to
the formative ideals of state benevolence and discipline. Victimization
strategies leave both ideals in place. Central to their operation are the
ideal images of widow dependence, incompetence, and deviance. Blurred
by the periodic intervention of lawyers and federal courts, these images
remain nonetheless formative. Their influence continues to subordinate
3 83
the alternative ideals and practices of autonomy and community.
That continued subordination suppresses the counterimages of client independence, competence, vulnerability, and solidarity.
The subordination of alternative ideals and practices and the sup-

pression of counterimages are consistent with the victimization strategy
of disability advocacy. This structure- and context-preserving strategy

raises a second objection, one based on the formalist argument that vic380. See Hill v. Sullivan, 125 F.R.D. 86, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). At the time of this writing,
the district court had not yet ordered an award of attorneys' fees to the Hill litigation team.
Telephone Interview with Matthew Diller, Staff Attorney, Civil Appeals & Law Reform Unit,
The Legal Aid Society, New York (Oct. 24, 1991).
381. But cf Joel B. Grossman & Austin Sarat, Access to Justice and the Limits of Law, 3
LAW & POL'Y Q. 125, 137 (1981) ("Securing access to justice means, at a minimum, recognition for the legitimacy-if not the validity-of one's grievances and aspirations.").
382. This possibility challenges the traditional resort to federal court intervention in technical matters of bureaucratic administration and adjudication. Nonetheless, federal court intervention continues to receive widespread backing. Robert Cover explicated the logic of
intervention when he wrote:

[C]lassificatory differences relating to widows and widowers or to legitimate and illegitimate children do present problems of justice that should be decided not as technical matters of pension law but as part of a broad conception of the salience of gender
and legitimacy; that is, they should be decided by courts, not by administrative law
judges or the secretary's delegates.
Cover, supra note 64, at 86.
383. For a discussion of citizen participation as an exercise of autonomy and community
in administrative contexts, see Robert E. Rosen, Participation,Due Process, and Responsive
Administration: Handler's The Conditions of Discretion, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 323 (1989)
(book review).
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timization strategies function in accord with appropriate client-lawyer
hierarchical practices. Lawyers defend these context-preserving practices on natural and necessitarian grounds. They contend that the traditional definition of client-lawyer roles and the organization of their
relations in terms of strict divisions of labor-namely, lawyer task definition and client task execution-correspond to the natural abilities and
disabilities of lawyers and clients, and are thus necessary to the basic
enterprise of representative advocacy.
Instrumentalists argue that the enterprise of disability advocacy requires the rational exercise of technical and organizational sdlls, and the
efficient coordination of labor and institutional resources. To the extent
this is true, instrumentalist arguments may be defensible. But when
those arguments overlook the contingencies and costs of instrumentalism
to justify a permanent strategy of victimization, they warrant rejection.
Like the unqualified version of instrumentalism, formalist arguments justify a victimization strategy on practical grounds. But unlike
instrumentalism, formalism deduces that justification from a fixed set of
ideals that directs immutable client-lawyer roles and relations. To formalists, the roles and relations are given, rather than contingent. Practice routines that fail to conform to such given roles and relations are
unnatural. In this way, formalism converts the necessitarian justification
of victimization into a natural justification. Under formalism, victimization strategies of advocacy are inherently practical.
Under the formalist view, there is no purpose to structure- or context-transforming practices, no need to change the disabling quality of
widows' disability advocacy. Hence, collaboratively revising practice
routines to allow disabled widows to assert enabling narratives is not simply impractical, it is futile.
To disclaim the futility of transformative practices without evidence
of productive experiments would be facile. Yet, it is equally facile to
ignore the intermediate forms of ideology and practice currently generat-
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ing alternative varieties of advocacy.38 4 Although fragmentary, these inchoate forms anticipate the broader possibility of transformative projects.
That is the visionary impulse and trajectory of a theoretics of practice.

384. See, eg., Gerald L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of
a Rebellious Collaboration,77 GEo. L.J. 1603 (1989); Lucie White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Spacefor Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
535 (1987-88).

